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A B S T R AC T
Mark J.V. Olson
Robotic Surgery, Human Fallibility, and the Politics of Care
(Under the direction of Della Pollock)
“Robotic Surgery, Human Fallibility, and the Politics of Care” leverages the methods and 
theoretical paradigms of performance, visual, and new media studies to explore the 
contradictions, aspirations, and failures of modern technologized medicine.  In particular, I 
consider the use of robots in the operating rooms of a large research hospital.  “University 
Hospital” illuminates a contemporary articulation of human bodies and robotic technology that 
focuses and amplifies existing and emergent tensions and contradictions in modern medicine’s 
investment in providing both care and cure.  Intuitive Surgical, Inc.’s da Vinci Surgical System 
provides a “platform” for this exploration, both as a concrete, material, and particular 
assemblage of hardware, software and human wetware, and as a technology that offers a 
specific and perhaps more productive vantage point—a modest step stool—for understanding 
the contemporary politics of surgical pedagogy and practice.  I locate the dVSS in a broader 
context of ambivalence that surgeons experience with regard to the manual practices of their 
craft, an ambivalence amplified by the increasing sophistication and automation of surgical tools 
and the changing ontologies of surgical practice.  The surgical interface of the dVSS prosthetically 
enhances—as well as displaces and replaces—embodied surgical skill.  At a time when all facets 
of medical care grapple with the problem of medical error, I outline an emergent sensibility of 
machinic virtuosity, articulated to both human and robotic surgical practice alike, geared toward 
addressing and overcoming the perceived pitfalls of human fallibility.  Rather than simply 
enacting a technological dehumanization of medicine, robotic surgery suggests a more 
complicated terrain where the nature of the human and the machine bleed into each other.  
What I term the “becoming machine” of the surgeon and the “becoming surgeon” of the 
medical device occurs on the cutting edge of the robot-surgeon interface.  The implications of 
this emergent medical sensibility are far from clear or unilateral.  In closing, I reflect on the 
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uncertain impact of the ideal of machinic virtuosity on the politics of care.  This reflection 
considers software and machine ethics alongside medicine’s aspiration to manage contingency 
according to the “procedurality” of medical and surgical protocols.
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—  1  —
I N T R O D U C T I O N
It is often said that contemporary US medical care is increasingly technologized.  Indeed,  
the everyday practice of  Western medicine immediately brings to mind an array of 
technologies and technological devices, from the ubiquitous digital thermometer to the most 
sophisticated high definition magnetic resonance imaging system.  This has not always been the 
case.1   As medical historian Stanley Reiser points out, medicine in the 17th and 18th centuries 
was characterized by an anti-technological ethos, “deeply held convictions that encountering 
patients with technology was inappropriate -- that tools were reserved for action in the 
common trades and the specialities of medicine of lower station such as surgery.  The physician 
was to observe and question patients to gain diagnostic knowledge, not to poke and probe 
their bodies.” (1993:  262-263).  In this medical epistemology, a patient’s self-narration of her or 
his corporeal experience was the key medical evidence, to be modestly supplemented by the 
doctor’s own sense data (precisely modest, as social norms demanded that examination be 
conducted at a polite distance from the patient).
Physicians of the early nineteenth century, eager to shore up their professional authority, 
granted less and less authority to patient narratives, however.  Coupled with the rise of the 
clinic and the growing emphasis on physical examination as a source of diagnostic evidence, 
Victorian doctors came to value the information their own senses provided over the stories 
told by their patients.  As Reiser points out, “the result was a diminution in the doctor's 
attention to the subjective, experience-centred account of illness by the patient, and turning to 
the evidence of illness the doctor could acquire directly through the senses” (1993:  264).  
Physicians of this era articulated their concern about the value of patient narrative in terms of 
1 Astute scholars of media technology might argue, rightly, that medicine has always been technologized, so to say 
that medicine is increasingly technologized, a statement of quantity, should instead be recast in terms of quality.  In 
other words, it would be more precise to say that the specificity of medicine-specific technics has changed, but not 
the fundamental technicity of medicine.  I will return to consider this argument later in relation to a discussion on 
the technicity of care.
an emergent scientific emphasis on the value of objectivity in producing truth.   In this 
epistemology, diagnostic evidence required detached observation and empirical verifiability.  
Moreover, diagnosis in this moment valued -- and indeed required -- the autopsis of the 
autonomous expert, the physician seeing for himself, rather than the physician reliant upon the 
“reportorial skill, memory and veracity of patients”, (Reiser, 1993:  264).   In other words, the 
expertise and authority of the physician was cultivated through a sensibility of autonomy from 
the patient.  The net effect of this emergent epistemology was to render a patient’s narrative 
suspect in its subjectivity, unreliable and subject to distortions of overemphasis and omission.  
This emphasis on skilled autoptic observation by the physician aligns with the mid-19th 
century development of technologies designed to augment, enhance and refine the physician’s 
sensory powers.  Sterne (2003) offers the the stethoscope as a paradigmatic example, a 
technology that both augmented the aural capabilities of the physician and displaced his ear 
from direct contact with the patient’s body.  The virtue of the stethoscope was that it amplified 
and differentiated sound in a manner superior to “immediate ausculation” allowing the ear of 
the physician to develop a virtuosity of diagnostic discernment, reading the subtleties of the 
body’s sounds.  Ironically, then, the movement away from dependence on a patient’s narrative 
gives way to a new and relatively uncritical dependence upon technology as sensory 
prostheses.   Seeing or perceiving for oneself in this moment becomes intimately linked to 
seeing or perceiving through a technological device.   Yet, the autoptic epistemology of early 
modern medicine comes up against tensions in its increasing reliance on the technical.  How 
autonomous is the privileged “self ” when the seeing for oneself that undergirds the importance 
of the physical examination acquires a dependence on technical mediation? 
Certainly, this blurring of the self-other distinction in the doctor-stethoscope articulation 
yielded a certain epistemological uncertainty, but Reiser and Sterne offer different, but mutually 
constitutive views on how this uncertainty was stabilized.  For Sterne (2003), a new 
understanding of perception emerged alongside the rise of the stethoscope, one that 
emphasized the autonomy of each of the senses and made them pliable and amenable to 
techniques and technologies that further isolated and optimized their operation.  Sterne 
articulates the logic by which the technical supplementation of human audition, far from 
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destabilizing the evidentiary status of data collected by the ear-stethoscope apparatus, instead 
buttressed it.  He writes:
A simple instrument marks and helps solidify a whole medical epistemology of 
mediation . . . In order to get the truest possible sense data (reception), for the 
doctor to really listen, hearing must be separated from the other senses.  Once 
so separated, hearing can be supplemented by techniques and technologies 
especially designed for it.  As the ear comes to be conceived as a technology, an 
apparatus to register a piece of the vibrating world inside doctors’ heads, the 
ear becomes particularly amenable to other technologies.  (Sterne, 2003:  
110-111).
In sum, the technically-assisted isolation and intensification of the ear-as-technology enabled it 
to register truth free from a certain kind of bias, the aberrant noise of other sense modalities 
that impinge upon “true listening.”  In a complementary fashion, Reiser (1993) outlines how the 
perceived autonomy and non-human nature of the technological device instead stabilized 
diagnostic evidence.  Non-subjects, technological devices came to be seen as objective.  
Machine-produced and, crucially, self-registering, the data produced by these devices was seen 
as uninfluenced by human concerns, human fallibility, or human fatigue (Reiser, 1993:  266).  The 
self-registering technological device thereby supplemented, displaced (and some would argue 
replaced) the physician’s own unaided sensory apparatus as the ground of diagnostic evidence.  
In place of the hand as a temperature sensor, the thermometer yields an information equivalent 
in terms of a numerical representation.  The doctor’s “new” technologies generate copious 
volumes of information about the body’s current state of health with a precision unheard of in 
the past.  No one would dispute, for example, that the latest MRI systems produce in vivo 
anatomical images of the human body with a contrast, clarity and accuracy that far exceeds that 
of earlier techniques.2   In the biomedical model, the overriding goal of medical care is cure, 
3
2 Of course, even the best diagnostic technologies carry with them a certain degree of epistemological uncertainty 
about whether they in fact reveal what they purport to reveal.  X-rays, CT scans and MR images draw their 
evidentiary status based upon the logic of photographic truth, an epistemological grounding that persists despite 
the fact that the materiality medical images register is of a much more convoluted nature than the trace of light 
rays bouncing off the surface of an object in the photographic image.   MR images, for example, are visual models, 
visualizations, constructed by graphically re-presenting numerical data that registers the differential radio-frequency 
gradients of energy released by the body’s hydrogen protons when subjected to strong magnetic fields.  MR 
images are indexical signs, yes, but of an entirely different order than the photographic.  Even more striking, 
perhaps, is how epistemologies of photographic truth persist in the medical imaging realm, a domain where 
algorithmic digital image manipulation is the norm.  See Cohn (2007) for insights on the “play” involved in 
manipulating a medical image to reveal what radiologists and physicians want to be able to see.
which today means access to the best technologies, whether they are diagnostic, interventional 
or therapeutic.
Technology rests uneasily in relation to our concepts of “good medical care.”   What 
constitutes good medical care?  Is it access to the best technologies, be they diagnostic, 
interventional, or therapeutic?  In other words, is care synonymous with the pursuit of cure, no 
matter the cost?  Different domains of medicine yield different answers.  The overriding goal of 
the biomedical model is cure.  This is particularly true in surgical medicine, where getting the 
best care is often seen as simply a function of the technical competence of the surgeon 
(dexterity, judgement) and access to the best facilities, technologies and techniques.  Surgeons 
are stereotypically infamous for their lack of care, of bedside manner, often forgiven by the 
patient who jokes “I don’t care if my surgeon’s an asshole, as long as he can cut straight!”  
Palliative medicine, on the other hand, suggests that in the absence of the possibility of cure, 
medical care involves a much more holistic caring-for the patient, as well as for his or her family.  
Indeed, palliative care is associated with the withdrawal of the techniques and technologies of 
treatment or cure, and the amplifying of the care of the body, mind and spirit with the goal of 
relieving suffering, improving quality of life (often at life’s end), and reinforcing affective and 
relational ties.   Clearly these latter concepts of care exist in a relation of exteriority, and often 
outright opposition to the technical.
Scene
On the last day of my observations in the operating rooms of University Hospital, Glenn, 
the third year Urology resident, claps me on the back as I tie my surgical mask.  “We’re going to 
be kickin’ it old skool today!” he exclaims.  We push through the heavy door and enter OR 8, its 
usual buzz of activity and amiable banter heightened several octaves by the anticipation of a 
rather challenging case.  “We’ll be doing a radical nephrectomy for a big, nasty cancer,” Dr. 
Sierra, the attending surgeon, had explained to me earlier in the day.  “You should stick around 
for the case.  It’s going to be open, not like the robotic prostates you’ve been observing us do 
every week.  They’ve become pretty routine.  But we just don’t see cancer like this every day.”  
Unlike the majority of cases conducted by University Hospital’s urological surgical service, this 
would not be “keyhole” surgery.  “Keyhole surgery” gets its name from the five or six half-inch 
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incisions made in the patients abdomen, just wide enough to allow the insertion of an 
endoscope, long slender laparoscopic surgical tools and similarly engineered teleoperative 
robotic instruments into the patient’s otherwise closed abdominal cavity.  This open 
nephrectomy procedure, however, required a large 10-inch incision, large enough for the 
surgeons to get their hands—sometimes three or four hands—inside the patient to remove 
safely a kidney entirely engulfed in cancer.  For residents trained extensively on laparoscopic and 
robotic surgical techniques, the chance to ratchet up the learning curve on traditional open 
surgical techniques—“kickin’ it old skool”—was, ironically, a relative novelty.
 The patient, identified on a whiteboard propped against the wall by name (“Carlos 
Santiago”), age (“59”), weight (“78kg”), drug allergies (“N/A”) and procedure (“Left Rad Nx”), 
was already under anesthesia.  (“Induction” is the medical term, as if it were an honor to be 
there on the table, on par with joining a learned society.)  One member of the anesthesia team 
puts in a central line, spattering a bit of blood on her gloves in the process.  Micah, promoted to 
chief resident just the day before, stands over in the corner in front of the PACS system.3  As 
the circulating nurse clicks through the patient’s CT images, Micah whistles.  “Come here, guys.  
You’ve gotta see this.”  He gestures toward the LCD screen as Glenn and I draw closer, making 
room for the 4th year medical student who had also scrubbed in as part of his surgical 
rotation.    “See that?  The tumor spreads over the midline.  It’s even pressing against his aorta.”  
“Yeah,” we all respond, even I.  Months of observing pedagogical practices in the OR have 
rubbed off in unanticipated ways, leaving me with a reasonable level of confidence that I 
recognize what I see on the screen.    
“This could be a bloody case.  The tumor’s so vascular.  Good thing they embolized it 
earlier.”  Glenn turns to the medical student and explains that with tumors like these, they try 
to cut off its blood supply prior to the surgery by a catheter-delivered injection of alcohol 
U.S.P., an attempt to “dry it out a bit.”
5
3 PACS is an acronym for Picture Archiving and Communication System, which stores and manages all the 
diagnostic imaging records for University Hospital.  Any scan (CT, X-Ray, MRI) can be called up by a patient’s 
medical record number.  See Saunders (2006) for a consideration of the impact of PACS on visual apprenticeship 
in the radiological CT suite.
We turn to the patient, now fully anesthetized.  The residents and medical student move to 
the patient’s side.  I take up my usual position above the patient’s left shoulder, near the suction 
canisters that will collect any blood lost during the procedure.  Since the canisters tend to be a 
bit too visceral (literally!) for my taste, I edge as close as I can into the anesthesiologist’s domain 
at the patient’s head, careful not to get in the way.  But soon I have to move as an endoscopic 
echocardiogram and a medical device called a “BRAT” are wheeled into the OR.  I have no idea 
what the BRAT either is or does, but I make a note to ask at a less chaotic time.  I step out in 
the hall and pause for a moment on my way to the door that enters on the opposite side of 
OR 8.  In my observation notebook I scribble “Verging on chaos in here.  2 residents, 1 
attending, 1 med student, 3 from anesthesiology, 3 nurses (scrub, circulating, student) + 1 BRAT 
(?) technician.  + Me.”  That’s a lot of people to cram into a small operating room.
I reenter the OR and stand now above the patient’s right shoulder, out of anesthesia’s way 
but with a view partially obstructed by the IV hanger.  Glenn, joking about no longer being at 
the bottom of the “surgical food chain”, gives the medical student “the opportunity” to 
catheterize the patient.  He supervises the medical student’s clumsy attempts at inserting a 
catheter and then swabs the patient’s abdomen with betadine.  Together, they position the 
sterile drapes.  All that remains visible of the patient is the sterile field.  Blue drapes frame a 
rectangle that extends from the pubic symphysis of the patient’s pelvis to just above the 
xiphoid process of his sternum.  
Glenn casually runs his double-gloved hand over the word “YES,” written in large bold black 
letters on the left side of the patient’s abdomen, a not-so-subtle reminder that it’s the left 
kidney, and not the right, that is the focus of today’s operation.  The chief resident steps in with 
a black sterile marker.  He traces an inverted “V” just below the patient’s ribline, its apex just a 
few finger widths below the patient’s xiphoid process.  “What’s this incision called?” Dr. Sierra, 
the attending surgeon, pimps the medical student.4  “A bilateral subcostal incision, or chevron,” 
the medical student answers quickly, with only a slight upward inflection of voice betraying his 
outward confidence.
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4 “Pimping” is slang in medical school contexts for situations in which a senior physician, usually the attending, 
spontaneously and thoroughly quizzes a medical student on the particularities of a procedure, drug interaction, 
anatomical structure or other element of medical practice.
“Excuse me, but where are you gonna be!?” the circulating nurse suddenly bellows in 
my ear.  The surgical field may be the attending surgeon’s domain, but the rest of the OR is 
hers.  “Out of your way, that’s for sure,” I counter, blushing a bit behind my mask.  I step out of 
the way and quickly scan the room for another location to observe the surgery.  Unlike a 
robotic procedure, where a video endoscope transmits the surgeon’s privileged viewpoint to 
three LCD screens in the OR, this open procedure offers no televisual immediacy, no tele-
presence.  Seeing something is going to require being somewhere where I can see.  I circle a 
wide berth around the scrub nurse’s sterile instrument trays and stand between the patient’s 
feet and the da Vinci surgical robot, which, not needed for this procedure, is pushed up against 
the wall as far as it will go.  I know I’m still standing in the circulating nurse’s path, but by 
stepping up on the robot’s stabilizing base, I can both allow her to pass without interference 
and gain a better vantage point on the surgery.  “Should I be standing on this?” I wonder, but no 
one seems to notice that I’m using the $1.2 million Da Vinci® Surgical System as a stepstool.
“Alright, people.  Can we do a time out?  People?  Listen up!  Let’s do a time out.”  The 
circulating nurse waits for everyone to give her his or her attention.  “Alright.  This patient is 
Carlos Santiago, a male with no known allergies.  The scheduled procedure is a left radical 
nephrectomy.  Does everyone agree?”  “Yes,” the OR team responds in unision.   Dr. Sierra 
directs, “Let’s get started, then.”  He stands on the patient’s left side, with Glenn and the medical 
student lined up along the patient’s flank beside him.  Micah and Anissa, the scrub nurse, stand 
on the other side of the patient.  Dr. Sierra holds out his hand and without a word, Anissa 
places the scalpel in his palm.  “Care to do the honors?” Dr. Sierra queries the medical student.  
Glenn and the medical student switch places.  Carefully taking the scalpel in hand, the medical 
student moves the blade toward the black line he’s supposed to incise.  “Smooth and 
deliberate” advises Dr. Sierra.  
“Incision at 14:05.” 
*  *  *  *
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This dissertation is a cultural study of robot-assisted surgical technologies, an emergent 
apparatus of “minimally invasive” surgical techniques being woven into the fabric of everyday 
life--at least the everyday life of the surgical suites of major medical institutions across the 
country, including University Hospital, where I observed.  Such techniques have become the 
standard of care for many surgical procedures and, with the FDA approval in 2000 of Intuitive 
Surgical’s robot-assisted da Vinci® Surgical System (dVSS), they are increasingly performed via 
televisual and telehaptic robotic mediation.  Intuitive Surgical, Inc. is the industry leader in 
robotic surgical systems, reporting as of December 31, 2008 an installed base of 1,111 da 
Vinci® Surgical Systems:  825 in the United States, 194 in Europe, and 92 in the rest of the 
world (Canada, China, India, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, Australia, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Puerto Rico and Russia).5  
Hackensack University Medical Center is the single institution with the highest number of 
systems (5), and over 110 hospitals own more than one system.    Since its first FDA approval, 
Intuitive Surgical has garnered FDA clearance for the use of its products in laparoscopy, 
thoracoscopy, prostatectomy, cardiotomy, urology, gynecology, pediatric and revascularization 
Photo courtesy of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2009
8
5 Figures from Intuitive Surgical’s Q1 2009 Investor Presentation.
procedures.  The company estimates that over 136,000 da Vinci-assisted surgical procedures 
were performed in 2008, an increase of approximately 60% from 2007.6 
The increasing ubiquity of these techniques has led some surgeons to declare an emergent 
“paradigm shift” in surgical practice:
Substantial improvements in the art and science of surgery were made over the 
150 years since the introduction of antiseptic techniques by Lister, including 
improved anesthetic agents, antibiotics, surgical nutrition, and organ 
transplantation, in which the basic tools and techniques remained basically 
unchanged. The core task of “surgery,” that is, “cutting and sewing,” with hand 
instruments and direct visualization of and contact with the organ or tissue has 
remained the same. However, during the last quarter of the 20th century, and 
especially during the last decade, there has been a paradigm shift in the 
methods for performance of surgery. (Mack, 2001:  568)
It is, perhaps, at best too early (and at worst, futile) to “diagnose the new” as indicative of a 
fundamental paradigm shift in medicine.7  And yet I will argue that, as the scene I have 
recounted above suggests, these emerging technologies do transform specific relations in the 
context of surgical intervention.  Specifically, they reconfigure the relationship of bodies to 
machines, images, and particular formations of medical knowledge, as well as to other bodies.  
The da Vinci Surgical System will serve as a concrete site for interrogating these new modes of 
surgical practice.  At issue are complex technical mediations of vision and touch, which have 
been aggregated into procedures and protocols of control, cutting, manipulation, dissection and 
suturing.  
In particular, I focus on the everyday practice of using Intuitive Surgical’s dVSS for conducting 
and teaching robot-assisted urologic and gyn-oncologic surgery at a major U.S. teaching hospital 
(“University Hospital”).  It is my contention that the introduction of robots into surgical practice 
exacerbates existing tensions within the surgical profession, such as the surgeon’s ambivalent 
relation to the manual aspects of surgical craft, the increasing strictures on the surgeon’s 
professional autonomy in an era of managed care and corporate medicine, and the 
9
6 Of these 136,000 procedures, over 72,000 were da Vinci® prostatectomy procedures (approximately 50%).  
Intuitive Surgical expects that the prostatectomies to continue to be a product driver, but expect prostatectomies 
to be a decreasing percentage of the array of robotic procedures as the dVSS repertoire expands.  da Vinci® 
hysterectomies, for example, more than doubled from 2007 to 2008, to approximately 33,000 annual procedures.
7 Modernity certainly has a pernicious ability to incorporate and appropriate the new into its logic and structure.
displacement of the surgeon’s expertise, authority and judgment in the face of proliferating loci 
of medical knowledge production and exchange.  Here I am thinking particularly of the array of 
web-based corporate, educational and “patient-driven” social networking websites available to 
patients and their families.  Furthermore, surgical robots are emerging at a cultural moment 
when the problem of medical error is receiving significant professional and public scrutiny.  In a 
context increasingly geared toward addressing the problem of error, the promise of robots (in 
the cultural imaginary, at least) to transcend the limitations of the human articulates, inflects and 
amplifies attempts to manage contingency and risk by technical means.  “To err is human,” after 
all.  As I will argue, the dVSS participates in an emergent socio-technical apparatus of discipline 
and control in the practice and pedagogy of surgical medicine.  
Throughout the project, I maintain a dual sense of the practice of medicine as both a 
performative-interventionist and a pedagogical enterprise.   By focusing on robotics as new 
media technologies in the context of the teaching hospital, I operationalize both of these senses 
of practice.   Practicing surgery in this perspective becomes a compound protocol of surgeons 
learning to perform with robots.  Furthermore, my analysis conveys the attending set of 
ambivalences and contradictions that follow from this pedagogical enterprise of producing 
surgeons.  This pedagogy may be largely focused on the teaching of procedure — surgical skills 
— but it still takes place in the context of providing patient care.  Ultimately, the questions 
motivating this dissertation are these:   What is the nature of robotic surgery? And, if robotic 
surgery is a procedural technology of ever-more effective yet “non-invasive” seeing, knowing 
and intervening on the human body, what are its implications for the politics of care in 
contemporary techno-medicine? 
The Million Dollar Step Stool
It may seem odd to begin a dissertation on the impact of robotic surgery by relating a 
story where the robot is merely a bit player, a million-dollar technology reduced to a step stool 
in the corner of the OR.  Why might this be a fitting choice after all?  First, I want to 
acknowledge at the outset the limited and partial nature of my study.  Even at University 
Hospital, where robot-assisted procedures constitute a major component of urologic and gyn-
oncologic surgical services, they do not exhaust the surgeon’s procedural repertoire.  
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Laparoscopic and, to a lesser extent, open procedures still constitute a significant percentage of 
these surgeons’ workloads.  In such procedures, the dVSS is more impediment than enabling 
apparatus, because its sheer size consumes a large footprint in an already crowded operating 
space.   Simply put, I don’t want to overstate the impact of robotic surgery on care; although 
important, it is only one vector in a complex field of forces constituting the present and shaping 
the future of medicine.  
The surgeons with whom I worked are actively involved in expanding the repertoire of 
procedures performed using the dVSS.  While I am certain that open and laparoscopic 
procedures will not disappear from surgical practice in these domains, I do maintain that the 
rapid adoption of the dVSS in urology, gynecology and gyn-oncology, together with its growing 
use in cardiothoracic, pediatric, and general surgery suggests a trajectory toward a robotic 
territorialization of broad domains of surgical practice.   Further--and this demarcates another 
significant limit of my study--surgical intervention constitutes only one facet in the “continuum 
of patient care” at University Hospital.  My ethnographic observations are limited to the space 
of the operating room and the various apparatuses of surgical care deployed there.  My focus 
in this study is on surgeons and their practices in relation to robotic surgical technologies.  I had 
very little contact with patients (at least as conscious subjects); their understandings of and 
perspectives on these new surgical technologies in relation to the politics of care are thus 
notably absent from consideration.  
At another level, figuring the dVSS as a stepstool is an invitation to understand technology 
according to Ian Bogost’s and Nick Montfort’s analytic of the “platform.”  According to Bogost & 
Montfort (2008), in computing, a platform is:
the hardware and software framework that supports other programs . . . A 
platform in its purest form is an abstraction, simply a standard or specification.  
To be used by people and to take part in our culture directly, a platform must 
manifest itself materially.  This can be done in the chips, casings, peripherals, and 
other components that make up the hardware of a physical computer system.  
A platform may also include an operating system.  It is often useful to see a 
programming language or environment on top of an operating system as a 
platform, too.  Whatever the programmer takes for granted when developing, 
and whatever, from another side, the user is required to have working in order 
to use particular software, is the platform.  In general, platforms are layered — 
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from hardware through operating system and into other software layers — and 
they relate to modular components, such as optional controllers and cards. 
(176)
For me, this notion of a platform provides a useful framework for thinking about the media 
specificity of the dVSS.  The dVSS is, quite literally, an operating system upon and through which 
particular surgical procedures are carried out.  Articulating the differential specificity of this 
particular surgical platform involves drilling down through the components that form the 
material substrate of technologically enabled surgical practice, with the goal of understanding 
how the matter of a particular technological assemblage matters:  how “the hardware and 
software of platforms influences, facilitates, or constrains particular forms of computational 
expression”, and, I would add, computationally-mediated agency (Bogost & Montfort, 2008:  
177).  As outlined on the website for the Platform Studies book series (http://
www.platformstudies.com/), an attention to technology as platform “investigates the 
relationships between the hardware and the software design of computing systems and the 
creative works produced on those systems.”   It, in other words, a complex question of 
attending to a technology’s material affordances and constraints.    In part, then, this dissertation 
explores the specificities of the dVSS as a platform of hardware and software, the specificity of 
which has implications for the “creative work” of surgical practice.  I hope to expand on this 
notion of platform by foregrounding the materiality of the body.  As such, human “wetware” 
and its articulations to the hardware and software of the robotic surgical system are crucial.   
Insofar as the dVSS operates by tightly coupling bodies and machines, the question of its 
material effects is intimately tied to the materiality of the human body and the capacities and 
constraints the body brings to the human-machine interface.  It’s not even sufficient to speak of 
“the” body; an expert surgeon seated at the dVSS’ controls is an entirely different apparatus 
than an amateur like me using the robot as a platform upon which to stand.  By expanding the 
web of platform affordances and constraints to include the specificities of “wetware” (i.e. the 
surgeon-body or the patient-body), I pursue a nuanced analysis of the productivity of the dVSS 
as socio-technical apparatus.  In attending to the specificities of human wetware, however, I 
recognize the pitfalls:  first, the tendency to reify the human, as if biology exists outside history 
and the social.  And second,  the tendency to think of the human only in opposition to 
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technology.  A helpful via media regards the human as fundamentally constituted in and by 
relations with the technological.
To view the robot as a step stool is to signal how pedagogy in the operating room always 
and already involves the assumption of a proper vantage point.  In the surgical theater, like all 
forms of theater, being able to see for oneself is 
paramount, as this early twentieth-century image 
of surgeons crowding to learn new techniques 
from the pioneering neurosurgeon Harvey 
Cushing powerfully illustrates.  Hirschauer 
describes how “location in relation to the 
operating area corresponds to the surgical 
hierarchy; those in places 'with restricted visibility' 
have no say, those with the best view do” (1991:  
294).  In the ORs of University Hospital, surgical 
residents have the privilege of positioning 
themselves for the best view.  Usually, this is 
either next to or across from the attending 
surgeon as s/he works in the sterile surgical field.  Medical students, on the other hand, must 
jockey for position to look over the shoulder of the attending or a resident.  As a PhD student 
in Communications, I was an anomaly in this hierarchy of vantage points; clearly I fell outside the 
social hierarchy of the typical operating room.  The circulating nurses, who manage the spatial 
distribution of observers in the OR, didn’t know what to do with me.  However, the success of 
my ethnographic observations hinged upon my own ability to see.  This meant that I, too, spent 
a great deal of time attempting to find my own vantage points from the periphery.  As will 
become clear, the dVSS figures as a means to transcend the limited human capacities of the 
surgeon.  This is exemplified in Intuitive Surgical’s trademarked byline “Taking Surgical Precision 
and Technique Beyond the Limits of the Human Hand®.”  In foregrounding the dVSS as a step-
stool in the opening pages of this dissertation, I finally want to highlight the ways in which I, too, 
used the dVSS in an embodied (always embodied) attempt to transcend the limits of both my 
particular body and my relative outsider status in the OR.  Even when functioning as a “mere” 
Photo courtesy of the American Association of 
Neurological Surgeons, Rolling Meadows, IL, 2009
(Photographer:  Richard U. Light, MD)
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step stool, a technology of augmenting height, the dVSS gave me a place to stand—figuratively 
and literally—in the contemporary OR.  Without question, this afforded me a particular and 
sometimes privileged perspective on robotically-enhanced surgical medicine, and allowed me to 
see things I otherwise might not have seen.  
Visuality & Performativity in Surgical Pedagogy
Whether interfaced with robotic technologies or not, the practice and teaching of surgery 
crucially depends on visuality and performativity.  One theme that I trace in this dissertation is 
their entwining.  Surgeons often refer aphoristically to the teaching of surgical procedure as 
“See one, do one, teach one,” a particularly tight circuit of vision, performance-as-doing, and re-
performance-as-display.  The practices of teaching surgical procedure in the operating theater 
are thus medicine-specific forms of performative show and tell that demonstrate, through 
gesture and narration, the precise manual practices that constitute surgical technique.  Teaching 
surgical procedure requires making visible the practices of the surgical eye as well as the hand, 
and so surgical pedagogy involves what Mitchell (2002) calls the “performance of showing 
seeing,” where the “objects” of an attending surgeon’s show-and-tell performance are the 
practices of surgical visuality.8  In other words, the training of the surgical apprentice relies upon 
modes of visuality that are decidedly synesthetic, embodied, and, as recent work in cognitive 
neuroscience has argued, enacted.  
On one level, this domain could be described as the domain of “know-how,” where both 
practice and visuality are integral.  Stefan Hirschauer suggests that the anatomical knowledge 
required of successfully navigating particular bodies in a surgical procedure emerges out of a 
circuit or feedback loop of the enskillment of vision and the manual practices of cutting.  He 
writes, 
'Knowing about' these regions of the body, which grows out of acquiring an 
anatomical view in surgical practice, combines the anatomical knowing that of 
the visible, and the anatomical knowing how of making something visible. 
Knowledge and skill are tied to each other. On the one hand, the knowledge 
emerges out of dissection; on the other hand, it structures dissection as an 
instruction for viewing and cutting. (Hirschauer, 1991:  310)
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8 Jackson (2005) uses Mitchell’s precise phrasing to launch a reflection on the “parallels, discontinuities and 
enmeshments between performance studies and visual culture studies” (164)
To put it another way, contemporary surgical pedagogy relies heavily on medicine’s modern 
investment in autopsis.  With the concept of autopsis I intend to signal both autopsy proper 
— the “opening up of a few bodies” that Foucault describes as the founding moment of 
modern medicine — but also autopsis as a particular apparatus of perception, of seeing, of 
knowing that constitutes the productivity of the medical gaze.  As Saunders (2008) points out, 
autopsis involves not only a “seeing for oneself ”, but also a “saying what one has seen” (17).   
Autopsis is thus a particular and historical configuration of perception and knowledge and the 
articulation/transmission of that knowledge.  Seeing and saying are not co-extensive and the 
veracity of either may be contested.  But it is through adopting a particular apparatus of 
autopsis, I contend, that surgeons “acquire a body.”  As employed by Bruno Latour (2004), 
“acquiring a body” connotes the taking on or developing of the skilled sensorium.   These 
trained  habits of perception differentiate and individuate the surgeon-body as an expert or 
“articulate” and, I would add, articulated, subject (Latour, 2004:  209).  Insofar as autopsis is also 
a “self-seeing,” seeing oneself as a surgeon involves literal incorporation, i.e. the naturalizing of 
certain modes of embodied comportment, a complex making-habitual of perceptual, kinetic 
and epistemic formations.  
(New) Media & Medicine
When interfaced with robotic technologies, these questions of performativity and visuality 
assume the additional problematic of technological mediation.  The dVSS introduces a 
technological assemblage between the surgeon and the patient.  The surgeon no longer looks 
directly into the patient.  Her gaze is mediated by the dVSS’ InSite® Vision System, a binocular 
form of endoscopic video camera that, when processed according to an image registration and 
display algorithm, produces a 3D video representation of the patient’s interior.  The surgeon no 
longer stands at the side of the patient, but sits at a console on the other side of the room.  The 
surgeon no longer feels the patient’s tissues with his hands —sensations of texture, 
temperature, and hardness are lost to sight.  The sound of cutting tissue is oddly dislocated and 
muffled in comparison to open surgery.  But the smell of tissue vaporized by the electrocautery 
remains.  Consequently, in building upon the theoretical resources and insights from 
performance studies and visual studies, I would also characterize this dissertation as 
contributing to a deeper understanding of the interrelationships between new media and 
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medicine.  There has been much important work in this vein, perhaps best exemplified in the 
edited volume Cultural Sutures:  Medicine and Media (Friedman, 2004).  Much of this work, 
however, confines itself to the analysis of the representation of medicine in various media 
(print, television, cinema, etc).9  My approach is different in that I want to move beyond the 
question of the representation of medicine in the media into an engagement with the 
entwining materialities of media and medicine as platform practices.
At least three theoretical vectors help to map this domain.  The first is McLuhan’s claim that 
all media are prosthetic mediations – extensions and amputations – of the human sensorium, a 
controversial theory that nonetheless calls attention to the manner in which media and 
medicine possess a common terrain of operation: reworking the materiality of human bodies.10  
The second vector involves the claim that new media (commonly associated with the digital) 
and medicine (commonly associated with the biological) are becoming promiscuous with their 
material substrates.  As Mitchell (2007) points out, contemporary “new media” encompasses 
both the informatics of digitality and the wetware of biomedia.  Similarly, contemporary 
medicine produces and operates on bodies that are both “flesh and blood” and “bits and 
bytes.”  In other words, as Waldby (2000), Lenoir (2004) and others have argued, medicine 
increasingly deploys digital images and simulations as “operative images” that represent (signify 
as well as stand-in for) their “analog” flesh and blood counterparts.  At the same time, 
bioscience increasingly conceives of the cognitive and biological processes of human wetware in 
terms of information, communication, computation and (genetic) code.  Finally, I argue that both 
medicine and new media share a common concern with the question of mediation.  While this 
may seem obvious in the case of new media (media are precisely that which mediate), it is also 
true, as Lenoir (2004) notes, that “surgery demands an interface.”
The issue of mediation in medicine is not new, of course.  I read, for example, Stanley 
Reiser’s seminal Medicine and the Reign of Technology in precisely these terms, as a history of 
16
9 A notable exception in that volume is Lenoir (2004).
10 See McLuhan (1994).  To return to McLuhan is, of course a controversial move within cultural studies, given 
Williams’ influential critique that McLuhan aestheticizes, abstracts and de-socializes media technologies.  For 
Williams’ critique, see his important Television:  Technology and Cultural Form (Williams, 2003).   Kember (2006) 
suggests that the influence of Williams’ critique of McLuhan within cultural studies has significantly limited the field’s 
ability to adequately deal with techno science.
changing spatial, temporal, and technical mediations in the dynamic field of technique, 
perception, knowledge and intervention that constituted medical practice from the 17th 
century to the 1970s.   Reiser adeptly illustrates how medical technologies signal different 
modalities of the doctor-patient interface, and consequently introduce into the history of 
medicine configurations of (and anxieties about) changing spatial, temporal and technical 
mediations.  For example, Reiser outlines how, in the 17th and 18th centuries, physicians’ 
reliance on patient self-narration of symptoms as sufficient medical evidence enabled a postal 
system of telemedical diagnosis and treatment, medical practice mediated by mail.  Changing 
configurations of what constitutes modern medical evidence, as well as new technologies and 
techniques, such as pathological anatomy, the protocols of the physical examination, and even 
the spatial arrangement of the hospital, produced a different configuration, one “dependent 
upon the geographic proximity of doctors to each other, to patients, and to the implements of 
technology” (Reiser, 1978:  197).  
A shift toward greater physical immediacy between patients, doctors and technologies did 
not erase mediation as a problematic in medicine, however.  For Reiser, the issue of mediation 
shifts at this historical moment from one of spatial mediation to technical mediation of the 
physician’s sensory apparatus by a myriad of monitoring, diagnostic and visualization 
technologies. Historically, this mediation was embodied in two forms, augmentation and 
displacement. Jonathan Sterne (2002), for instance, discusses how the invention of the 
stethoscope augmented the aural capacities of the physician by inserting a mediating 
technology, a hollow tube, between the physician’s ear and the patient’s chest.  He argues that 
the stethoscope prompted the emergence of a medicine-specific form of media technics:  
techniques of “mediate auscultation” (as opposed to “immediate” auscultation – the physician’s 
ear on patient’s body).  Sterne outlines how these techniques and technologies of mediation 
remobilized and reconfigured the physician’s senses in the name of, and in relation to, reason.  
In Sterne’s analysis, the stethoscope involved both a reworking of the materiality of the patient 
and the sensory apparatus of the physician, who became, ideally, a virtuoso at identifying the 
auditory signs of vital “flow” and “pathology.”  In these cases, the physician was, in a sense, made 
super-human by prosthetic sensory media technology.
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Other technologies displaced and replaced the physician’s unaided sensory apparatus.  For 
instance, in his essay “Technology and the Senses in Twentieth Century Medicine,” Reiser cites 
how the now-mundane technologies of the thermometer, the X-ray and the 
electrocardiograph supplanted the physician’s sense of touch in the reading of subtle gradations 
of a patient’s temperature, or the audile/tactile sense involved in determining if a bone was 
broken (crepitus) or if a pulse exhibited subtle deviations from the norm. In their place, these 
technologies offered numeric (a temperature reading in degrees Fahrenheit), pictorial (an x-ray 
image) and graphical (an EKG tape) representations that, within the context of an emerging 
scientific rationality that valued objectivity, standardization and reproducibility, were seen as far 
superior to the merely subjective and potentially biased “sense data” gathered by the unaided 
physician.  As Reiser puts it, in relation to this “self-registering” evidence, “the doctors and their 
senses were found wanting” (1993:  267).  These developments, interestingly, did not reduce the 
relative power of doctors within the social hierarchies of medicine, even though these 
technologies did introduce a form of “deskilling” into medical practice.  As both Reiser (1993) 
and Sandelowski (2000) point out, the skill involved in medical practice was dissociated from 
practices of medical observation and re-articulated onto practices of diagnostic interpretation.  
The dissociation of medical observation from the body of the physician was ultimately 
recuperated by a two-fold renegotiation of the “proper domain” of the physician vis as vis other 
medical personnel, such as nurses.
   Reiser’s and Sterne’s work helps us trace the emergence of medicine-specific forms of 
modern media technics.  Reiser’s analysis leaves off in the mid-1970s, however, just at the point 
of emergence of the then-new technologies of telecommunications and computation that are 
central to the tele-robotic operation of surgical systems like the dVSS.  I envision my own 
project, then, as an extension of Reiser’s analysis into the contemporary moment.  What are the 
effects of “new media in medicine” at this particular conjuncture?  New media yield new modes 
of mediation, and, in turn, different configurations of embodied power/knowledge in medicine. 
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Interestingly, for example, we are witnessing a return (and 
growing acceptance) of the spatial mediation of care enabled by 
tele-videoconferencing technologies.  In fact, California-based 
InTouch Health markets the RP-7® Robot, a so-called “rounding 
robot” that allows a physician to conduct rounds remotely (see 
image at right).  This return of spatial mediation, however, does 
not abandon an investment in proximity as a component of care, 
but instead refigures relations of proximity to allow for “virtual” 
or “remote presence.”  Again, this technology figures as an 
augmentation or empowerment of the physician.  As InTouch 
Health states on their website, http://www.intouchhealth.com: 
Remote Presence is the ability to project yourself from one location to another 
to hear, see, talk and move around as though you were there.  Using 
telecommunications and mobile robotic technology, a physician can visit more 
often with patients and hospital staff.  With the impending aging demographic 
crisis, Remote Presence plays a key ‘force multiplying’ role enabling the 
healthcare work force to meet the ever increasing demands of the healthcare 
system.
InTouch surrogates human presence with a mechanized platform.  The machine becomes a 
doctor who performs care “as if ” he—the flesh and blood doctor—were there.  The 
performative dis/placement of the physician answers a metaphysics of person-centered 
presence with technologically reproduced multiplicities of person-like presences.
Alongside the resurgence of technologies that mediate medical care spatially are 
technologies that threaten to displace and perhaps replace not just medical observation but 
medical interpretation.  Let me pursue, for example, Reiser’s example of the electrocardiograph.  
If technologies like the electrocardiograph “made it possible to separate the act of receiving 
medical data from the act of interpreting it,” then contemporary innovations in 
electrocardiography suggest that the cognitive labor of interpreting medical data might be soon 
be displaced from the domain propre of the contemporary doctor.  Atul Gawande, for example, 
tells of research conducted in Sweden to gauge the ability of artificial intelligence software to 
perform against a human expert in the interpretation of EKGs, a study Gawande calls “the 
Photo courtesy of InTouch 
Health, 2009
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medical world’s version of the Deep Blue chess match” (2002: 35).   Lars Edenbrandt, an MD/
PhD with expertise in artificial intelligence, developed a computer system to learn to identify 
EKGs whose electrical signatures indicated a heart attack.  Gawande continues:
[T]he machine grew expert at reading even the most equivocal of EKGs.  Then 
[Edenbrant] approached [Dr. Hans] Ohlin, one of the top cardiologists in 
Sweden and a man who ordinarily read as many as ten thousand EKGs a year.  
Edenbrandt selected two thousand two hundred and forty EKGs from hospital 
files to test both of them on, of which exactly half, eleven hundred and twenty, 
were confirmed to show heart attacks.  With little fanfare, the results were 
published in the fall of 1997.  Ohlin correctly picked up six hundred and twenty.  
The computer picked up seven hundred and thirty-eight.  Machine beat man by 
20 percent” (2002:  37)
Since that study was published in 1997, Edenbrandt’s research group has expanded its research 
to include “decision support systems” to aid physicians in the interpretation of diagnostic 
images such as CT images, arguably much more complex in nature than a EKG.  This 
dissertation explores, in part, a parallel set of mediated displacements in surgery brought about 
by the dVSS.  As surgical technique becomes more and more mediated, and potentially 
automated through robotic technologies, surgeons tend to disavow their manual practice and 
suggest that their real domain propre is what they refer to as “surgical judgment,” a notion that I 
will take up later in the dissertation.
New Media:  A Disclaimer
For me, differential determinations of the distinctiveness of “new media” bear an additional 
danger when the distinctiveness is articulated according to a (binary) logic of new versus old, a 
binary that often tends to fetishize “the new.”  Much can be said about this tendency – it can be 
located in a modernist logic of difference; or in a capitalist logic of “planned obsolescence” that 
drives ever faster the pace of contemporary commodity consumption, or in a contemporary 
“forgetting of history.”  Pursuing these lines of critique, some scholars, such as Carolyn Marvin 
and Lisa Gitelman, relativize contemporary claims about the radical novelty of the new (media) 
through historical work that considers “when old [media] technologies were new” (Marvin, 
1990; Gitelman, 2006).  Their work historicizes taken-for-granted “old media” by attention to 
the moments of their emergence as new media technologies, when their “location” in culture 
and networks of communication and power were neither as stable nor as naturalized as they 
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might seem to be today, when dominant and pre-existing fantasies about the possibilities of the 
new media hold much sway in contouring their actualization.  As a consequence, the purported 
radical “newness” of contemporary new media (whether utopic or dystopic) gets blunted.  This 
happens through the re-presentation of similar fantasies and fears that accompanied the 
emergence of older, now-taken-for-granted technologies such as the telephone.  
Further, such work displaces the tendency in media studies – new media and old – to 
position media technologies as the engine of history.  As Acland puts it:
In fact, I would go so far as to suggest that few phrases have been evacuated of 
meaning, and have outlived their critical usefulness, faster than “new media.”  If 
there is a reigning myth of media, it is that technological change necessarily 
involves the “new” and consists solely of rupture from the past.  It ignores the 
way the dynamics of culture bump along unevenly, dragging the familiar into 
novel contexts.  (2007:  xix).  
For the purposes of this dissertation, then, I want to highlight how the new/old binary tends to 
over-amplify the effectivity of “new media” in determining the contemporary moment (not to 
mention the future).  This dichotomy diminishes and sometimes erases the continued effectivity 
of older media still operating in the contemporary context, as well as other social and 
economic forces.  
Rather than “new media” I would prefer to use the term “emergent media” to describe 
innovation in media form and technology.  [Here I am following Williams (1973) and more 
recently Acland (2007).]   Accordingly, this approach acknowledges the fact that dominant and 
residual media are still "in effect", exerting effectivity in the present, in the contemporary 
context, alongside vectors of newly emergent media, even as the rhetoric of “new media” 
asserts their obsolescence.  With his notion of the “emergent,” Williams sought to convey “that 
new meanings and values, new practices, new significances and experiences are constantly 
being created” (1973).  On the other hand, “the residual, by definition, has been effectively 
formed in the past, but it is still active in the cultural process, not only and often not at all as an 
element of the past, but as an effective element of the present” (Williams, 1977:  122).  As 
Acland points out, Williams’ “categories of the residual and emergent . . . act as prefiguring 
formations for the not yet fully dominant” (2007:  xx).  In this way, I hope to bear witness to the 
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pressure of both the residual and the emergent as forming the condition of possibility for the 
contemporary moment.  I do so while keeping open the question of future articulations (rather 
than subsuming transformation under a teleology of the “new”).  I intend this to be a materialist 
approach to media – understanding how we, in our media(ted) practices, make history, under 
conditions not of our own making.  Acland describes this conceptual framework as “a 
materialist process, wherein ever-shifting social conditions arise from ever-present preexisting 
ones, as well as opportunities for struggle” (2007:  xxi).  As such, emergent media can’t be 
thought in isolation from dominant and residual media, nor other emergent, dominant and 
residual lines of force that constitute a particular context.
To put it succinctly, my interest in this dissertation is in the materiality of media practices in 
medicine, some of which are residual, some dominant, others that are emergent or “new.”  Even 
emergent technologies are assemblages of both innovative and "old" devices, of “new” as well as 
dominant and residual ways of seeing, of conflicting modes of spectatorship, and remediations 
of dominant media forms.  In fact, I'm not even interested in media per se, but in media-in-
relation, within relations of power, within configurations of technologies, bodies, knowledges and 
institutions, or what Foucault might call an “apparatus.”  As always, we find ourselves in media 
res.  Despite these reservations, however, I continue to use the term “new media” in part 
because, for better or worse, it defines a field and a set of intellectual practices that I want 
simultaneously to augment and contest.
Interdisciplinary Objects: Meaning, Materiality, Anxiety
In her essay “Performing Show and Tell,” a reflection on the “parallels, discontinuities and 
enmeshments between performance studies and visual culture studies,” Shannon Jackson 
suggests that performance and visual studies share a “disciplinary likeness” in their “invocation of 
a list of expanded objects” of inquiry (2005:  164, 167).  If visual studies innovates by expanding 
the repertoire of relevant objects from fine art to visual culture in all of its contexts of in/
visibility, performance studies makes a similar move, opening its aperture to let in everything 
from the proscenium-staged theater event to carnival to performance in everyday life.  As 
Jackson aptly notes, however, this expansion is wrought with anxiety.  For example, Jackson cites 
the anxiety of supplementarity, the anxiety that the incorporation of an expanded set of objects 
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will “never be benignly additive but always anxiously substitutive” (2005: 166).  Jackson also 
points out that an expanded disciplinary field incites anxieties about the expertise required to 
engage, using the tools of one’s own discipline, with the objects “proper” to another field of 
study.  She writes that: 
While visual scholars worry about the appropriateness of studying baseball 
cards or wonder whether their colleagues really know enough about bio-
imaging to think anything worth saying, parallel scholars in theater and 
performance worry about the prospects of someone who studies the 
‘performance of picnics’ and wonder if their colleagues really know enough 
about ‘the performance of surgical practice’ to say anything worth 
hearing.” (Jackson, 2005:  167).
Insofar as my project engages both medical imaging technologies and the performance of 
surgical practice, I risk a double indictment, double anxiety.  What do I, as someone who hails 
from a Department of Communication Studies, have to say that’s worth hearing about the 
emergence of robotics in surgical practice and pedagogy?  I experienced anxiety acutely every 
time I described my research interests within the space of the OR.  If, as I noted earlier, the 
circulating nurses literally didn’t know where to place me within the physical configuration of 
bodies in the OR, I struggled throughout my observations to position my research within the 
conceptual and discursive space of medicine.  When describing my research project to the 
medical students who often observed next to me, I’d explain “I’m part anthropologist, part 
computer scientist.”  This was usually met with silence, or worse, “oh, I took an anthropology 
class in college once.”  Positioning my research in relation to the data-driven context of 
evidence-based medicine was even more difficult.   “How would you quantify that?” was a 
question too often posed to me by the attending surgeons and more experienced surgical 
residents, at times suspiciously, at others amusedly.  My expressed interest in understanding how 
the dVSS functions to shift configurations of expertise among surgeons was translated into 
“Oh, so you’re interested in the surgical learning curve.  We’ve done some studies of that; I can 
get you the data.  It’s about 50 procedures.”  
The ways in which I was articulated in the operating room suggest that disciplinary 
identifications are a means of (perhaps) falsely purifying entangled domains of practice.  What 
utility does my analytic bring to the life and death practices in the operating room?  Am I simply 
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adding an anthropological overlay — about the social and cultural meaning of robotics in the 
lifeworld of the OR — to the “real work” of medicine, critical work that deals in blood and 
guts, the visceral materiality of the body?   I argue that cultural work is critical work that 
traverses the material as well as the semiotic, that this kind of research matters to the material 
work medicine does.  In The Body Multiple:  Ontology in Medical Practice, Anne-Marie Mol 
questions the fundamental distinctions upon which these anxieties hinge, distinctions between 
meaning and materiality, between the social and the body.  She wonders about a critical 
practice that not only “interprets reality” but has the “power to mark physical reality.”  (2002:  
11).  She suggests that this power was ceded to the sciences in the 1950s, through the founding 
work of medical sociologists like Talcott Parsons.  For Mol,
relating to [Parsons’] work allows someone fifty years later to discover how the 
social sciences established their rights to speak about health care and sickness in 
the 1950s—and at the same time how they set limits on this right.  They turned 
the domain of the social into what they were competent to speak about.  In this 
way, the social sciences delineated an object of their own and granted 
biomedicine the exclusive right to talk about the body and its diseases. (2002: 
13).  
The disciplinary division between the social and medical sciences was predicated on an 
empirical positivism borrowed from and shared with the natural sciences, by which the material 
object was distanced from the subject-scholar or practitioner in what has become a classic 
subject-object relation.  This relation is of course exacerbated by the renewed materiality or 
object-ness of the mediated/remediated body.
Contemporary medical futurists such as Dr. Richard Satava claim that medicine is no longer 
about blood and guts, but about bits and bytes.  For someone trained in Communication 
Studies, such an assertion would seem to position medicine firmly as an “object” of my home 
discipline:  medicine as media, as communication, as information.  I align myself, however, with an 
array of communication and cultural studies scholars who hold fast to the embodied nature of 
digital experience and the materialities of information, communication and computation.  As 
such, this dissertation still seeks to traverse and to trace the semiotic and the material across 
crisscrossing circuits of blood and guts, bits and bytes, informatics and practices of care.  
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Sites of Inquiry I - Robotic Surgery at University Hospital
Le bloc opératoire en est le cœur ; c’est la scène d’un théâtre qui me fascine et 
m’attire ; c’est le lieu le plus mystérieux, la scène de mes peurs et de mes 
fantasmes ; une zone protégée que seuls les initiés ont le droit de pénétrer ; 
c’est le territoire des chirurgiens, une tribu arrogante et secrète, des guérisseurs 
qui retardent la mort et rendent à la vie.11
— Benoît Rossel, Le Théâtre des Opérations (2008)
“University Hospital” is a prestigious teaching hospital, with a strong reputation nationally 
and internationally for its leading-edge care and exceptional medical school.  University Hospital 
owns 2 of Intuitive Surgical’s platforms, a first generation dVSS with an accessory 4th arm, and a 
second-generation HD “S” model.  As part of my research for this dissertation, I spent close to 
six months observing the use of the dVSS on the hospital’s urology and gyn-oncology surgical 
services.   In all, I observed 38 surgical procedures.  The majority of them were robot-assisted 
radical prostatectomies and hysterectomies but my observations also included robotic-assisted 
pyleoplasty and partial nephrectomy.  I also observed non-robotic procedures — both open 
(radical nephrectomy, uterine fibroid removal, as well as a colostomy reversal) and traditional 
laparoscopic (radical hysterectomy) — in order to better understand the differential specificity 
of these particular surgical practices.
Gaining research access to the operating suite, one of University Hospital’s most restricted 
areas, was no easy task.  Beyond the usual IRB approvals, a 7-page legal contract was drawn up 
by University Hospital’s legal counsel, establishing between my home academic department and 
University Hospital’s Department of Urology a six-month “educational preceptorship,” a 
recognized mode of supervised practical experience and training within the medical sphere.  I 
provided documentation that I had obtained the required immunizations and that I had 
successfully completed University Hospital’s online HIPAA training.   An attending urology 
surgeon agreed to serve as my preceptor.  Once fully vetted by the hospital administration, it 
was largely through this surgeon’s goodwill and guidance that I was able to conduct my 
ethnographic research.  Introduced to the protocols that one must traverse to enter University 
Hospital’s restricted areas — protocols that I in many ways transgressed — I obtained my own 
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11 Translation:  “The operating block is [the hospital’s] heart; it is a theater that fascinates and attracts me; it is the 
most mysterious place, the stage of my fears and of my fantasies; a restricted area that only the initiated may 
enter ; it is the territory of surgeons, an arrogant and secretive tribe, healers who delay death and bring back life.”
set of University Hospital’s green surgical scrubs and made use of the physicians’ locker rooms, 
even had a permanent locker assigned to me, with a nameplate that read “Dr. Olsen” (my name 
misspelled, I joked, so that being called “doctor” couldn’t go to my head).  And yet once these 
conditions of access were met, my movement in the hospital was relatively unfettered.  I 
received the Urology surgical schedules on a weekly basis via email, and was able to come and 
go as I pleased.  Indeed, I found that the aura of restriction, of the OR as bounded space, was 
largely just that.  University Hospital’s main suite of operating rooms sits off a main hallway and 
can be entered through a door that does not require swipe-card authorization for access.  I 
found that with a pair of green scrubs and an ID (any ID, actually) attached to one’s scrubshirt 
pocket functioned as a passport to the most of the hospital, so long as you acted like you knew 
where you were going.  In fact, I was never able to work out obtaining card-swipe authorization 
to the women’s and children’s OR, where the gyn-oncological procedures were conducted 
using the more advanced dVSS, the S model.  But if I paced the hall outside the OR suite for 30 
seconds or so, I could slip in behind the relatively constant flow of traffic in and out of the main 
door.   
Not that my movements were completely unbounded; fluid movement required adopting 
the quotidian habits particular to the OR.   These habits are both socially and spatially 
structured.  Fox (1997) suggests that the spatial organization of the OR,  its “physical 
boundaries and barriers enable, and help to constitute, a regime of sterility which organize sets 
of movements through the surgical spaces: movements of bodies, staff and instruments” (650).  
Different spaces have different regimes of sterility.   As one moves about from the general 
environs of the OR, into the OR itself, and approaches the “sterile field” that surrounds the 
patient during a surgical procedure, one’s mobility is marked by increasing constrictions on 
comportment that correspond to the increasing requirements of asepsis in each space.  Fox 
(1997) calls these structured mobilities “circuits of hygiene” and suggests that patients, surgical 
staff and instruments all travel within different, but intersecting circuits.   No one ever entered 
the suite of operating rooms except in scrubs and a surgical cap (or in the “bunny suit” 
reserved for visitors who came in their street clothes).  Entering the operating room itself 
required a sterile mask, of course, even if it was just held in place rather than tied on.  And the 
26
nursing staff quickly checked the identity of anyone they did not recognize, and recorded the 
name and position of everyone observing in the OR.  
The OR is both a bounded space and a space of flow.   As Moreira notes:
Our familiarity with the operating room as a bounded space is in tension with 
our knowledge that its activities depend on resources organised outside this 
space: electricity, sterilised materials, radiographic prints, technological and 
medical standards, etc. How are we to think about the relationships between 
the operating room and the other locales on which it depends, between this 
locale and the `global' on which it depends or in which it is included? And how 
can we describe the relationships between these different types of spatial 
relations? (Moreira, 2004:  53)
Accordingly, it is a space of and in tension, between public and private, between the sacred and 
the profane, and, crucial for my purposes, between the professional and the popular.   While the 
surgeons I observed relentlessly maintained that the robot was simply a new surgical tool, it 
was clear that the circulation of “the robotic” preceded and exceeded the sterile 
instrumentalism of the surgical profession.  Flows of popular culture co-mingled amidst “circuits 
of hygiene.”  These flows varied in intensity, but one afternoon in the OR was saturated with 
popular and professional figurations of the robotic.  We waited for pathology reports to come 
back on some tissue excised during a radical prostatectomy.  The focus of attention in the OR 
dispersed from the procedure into several side conversations.  The senior resident at the 
Surgeon’s Console sang along with the mix of tunes pouring out of the always-present iPod.  At 
one point she exclaimed, “Hey!  Look everybody!  I’m doing ‘the robot’!”  The Endowrist 
instruments did a pop and lock on the LCD display, suspended above the patient’s prostate.  
Everyone laughed.   Conversation shifted to a debate between the attending surgeon and the 
medical student du jour about whether or not the latest summer action flick was worth the 
price of admission.  The film was Iron Man, whose main character, a billionaire genius engineer, 
creates a mechanized suit to save his own life, later perfecting the robotic exoskeleton to 
assume the superhero persona Iron Man.  No one caught my ironic glance up at the imposing 
robotic arms stretched out over the patient.  Conversation halted abruptly when the OR 
telephone rang with the verdict from the pathology lab:  no evidence of cancer in the biopsy.  
Relieved, the surgical team re-aggregated their focus on the task at hand.  The iPod speaker 
volume was turned back down, but not before I registered the song that had just begun to play.  
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“More Human Than Human.”  I scribbled it down in my observation notebook, only later 
recalling that the band White Zombie titled their single based on a line from the 1982 cyborg 
classic Blade Runner. 
Sites of Inquiry II - Intuitive Surgical, Inc.
Intuitive Surgical, Inc designs, manufactures and markets the dVSS.  The company’s signature 
product can traced back to the Stanford Research Institute, later known as SRI International.  
SRI was created in 1946 by the Trustees of Stanford University as a non-profit scientific 
research institute to promote technical and commercial innovation on the West Coast.   Its 
major activities have centered around conducting government, commercial and private 
foundation-sponsored R&D, which often produce “strategic partnerships” and spin off for-profit 
companies.  SRI also licenses the technologies it develops through its R&D activities.  In the 
1960s, SRI was home to Douglas Engelbart’s lab, the Augmentation Research Center, a team of 
researchers led by Engelbart that developed many of the constituent technologies of the 
personal computer, including hypertext, the bitmapped screen and, notably, the computer 
mouse.  In 1970 SRI became independent from Stanford University and was legally established 
as a California Non-Profit Benefit Corporation.  From 1966 to 1972, SRI’s Artificial Intelligence 
Center developed Shakey, the first robot capable of sensing its environment and autonomously 
navigating its own course.12
 In the mid-1980s, SRI, under contract to the U.S. Army in the mid-1980s and later funded 
by the National Institute of Health, developed the tele-robotic surgical prototype on which the 
dVSS is based.  The goal of this initial prototype was to explore the feasibility of distance tele-
surgery:  would it be possible to perform remote telesurgery by leveraging robotics and 
satellite telecommunications to conduct surgical procedures on the battlefield while keeping 
the surgeon hundreds of miles from harm’s way?  In addition to military interests, SRI also 
actively demonstrated this early prototype to various venture capitalists and medical 
administrators, hoping to illustrate the potential for tele-surgery in the emerging field of tele-
medicine.  Telesurgery, SRI argued, might allow a single specialist - a master surgeon - to operate 
in many different operating rooms around the country or around the world, in a single day, 
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12 It is ironic that the research that would eventually lead to the dVSS, which eliminates human hand tremor, would 
be called “Shakey.”
without having to travel.  The biggest obstacle to this version of telesurgery proved to be the 
disorienting time lag that network latency introduces into the circuit between a surgeon’s hand 
motions, the remote robotic arm movements, and the video transmission of those motions 
back to the surgeons.  As a consequence, SRI’s marketing efforts of their tele-surgical prototype 
were largely unsuccessful.13
However, Dr. Frederic Moll, cofounder of several medical device companies that have 
focused on innovations in laparoscopy, took interest in the prototype for a different reason.  
According to Moll, “What got me excited wasn’t the remote-surgery aspect . . . but the way the 
system eliminated the need for a hand to be directly connected to a surgeon’s instruments.  It 
offered new ways of solving the challenges in minimally invasive techniques” (Ditlea, 2000).  In 
November 1995, Moll, John Freund (a Harvard MD/MBA) and electrical engineer and 
ultrasound device entrepreneur Robert Younge founded Intuitive Surgical Devices, Inc., after 
Freund successfully negotiated and entered into a licensing option agreement with SRI on 
September 12, 1995.  The licensing agreement between Intuitive Surgical and SRI was signed in 
December of 1995 and granted Intuitive Surgical licensed access to “certain patent rights and 
know-how regarding Telepresence Surgical Technology” owned by SRI (Intuitive Surgical - SRI 
License Agreement).  
Intuitive Surgical received FDA approval for the dVSS to assist with surgery in 1997.  This 
initial approval allowed the dVSS to be used in conjunction with only a limited set of non-sharp 
instruments - blunt dissectors, retractors, stabilizers — and its endoscopic camera system.  This 
was referred to as an approval to use the dVSS to “assist” in surgical procedures.   In 2000, 
however, the FDA cleared the dVSS to perform laparoscopic procedures, authorizing scissors, 
scalpels, forceps, needle holders, clip appliers and electrocautery instruments so that the system 
could be used for the additional indications of grasping, cutting, electrocautery and suturing.  In 
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13 SRI continues research in the area of tele-surgery, most notably in conjunction with the TraumaPod project.  SRI 
and the University of Washington’s BioRobotics Lab are co-PIs on this jointly funded DARPA/TATRC initiative, 
which also includes partnerships with General Dynamics Robotic Systems, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the 
University of Texas, the University of Maryland and Robotic Surgical Tech, Inc.  The goal of the project is to create a 
mobile robotic surgery platform.  SRI’s major contribution is the M7 surgical robot, a several-generation 
descendent of the original SRI prototype, which recently conducted the first “acceleration compensated” medical 
procedure in zero gravity and has been able to overcome network latency issues successfully enough to perform 
telesurgery over 1,200 miles of the public Internet.  The TraumaPod also includes Penelope, a robotic surgical scrub 
nurse, and a machine vision system (TraumaPod MVS) designed to count surgical supplies, both developed by 
Robotic Systems & Technologies, Inc.
other words, the dVSS was cleared to perform the array of manual practices that constitute the 
craft of surgery.  The dVSS has since been approved for an array of surgical procedures in 
urology, gynecology, cardiothoracic and general surgery.
Since going public in 2000, Intuitive Surgical has become a revenue-generating powerhouse.  
In 2008 its revenues increased to $875 million, up 46% from 2007 after three consecutive years 
of 60%+ growth for the company.  According to its latest financial reports to its investors, 
reflecting all four quarters of 2008, Intuitive Surgical’s operating profit was $311 million, up 50% 
from 2007.  Its current cash assets are estimated at $902 million.  Intuitive Surgical describes its 
business model as “essentially a ‘razor/razor blade’ operation.  Initially, we sell and install the da 
Vinci Surgical System into new customer accounts.  Once systems are sold into customer 
accounts, we generate recurring revenue as our customers use the system to perform surgery 
and, in the process, buy and consume our EndoWrist instrument and accessary products.  We 
also generate recurring revenue from system service” (Intuitive Surgical - Investor FAQ).  The 
average sale price of Intuitive Surgical’s “razor,” the dVSS, is $1.34 million and the most feature-
rich systems “retail” for $1.7 million.  Thus, the sale of “razors” has generated $455 million in 
revenue as of Q4 2008.   In terms of “razor blades,” each surgical procedure generates revenue 
of $1,300 - $2,200, the per-procedure cost of Intuitive Surgical’s patented EndoWrist 
instruments, which have a life cycle of only 10 procedures, enforced by a microchip that 
prevents use after the procedure limit is reached (and conveniently ensures that only Intuitive 
Surgical-manufactured instruments can be used).  The sale of “razor blades” has generated $293 
million in revenue as of Q4, 2008.  Finally, the company’s two-tiered service plans cost hospitals 
on average $140,000 per dVSS annually, generating $127 million in revenue in 2008.  
Intuitive Surgical’s FDA clearances provide it with a virtual monopoly in the field of surgical 
robotics, and the company possesses exclusive rights to over 600 patents.  Total investments in 
intellectual property during the year ended December 31, 2008 were $43.5 million (Intuitive 
Surgical - Annual Report 2008).  As a consequence, the company places a premium on 
intellectual property.  According to the company’s Code of Business Conduct and Ethics, 
“Protection of ISI’s intellectual property — including its patents, trade secrets, copyrights, 
trademarks, scientific and technical knowledge — is essential to maintaining our competitive 
advantage.  The intellectual property you generate while doing your job contributes to ISI’s 
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strength, and you have a duty to protect these valuable assets from misuse and unauthorized 
disclosure” (5).  At Intuitive Surgical, knowledge = property = surplus value.  I highlight this facet 
of Intuitive Surgical’s business operations here to underscore how central the commodification 
and privatization of knowledge is to the company’s success, an issue that I take up later with 
regard to the production of embodied surgical knowledge in the contemporary teaching 
hospital and how the dVSS, potentially at least, intervenes on the surgeon’s “ownership” of her 
or his knowledge and skills.       
During the course of my research, I interacted with Intuitive Surgical on a number of 
different levels.  Their official website, http://www.intuitivesurgical.com provided a wealth of 
information and insight on how the company positions its product across several different 
audiences, from patients to surgeons to hospital administrators to current and potential 
investors.  From this website I was able to access Intuitive Surgical’s annual reports as well as 
PDFs of PowerPoint presentations made to investors on a quarterly basis.  Intuitive Surgical’s 
main website also linked to several minisites that focused on promoting to patients the dVSS in 
relation to particular procedures (http://www.davincisurgery.com, http://
www.davinciprostatectomy.com, and http://www.davincihysterectomy.com).   I also interacted 
on several occasions with a field representative for Intuitive Surgical who worked closely with 
the surgeons at University Hospital.  Ravitch (1987) suggests that the presence of sales 
personnel in the OR poses issues for surgical authority and potentially challenges surgical 
expertise.  He writes
The role of the company representative is the one most often questioned when 
[the company’s] device is one to be used in the operating room . . . The surgeon 
cannot turn an intrinsic portion of his operation over to a mechanic versed in 
the use of a device, much though he would appropriately benefit from advice 
from such a source as to the manner in which the device itself is operated, i.e., 
turned on or off, made to cut more or less rapidly, perhaps the angle at which it 
is to be held” (Ravitch, 1987:  133).   
However, I did not see this interaction as anything but a collegial partnership, which suggests 
that contemporary surgery, reliant as it is on technical devices, requires understanding surgical 
expertise as necessarily distributed, a condition that often results in tight corporate-medical 
(and in the case of University Hospital -university) enmeshment.   The Intuitive Surgical field 
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representative provided me with several promotional and educational flyers and CD-ROMs 
that were geared toward surgical professionals and provided comprehensive descriptions and 
video demonstrations of procedures conducted with the dVSS.  Finally, I was able to receive 
from Intuitive Surgical’s Applied Research Group information on the dVSS’ Application 
Programming Interface, or API, which provides, through proprietary means, access to the data 
streams produced by the dVSS while it is being used to perform surgical procedures.
Crucially, and perhaps controversially, my research also draws upon materials downloaded 
from Intuitive Surgical’s WebDAV server.  I encountered this publicly available website during 
the course of my internet research.  While I can’t recall my original search string, the site is 
currently still available through a Google search (“intuitive surgical ftp”).  Web-based Distributed 
Authoring and Versioning, or WebDAV, is an extension of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(http) that allows users to both read file from (as in traditional web browsing) and write files to 
a web server.  As such, it is similar to the older, and perhaps more familiar File Transfer Protocol 
(FTP).  Like FTP servers, WebDAV-enabled servers are typically used to facilitate the 
distribution of digital files (images, documents, videos) from a central computer over the 
internet.  Authorized users can access the WEBdav server using a “client” that enables them to 
both upload and download files.  Occasionally, WebDAV servers allow for users to access (read 
and/or read & write) files on the server “anonymously” (e.g. without requiring authorization).  
This is the case with Intuitive Surgical’s server.  I’ve been reticent to inquire about the intended 
functionality of this file server, as I’m not entirely certain that Intuitive Surgical is aware that its 
contents are openly available to the public; it has been a rich archive the access to which I don’t 
want to lose.  It may be that Intuitive Surgical is aware that these files are publicly available, or it 
may be that the systems administrators responsible for the server feel that “security through 
obscurity” outweighs the hassle of enforcing authentication and having to assign usernames and 
passwords for access.   The materials available on the site include product videos, product sell 
sheets, high resolution images, and marketing materials, as well as 3D models of the dVSS and its 
instruments.  Some material, such as ISI’s highly-polished marketing collateral, is clearly intended 
for the public, albeit perhaps not through this media channel.  Other material is clearly intended 
for ISI’s sales force, such as a document that provides a script to be delivered while surgeons 
“test drive” the dVSS at professional meetings.  Still other material is clearly in draft form, such 
32
as training materials being developed in conjunction with practicing surgeons (including 
surgeons at University Hospital).  Occasionally, a file will be placed on the server that seemingly 
bears no relation to ISI at all.  For example, for a time the site hosted a video clip from the 
animated television comedy The Family Guy.  In fact, I’ve verified that the public is able to upload 
their own files to this server, which is clearly not a security “best practice,” causing me to dream 
a bit about perpetrating a bit of performative multimedia mischief, such as uploading a poignant 
clip or two from the 2004 film I Robot.  
If one locus of my research, the operating room, can be productively described as a 
heterotopia, so can Intuitive Surgical’s WebDAV site.   Arguably, the WebDAV site functions as 
“a counter site . . . in which the real sites” — such as the highly-polished official Intuitive Surgical 
websites — “are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted” (1986: 24).  Further, as 
Foucault notes, heterotopias “are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to 
indicate their location in reality” (1986: 24).  To me, this sense of a real yet thoroughly “other” 
space characterizes well the nature of ISI’s online archive.  It is real, mirroring ISI’s utopic 
corporate self-representation, while yet “hiding in the light,” publicly accessible but thoroughly 
obscure without serendipitous bit of Google jockeying.
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—  2  — 
T H E  D A  V I N C I ®  S U R G I C A L  S Y S T E M :  
M AT E R I A L I Z I N G  T E C H N O L O G Y, M E D I C I N E  A N D 
C A R E
This dissertation focuses on the da Vinci® Surgical System as a concrete site for thinking 
through questions about the media specificity of medical technology and the technicity of care.  
Moreover, I focus on the dVSS in a particular context, the urology and gyn-oncology surgical 
suites of University Hospital.  This is necessary, I argue, because these issues cannot be explored 
in the abstract.  Too much discourse about technology tends to elide important differences 
between technologies, the specificities of their affordances, and the differential affectivities of 
their articulation with other entities:  humans, other technologies, the physical environment, and 
so on.  A similar tendency to gloss over specificity can be found in the medical humanities, 
which often treat medicine as a singular and unitary discursive formation.  Instead, I see 
contemporary biomedicine as a complex and disjunctive set of discourses and disciplines, each 
of which differentially addresses the human body, and practices different ontologies (Mol, 2002).  
Medicine, care and technology — and in particular the question of care’s relation to medical 
technology, the politics of medical care’s technics — must therefore be evaluated in concrete 
material contexts, in reference to sets of specific material practices and technologies.  Care is 
an embodied, material practice, not an abstract ethic.1  Medicine, too, practices its 
epistemologies and ontologies in material ways, through materially embodied enactments of 
care and cure.  Its techniques are increasingly rationalized into the logic of the protocol.   While 
1 I’m particularly drawn to Maurice Hamington’s notion of “embodied care”, which he defines as an approach to 
social relations “that shifts ethical consideration to context, relationships, and affective knowledge in a manner that 
can be fully understood only if its embodied dimension is recognized” (2003:  32).  Drawing on the work of 
Merleau-Ponty, Hamington brings the centrality of the body into theories of the ethical, arguing that care manifests 
in embodied habits, material practices that emerge from embodied knowledge of the self and other, not an 
abstract other, but a concrete, particular other.  While embodied care has for Hamington, “a telos of well-being or 
the flourishing of embodied creatures,” the “processes and practices of care are as important as the good.”  In 
other words, it’s the embodied, performative nature of care that necessitates grounding care in concrete relations, 
contexts and practices.
I will at times speak of technology and medicine in the abstract, my desire is to keep my analysis 
materially grounded, specific and concrete.  
Two risks attend this articulation of the differential specificity of the dVSS.   Weber points 
out one important danger:  “The attempt to work out the differential specificity of the medium
—to get at what distinguishes it from other media—runs the risk of transforming, albeit 
unawares, a differential determination into a positive and universal essence” (1996:  109).  In 
order to introduce the techne of the dVSS system, I begin with a relatively straightforward 
account of its material specificity.  The second risk derives from the fact that this accounting is 
an interpretive and potentially endless task.  As Hayles notes:
‘‘The physical attributes constituting any artifact are potentially infinite; in a digital 
computer, for example, they include the polymers used to fabricate the case, the 
rare earth elements used to make the phosphors in the CRT screen, the 
palladium used for the power cord prongs, and so forth. From this infinite array 
a technotext will select a few to foreground and work into its thematic 
concerns. Materiality thus emerges from interactions between physical 
properties and a work’s artistic strategies. For this reason, materiality cannot be 
specified in advance, as if it pre-existed the specificity of the work. An emergent 
property, materiality depends on how the work mobilizes its resources as a 
physical artifact as well as the user’s interactions with the work and the 
interpretive strategies she develops —strategies that include physical 
manipulations as well as conceptual frameworks. In the broadest sense, 
materiality emerges from the dynamic interplay between the richness of a 
physically robust world and human intelligence as it crafts this physicality to 
create meaning.’’ (Hayles 2002:  32-33)
In context, Hayles is talking about “technotexts,” digital literature that explicitly engages with the 
material conditions of its expression.  Following her argument nonetheless, I want to suggest 
that any engagement with materiality entails critical mobilization.  Materiality is a dynamic 
interplay between specification and interpretation.  
My point of interpretive mobility is governed by two primary methodological frameworks.  
The first, as I indicate in my introduction, is ethnographic observation.  In order to understand 
the dVSS in situ and in relation to the material practices of surgery, access to the ORs at 
University Hospital has been key.  I am not a surgeon myself, so understanding the dVSS in the 
professional culture of surgery, its “lifeworld”, is a critical mode of grounding my claims.  It yields 
35
a sense of the technology-in-use, how the dVSS gets practiced with, within and against a pre-
existing field of surgical and pedagogical practices.  Or again, how it produces new objects, 
affects and effects by bending the trajectories and structures of power and relationality already 
operative in the contemporary operating room.  Consequently, I must tell the story of the dVSS 
from a position of being in material/corporeal articulation with emerging practices—practices 
of repetition that, in their performance, nonetheless remain unstable and so open to critique 
and change.  
Secondly, I bring to this project a certain “technical expertise” that leverages my own 
“making sense” of the socio-technical components of the dVSS.  Having spent the last 10 years 
working on developing technologies and technological practices that can serve and transform 
the arts and humanities, this dissertation follows the implications of the dVSS as technical 
assemblage “all the way to the metal” (Kirschenbaum, 2008).  In other words, I take specificity 
and materiality in my analysis literally, and work to reconstruct the technical mechanisms of the 
dVSS’ black box. 
Pursuing media specificity of a platform in this manner may tend toward technological 
determinism.  I do want to maintain some sense that technology isn’t just what we do with it.  
Attention to the materiality of technology must acknowledge its “thing-ness” apart from human 
use value.  This proposition resonates with Gilbert Simondon’s (1958) attempts to articulate a 
mechanology, even as the very terms of differential specificity between human and technology 
collapse as they interface in increasingly complex ways.  Where possible, however, I try to 
highlight the relationality of the system, how its ontology is a function both of its articulation to 
human actors, as well as the techniques of my own interpretive practices.   Part of my analysis 
then might be characterized as an attempt to balance, perhaps precariously, both vectors that 
make up the interface of somatechnics, “a newly coined term used to highlight the inextricability 
of soma and techne, of the body (as a culturally intelligible construct) and the techniques 
(dispositifs and 'hard technologies') in and through which bodies are formed and 
transformed.”2   Following Richardson (2003), my analysis “underscores simultaneously the 
equipmental and corporeal — the technosomatic — specificity of seeing and knowing” that is 
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2 See http://www.somatechnics.mq.edu.au/
always relational, but articulated by and through the material conditions that shape or “do” 
these relations (22). 
What is the dVSS?
What is the da Vinci Surgical System?  Intuitive Surgical, Inc’s website offers this enticing 
description, portraying the surgical robot as: 
 . . . an advanced surgical system that we believe represents a new generation of 
surgery—the third generation.  We believe that this new generation of surgery, 
which we call Intuitive surgery, is a revolutionary advance similar in scope to the 
previous two generations of surgery—open surgery and minimally invasive 
surgery, or MIS.  Our da Vinci Surgical System consists of a surgeon’s console, a 
patient-side cart, a high performance vision system and proprietary “wristed” 
instruments.  By placing computer-enhanced technology between the surgeon 
and patient, we believe that our system enables surgeons to perform better 
surgery in a manner never before experienced.  The da Vinci Surgical System 
seamlessly translates the surgeon’s natural hand movements on instrument 
controls at a console into corresponding micro-movements of instruments 
positioned inside the patient through small puncture incisions, or ports.  Our da 
Vinci Surgical System provides the surgeon with the intuitive control, range of 
motion, fine tissue manipulation capability and 3-D visualization characteristic of 
open surgery, while simultaneously allowing the surgeon to work through the 
small ports of MIS.  (Intuitive Surgical - Investor FAQ)
Photo courtesy of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2009
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This description can be parsed in several ways.  First, Intuitive Surgical describes the dVSS as the 
(r)evolutionary advanced offspring of the “previous two generations of surgery,” open and MIS, 
a prodigy that carries forward the best elements of the previous generations.  Second, it defines 
the dVSS as a set of hardware components — a surgeon’s console, a patient-side cart — that 
map in some fashion to the key elements of the human surgeon’s body:  eyes and hands, in 
particular.3   Third, ISI defines the dVSS as a prosthetic enhancement of the capabilities of the 
human surgeon in that it enables better precision, better control, greater freedom of 
movement, and better visualization of the surgical field, all of which yield, in the end, better 
surgery.  Importantly, this prosthetic enhancement, as a product of computational mediation—
by placing a computer between surgeon and patient—is, nonetheless, a seamless translation.  It 
effectively dispels any notion that slippage occurs any moment of translation as re-presentation 
(e.g. “Ceci n’est pas une pipe”), or that the tight coupling of human and machine might produce 
something other.  In the rest of this chapter, then, I consider these different vectors defining the 
dVSS:  a (r)evolution of the surgical interface; a set of components, and a seamless translation of 
the surgeon’s intention into robotic action, of the surgeon’s eyes and hands into the surgical 
field.
The “(R)evolution” of the Surgical Interface
ISI positions the dVSS as the next evolution of the surgical paradigm.  The story of the 
“evolution” of surgery is usually told by marking a progressive series of technical “revolutions”:  
the ability to control hemorrhage through cautery and ligature; the ability to control pain 
through anesthesia; the ability to control infection through aseptic technique.  Not only did 
each of these innovations radically improve the prognosis of the surgical patient, they also 
transformed the subjectivity and embodied skills required of the surgeon.  For example, prior 
to the introduction of anesthesia, even minor procedures required adopting a disposition of 
grim if not sadistic virtuousity, teeth-gritting speed and desperate economies of efficiency:
A complete mastery of the craft was essential—a sureness, a boldness, and a 
fearlessness, with complete control of the instruments used, were especially 
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3 Hirschauer (1991) describes how the practices of “scrubbing in” effectively reduce the surgeon-body to its most 
instrumental elements, eyes and hands.  Not only is the patient immobilized and reduced to the “operating field” 
through practices of draping, the surgeon’s body is “visually reduced to the light gloves and the region of the eyes” 
and immobilized as well by the requirements of aseptic technique (Hirschauer, 1991:  285).
necessary, for we can imagine the difficulties due to the movements of the 
patient and too often the disturbing effect of his moans and cries.  (Thomas, 
1919:  804)
Surgery here figures as barbarous acts of non-anesthetized torture that more often than not 
resulted in the patient’s death, either from uncontrolled bleeding or the onset of systemic 
infection.   Certainly the introduction of these new techniques “humanized” surgery, as the act 
of surgery could be performed with less trauma and with a brighter post-operative prognosis.  
Not surprisingly, narratives of revolution and progress continue to frame innovations at the 
surgical interface.
Open Surgery
Within the evolutionary logic of surgical 
innovation, “in the beginning” were the large 
incisions of open surgery.  Open surgery is so 
named because it involves opening up the body 
in often dramatic ways to gain direct access to 
the surgical field.  This mode of surgical practice is 
predicated on direct, unmediated visual and 
tactile contact between the surgeon and the 
patient.  Large incisions allow the surgeon to look 
directly into the surgical field, to see and touch 
autoptically the targeted anatomy.   Or to put it 
another way, in the absence of techniques and 
technologies of prosthetically telemediating these 
senses, surgery’s fundamental reliance on the 
senses of touch and vision requires large, open 
incisions.
Hirschauer describes open surgery as a strategic “occupation of the patient body”:
The surgeon-body extends itself into the flesh: with fingers, clamps, suction 
tubes and cutting instruments.  One layer after the other is removed, camp is 
pitched, and the expedition continues.  Layers of skin and tissue obstructing the 
Image courtesy of Benoît Rossel
Source:  Le Théâtre des Opérations, a film by 
Benoît Rossel.  Produced by Pierre-André 
Thiébaud — PCT cinéma Télévision (Switzerland)
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view are cut through and spread apart.  Operating becomes a sequence of 
looking and cutting, of manipulations providing visibility for further 
manipulations. One must see to cut, and one cuts to see more.   Furthermore, 
organs are shifted for the sake of increased visibility; retractors spread the 
wound apart, gauze pushes organs aside, sleeves help to shift organs out of the 
wound. (1991:  299-300)
This particular configuration of the surgical gaze has its roots in the epistemologies of the body 
inaugurated by pathological anatomy.  The emergent techniques of anatomy, Bichat’s “opening 
up a few bodies,” produced a body amenable to the operational gaze of the surgeon—a spatial 
body composed of solids and surfaces, the body proper to anatomical mapping, the localization 
of disease to lesion—and set the conditions of intelligibility for surgical intervention as a mode 
of remediating pathology.  Foucault calls this mode of visuality the “anatomo-clinical glance” 
that, in kinship with the clinical gaze, formed the basis of modern medical perception.4  Unlike 
the clinical gaze, which Foucault links to aural perception, the glance involves a haptics, a 
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4 Foucault’s notion of the “medical gaze” is often taken to be unity.  But in fact Foucault identifies two medical 
gazes in his cartography of medical perception in the 19th century.  The first modality is the clinical, observing gaze:  
“The observing gaze refrains from intervening: it is silent and gestureless.  Observation leaves things as they are; 
there is nothing hidden to it in what is given” (Foucault, 1994:  107).  This gaze implies “an open field, and its 
essential activity is of the successive order of reading; it records and totalizes; it gradually reconstitutes immanent 
organizations” (Foucault, 1994: 121).  The clinical gaze is thus an open, scanning, ever-vigilant surveillant gaze.  Over 
time, however, Foucault argues that “the anatomo-clinical glance became suzerain over the clinical gaze” (1994:  4).  
“The clinical eye discovers a kinship with a new sense that prescribes its norm and epistemological structure; this is 
no longer the ear straining to catch a language [symptoms], but the index finger palpating the depths.  Hence that 
metaphor of ‘touch’ (le tact) by which doctors will ceaselessly define their glance.” (Foucault, 1994:  122).   
Pathological anatomy and clinical observation thus formed a mutually validating and constituting alliance.  
In Foucault’s analysis itself, then, I find reason to question any unitary conceptualization of the medical gaze.  
Instead, there are medical gazes, particular configurations of knowledge/power whose particularity, in a given 
context, can’t be glossed over.  The clinical gaze, once articulated in a particular apparatus, becomes something else 
in its relation to other elements in the apparatus, and can be literally refigured over time.   If the techniques of 
anatomy, Bichat’s “opening up a few bodies”, produced bodies amenable to the anatomo-clinical gaze—a spatial 
body composed of solids and surfaces, the body proper to anatomical mapping, the localization of disease to lesion
—then the techniques of the cinema, as a graphic practice, produced bodies amenable to the “vivifying 
physiological gaze”—a processual, temporal body.  These gazes are differently constituted and different in their 
effects.  If the anatomo-clinical glance was a gaze of bodily surfaces, Cartwright writes that the physiological gaze 
“regarded the body in terms of its living functions and processes, and its practitioners devised methods and 
techniques to facilitate a temporal, dynamic vision of the body in motion” (1995: 11).   
Media technologies are crucial here – the “new media” of the cinema in Cartwright’s analysis was crucial to the 
physiological inflection of the medical apparatus. Other technological mediations in the medical apparatus produce 
differently inflected medical gazes.   Note that I suggest that the medical gaze Michel Foucault describes is 
contextually and historically situated.  He theorizes how bodies came to be "objectified" in a particular domain, at a 
particular time:  the clinical teaching hospital in the 19th century.  Too often, Foucault’s notion of the medical gaze 
gets abstracted from the particular context from which Foucault articulated its formation, applied a-historically or 
mobilized too fluidly across contexts.  In other words, Foucault’s notion gets deployed unproblematically as a 
description of the politics of visuality, power and knowledge in medicine without doing the work of articulating 
how “the medical gaze” constitutes and gets constituted by other contexts, the contemporary clinic, for example, 
or domains of medical practice not defined by the clinical apparatus.
materializing tactility:  “this is no longer the ear straining to catch a language [symptoms], but the 
index finger palpating the depths.  Hence that metaphor of ‘touch’ (le tact) by which doctors 
will ceaselessly define their glance.” (Foucault, 1994:  122)  
Foucault elaborates that the anatomo-clinical glance thus “plunges into the space that it has 
given itself the task of traversing . . . In anatomo-clinical experience, the medical eye must see 
the illness spread before it, horizontally and vertically in graded depth, as it penetrates the 
body, as it advances into its bulk, as it circumvents or lifts its masses, as it descends into its 
depths” (1994:  136).  Implicit in Foucault’s description is how this medical glance both enacts 
and depends upon manipulation, on an exploratory or expositional doing that creates the space 
of visibility that the glance then “traverses.”5
In open surgery, hands are as important as eyes.  The sensory “resolution” of the hand far 
exceeds that of the eye.  The hand, for example, can pick out nanoscale variation on a surface 
that the eye perceives as undifferentiated and smooth.   The hand can sense the differentials in 
tissue viscosity and tensile strength that escape the eye.  Further, the hand can see more by 
virtue of its capacities for tinkering with the properties of tissue, further enabling the 
perception of subtle gradients of difference.   As Hirschauer elaborates:
Bare hands can, for example, make something out and then stretch some tissue 
to make it more transparent, or they identify nerves by way of their tensile 
strength. 'Blunt' dissection involves stretching, tearing or shifting tissue with one's 
fingers, during 'sharp' dissection hands serve as holders for the scalpel, scissors 
or the electric cauterizer. Vessels, skin, tissue and bones are tackled differently 
depending on the way in which they resist: the skin is treated with the scalpel, 
the yellow layer of fat and the peritoneum with scissors, muscles with the 
cauterizer. (1991:  300)
The practice of open surgery is thus sensorily rich and nuanced.  The work of the skilled 
surgeon in an open procedure resembles that of skilled craftsmen, cutting across skills 
associated with the carpenter, tailor, and butcher (Hirschauer, 1991:  300).  As a skilled craft, 
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5 The French “regard” can be translated as both gaze and glance.  It is unclear why Sheridan chose to translate “le 
regard anatomo-clinique” as the anatomo-clinical glance.  Casey (1999) provides an interesting meditation on the 
“striking” tactility of the glance that aligns it with medical practices of incision.  He writes:  “The glance lacerates; not 
only does it strike, as we signify in speaking of a ‘glancing blow,’ but it also cuts . . . Glance-work thus proves to be 
lance-work.  This latter is not to be confused with the separation-work of the intellect that neatly divides space 
and time into punctiform points and instants . . . Instead, the glance opens tiny tears in the continuous cloth of 
duration as well as minuscule faults in the surfaces of things, places, and people.” (Casey, 1999:  92-93)
competent execution of a procedure requires of the practicing surgeon a deep and embodied 
knowledge of the “stuff ” of his or her craft.  This is knowledge inscribed in hands and finger-tips, 
skin and muscles, the mnemonics of muscle memory.  Learning to practice open surgery 
involves a rich pedagogy of the senses, and accrues to the sentient body an intimate knowledge 
of the human body—the color and consistency of tissues, their shape and texture, their 
temperature, resiliency or fragility.  Zetka (2003) refers to this knowledge as “tactile 
intelligence” (11).   A surgeon learns as well to master her tools—the scalpel, scissors, needle 
and cautery—not only how they “fit” in her hand, but how they interact between hand and the 
visceral raw material of the surgeon’s art.
The large incision is not the final accomplishment of surgical visibility, however.  Its 
realization is both tenuous and temporary, and must be re-performed many times during an 
operation.  Maintaining the visual integrity of the surgical field can be described as both hard 
work and hand work, by which hands struggle to hold organs in place or out of place, to 
staunch the blood that always threatens to occlude a clear view of the targeted anatomy, by 
seepage or torrent.  As Hirschauer notes, the almost constant flow of blood is both an obstacle 
and a “sign of life” within the surgical lifeworld, initiating all manner of non-visual perceptions — 
e.g., warm and sticky sensations, the specific odor of blood and the stench of the cautery, the 
A Bookwalter™ Retractor - ©2009 Codman & Shurtleff, Inc.  All Rights Reserved
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gurgle of the suction (Hirschauer, 1991:  299).  Organs slip from grasp, flopping back over the 
surgical site.   A bleeder obscures the contours of anatomy under a wash of red.  Retractors 
stabilize the surgical field, but at the cost of inflicting greater trauma on the body, forcing skin, 
muscle and connective tissue to stretch to maximum limits.  I recall the first open surgery I 
observed on Dr. Kinema’s surgical service.  The procedure began with a 5-inch incision, 
vertically across the patient’s navel.  But the surgeons used a Bookwalter™ Retractor (pictured 
above) to force it open to twice that size, by ratcheting retractor spatulas against a rigid steel 
frame.  
Laparoscopic Surgery:  The “Minimally Invasive” Revolution
Laparoscopy “revolutionized” surgery by replacing the long incisions of open surgery with 
smaller, albeit more numerous, “keyhole” cuts.  
Instead of a long incision and flesh held back by 
hands and steel retractors, several small incisions 
are made in the abdominal wall, which is then 
inflated with CO2 gas.  Long, rigid, thin 
instruments are then passed through trocars that 
hold these small incisions open and into the 
inflated abdominal cavity.  Surgeons visualize the 
operating field tele-visually, by means of a fiber-
optic video camera called a laparoscope or 
endoscope.  A television screen displays a 2-
dimensional video feed from the endoscope.  The 
surgeon’s eyes and hands are thus extended 
prosthetically into the patient with minimal 
trauma.  
Often referred to as “band-aid” surgery, the smaller incisions heal much more quickly than 
the incision required for open surgery, lending to the characterization of contemporary 
laparoscopic surgery as “minimally invasive.”  As endoscopic surgery became the standard of 
care for many surgical procedures in the 1990s, cultural critics raised important reservations 
Image courtesy of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2009
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about the degree to which such practices were truly “minimally-invasive.” Instead, they stressed 
the continuities with well-established discourses of Enlightenment and the hegemony of the 
surgeon-subject.  Largely perceived as a masculine, voyeuristic, even colonizing form of 
spectatorship, these critiques of the “endoscopic gaze” emerge out of a feminist critique of 
invasive visuality, exemplified in the work of Ella Shohat (1998), Christina Lammer (2002), and, 
most recently, José Van Dijck (2005).  As Lisa Cartwright summarizes such arguments, 
The imaging of the body’s interior space in medicine and science has suggested 
to some scholars a narrative of Western advancement characterized by 
technology’s prosthetic augmentation of the sensory powers already built in, as 
it were, to the scientific observer’s body.  This argument suggests that devices 
designed to visualize physiological processes in effect enhanced researchers 
perceptual powers, extending the observer’s epistemological domain into 
previously uncharted territories—an Enlightenment project that continues in 
today’s medical imaging technologies.  (1995:  23)
Importantly, these scholars challenge us to see that in our contemporary context, the interior 
of the human body emerges as an important terrain of political struggle.  N. Katherine Hayles 
has argued, for example, that the extension of new techniques of scientific visualization into 
cyberspace and the “endospaces” of the body offer up both cyberspace and the bodily interior 
as “areas newly available for colonization” (Hayles, 1993: 185).    Ella Shohat perhaps expresses 
it most emphatically, however, in the following claim: “in an era when X-ray, ultrasound, and 
video laparoscopy have thoroughly charted the terra incognita of bones, chromosomes, and 
reproductive organs, feminist critique cannot afford to surrender the interior body to the 
curtained authority of the medical office” (Shohat, 1998:  240) 
I find the work of these theorists important for a number of reasons.  First, they assert that 
the social doesn’t end at the surface of the skin, but rather extends into bodily interiors as 
well.6  Their interventions counter the tendency within medical practice to strip bodies of their 
social significations, reducing them to “mere” biophysical objects (an ideology often referred to 
44
6 I discuss the significance of Probyn’s (1996) “sociology of the skin” in the next chapter.  For Probyn, the image of 
“stretching the skin” beyond the individual figures prominently in what she calls a politics of “outside belonging.”   In 
other words, rather than conceive of skin as a boundary that encapsulates discrete individuals, Probyn seeks to 
articulate a sociality of skin, the skin of the social that extends outward from the external limits of the individual 
body.  Insofar as I have an affinity with Probyn’s ethics of belonging, I therefore read attempts to think the social 
beneath the skin in a similar spirit.  Consequently, I have difficulty with feminist critiques that are predicated upon 
supposed violations associated with permeating the skin-as-boundary.  
as “instrumental realism”).7  To put it another way, they resist the tendency within surgical 
practice for bodies to become subject to what Michael Taussig calls “phantom objectivity”—a 
reduction to biological and physical ‘thingness’ in a manner that masks bodies (and bodily 
interiors) as sites and relay points in a network of social relations (Taussig, 1992:  84).  Against a 
medicine that treats bodily interiors as an asocial, apolitical terrain, whose perception can be 
ascertained independent of social codes of reading, these scholars render visible the complex 
politics of race, class and gender that striate the body’s viscera.  Furthermore, these scholars 
raise important questions about the politics of spectatorship in medical practice.  If both 
medicine and media involve interfaces, and if those interfaces are increasingly converging 
around the (computer) screen, then bringing critical insights from media studies (such as the 
spectator’s gendered gaze) to bear on media practices in medicine seems an important critical 
move.  Additionally, these critical analyses ask important questions about the materiality of 
optical and surgical interventions.  As Lammer (2002) points out, even though contemporary 
minimally-invasive procedures reduce invasiveness in terms of requiring smaller (horizontal) 
cuts, the (vertical) optical and tactile penetration into the body seems no more “minimally 
invasive” than open surgery.  Finally, these critiques raise serious reservations about 
epistemologies built upon Enlightenment-inspired ideologies of visibility and transparency.
Keeping these important critiques in mind, my analysis however focuses on the flip side of 
the discourses of enhancement and extension that accompany the endoscopic gaze.  Yes, 
laparoscopic technologies are media(ted) extensions of the human sensorium.  Yet every such 
sensorial extension is also an “amputation”, one that instigates a consequent re-ordering of 
“sense ratios” and disrupts the regimes of skill associated with open-incision procedures 
(McLuhan, 1994:  45).   Prosthetic extension consists of displacement and distancing as much as 
it involves enhancement and extension.  In his book, Surgeons and the Scope, James Zetka 
provides insight into some of these displacements.  He writes, 
“The contrast between the laparoscopic and the open-incision cases is pointed.  
A strange thing happens when the intra-abdominal image is projected on the 
television monitors:  Reality is inverted.  The larger-than-life image projected 
onto the television screen replaces the focus of the body as the focus of 
attention.  This images becomes the real, while the patient’s body serves as a 
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7 For a medical humanities defense of instrumental reason in surgical and imaging practices, see Belling (1998).
mere base from which the surgeon and her assistants manipulate their lever-like 
instruments.  The surgeon did not look directly at the tissue she was working on 
inside the body.  Her hands were not in the picture that was projected onto the 
screen; they were hovering above the abdomen and guiding instruments that 
protruded from the puncture ports.  Everything was done at a 
distance.” (Zetka, 2003:  15)
The laparoscopic image on the screen displaces the body of the patient; surgeons seemingly 
operate on the image, and the patient’s body tends to disappear from conscious 
acknowledgment.  This displacement is often seen as the salient issue when considering the 
ethics and politics of the endoscopic gaze from the point of view of the patient and the politics 
of recognition.  But when considered according to the craft- or labor-politics of the surgical 
profession, the disappearance of the patient from consciousness is not the only or the essential 
factor.  This disappearance co-exists alongside several other operations that the telemediated 
prosthetics of laparoscopy performs on the skilled open surgeon’s embodied “tactile 
intelligence.”  First, laparoscopy flattens the display of the surgical field into two-dimensional 
televisuality, eliminating depth perception and truncating the surgeon’s ability to judge distance 
in the surgical field.  Second,  the surgeon’s sense of touch is severely attenuated;  sensations 
transmitted through the laparoscopic tool handles in no way approximate the rich sensations 
received by the hand in open surgery.  The resistance of tissue to the probing intervention of 
the instrument is felt, but radically diminished by the fulcrum physics of the rigid laparoscopic 
tools.  And these instruments cannot transmit temperature, texture, viscosity — all the detailed 
qualities constitute the surgeon’s tacit knowledge of the body, of “seeing with” the hand.  Finally, 
laparoscopy inverts several of the habitual embodied relations upon which the open-incision 
surgeon relies upon for action orientation.   One manipulates here, but sees the action over 
there, on the screen, as in video game consoles like the Wii and Playstation that make use of a 
television screen and remote controllers.  Laparoscopy turns inside out the body’s habitual 
understanding of intention and action.  The fulcrum physics of traditional laparoscopic 
instrumentation inverts the relationship between hand movement and instrument tip.  To move 
the tip of an instrument upward, the hand grasping the instrument must be moved downward, 
and vice versa.   This, coupled with the 2D view of the surgical field, makes intervening on 
anatomy an extremely difficult and non-intuitive endeavor.  
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Making matters even more complicated, the laparoscopic surgeon seldom controls the 
orientation of the endoscope.  Instead, a surgical assistant holds and maneuvers the endoscope 
based on explicit verbal commands and by intuiting the scopic orientation desired by the 
surgeon.  The assistant and the camera become, in effect, the surgeon’s eyes.8  This simple 
displacement sunders the coupling of optical and the kinesthetic senses that constitute the 
“natural” human visual system.  More often than not, the eyes and the hands are out of sync, 
and cannot be fully re-aligned.  A skilled surgical assistant, of course, learns to anticipate and 
approximate the line of sight desired by the operating surgeon holding the instrument handles, 
but even among skilled surgical teams this separation is never ultimately overcome.  And if the 
surgery requires a spatial reconfiguration of the surgical team, such as the surgeons trading 
places to afford one or the other a better view or to enable a better surgical approach, 
orientation gets un-done.  As described by a ob/gyn surgeon quoted in Zetka (2003):
“You are looking at a screen and transferring [cognitively] what you are doing 
with your hands to what’s on the screen . . . You know, it is hard.  I mean you 
don’t know where you are.  Once you’ve oriented yourself and have that all 
worked out . . . now if you move to a different side of the table, everything has 
just changed again and you have to retrain your brain.”  (21)
Weber suggests that this dis-orientation constitutes a key element of the differential specificity 
of the television medium.  Weber argues that televisuality “transports vision as such and sets it 
immediately before the viewer” (1996:  116).  In a sense, Weber’s argument is a version of the 
mediation-as-alienation argument, except that Weber articulates it according to both the 
medium specificity of television and/in its relation to embodied human perception.  Television 
doesn’t dis-embody as much as split embodiment, creating syncopations in our sense of 
emplacement here.   He suggests that not only does the televisual augment the viewer’s 
capacity for sight, “it involves a transmission or transportation of vision itself.  The televisual 
spectator can see things from places — and hence, from perspectives and points of view (and 
it is not trivial that these are often more than one) — where his or her body is not (and often 
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8 Becoming the eyes of the surgeon has a coercive quality to it.  Operating surgeons can get quite angry if a 
surgical assistant or resident shifts position during the procedure.  In my interview with a gyn-oncology resident, 
this became, quite literally, painfully clear, as she described how for many laparoscopic procedures she must stand, 
perfectly still, often in an awkward and twisted position that gives the operating surgeon “proper exposure.”  
Laparoscopic surgery can resemble a deadly serious version of games like Twister (in this case, the awkward 
positions can be held for hours) or Simon Says (in this case, the “players” try to interpret and faithfully reproduce 
the movements that “surgeon says.”).
never can be) situated” (Weber, 1996:  116).  This makes vision relatively independent of the 
limits of embodied situatedness and does so by cutting the sutures that map bodily orientation 
to visual perspective.   As Weber succinctly puts it, “television overcomes distance and 
separation . . . only because it also becomes separation” (1996:  116).  
The “Next” Revolution:  Emergent Surgical Paradigms
Continuing the logic of medical (r)evolution, Intuitive Surgical’s website positions its 
technology at the bleeding edge:  “In the late 1990s, another evolutionary stage in the 
development of surgical technique was achieved with the application of robotics to surgical 
technology.  At the forefront of this new era, Intuitive Surgical introduced the da Vinci® Surgical 
System” (Intuitive Surgical - Robotic-Assisted Surgery).  Proponents of the robotic surgical 
paradigm now recast laparoscopy as a mere “intermediary” technology on the way to the 
robotics revolution.  Satava, for example, describes laparoscopy as a “revolution from the past,” 
a “transition technology” that “will recede in importance as newer modalities come 
forward” (2001:  1408).  Narratives of progress in late modern medicine tend to recast “old” 
technological revolutions as roadside attractions along a historical highway of ever-advancing 
innovation.  Implicit in the evolutionary narrative is a teleology of “species improvement,” such 
that each successive generation retains the traits best suited to its survival, while other, less 
adaptive traits wither away.  As I will articulate later in this chapter, ISI positions the dVSS 
platform as remediating the limits of the laparoscopic revolution without abandoning the 
“minimally invasive” affordances of tele-mediated vision and manipulation.  Indeed, the 
“minimally invasive revolution” continues.  For 
example, Laparoendoscopic Single-Site Surgery 
(LESS) reduces the number of “keyholes” cut into 
the abdominal cavity to a single incision at the navel.  
Endoscopic camera and laparoscopic instruments 
enter the body through this single point, as the 
image on the left indicates.  Natural Orifice 
Transluminal Endoscopy claims to eliminate the 
surgical incision altogether; surgeons enter the body 
instead through one of its “natural” access points:  the nose, mouth, anus or vagina.  Since any 
Laparoendoscopic Single-Site Surgery
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cutting used to access a surgical site takes place from already inside the body, NOTES is thus 
often referred to as “incision-less” surgery.  Some new surgical apparatuses leverage principles 
of interventional radiology in order to do away with incisions altogether, these can accurately 
be described as non-invasive surgical procedures.  For example, the Cyberknife® Robotic 
Radiosurgery System treats cancerous and non-cancerous tumors anywhere in the body by 
precisely delivering beams of high-dose radiation.  If “going under the knife” is a euphemism for 
surgery, it no longer obtains in these new surgical paradigms.  Cyberknife, for example, retools 
the surgeon’s scalpel as an artist’s paintbrush:   “The CyberKnife System can essentially “paint” 
the tumor with radiation allowing it to precisely deliver treatment to the tumor alone, sparing 
surrounding healthy tissue” (Cyberknife::How is the Cyberknife Unique?, n.d.).  Even more 
remarkable than Cyberknife’s severing of the link between surgery and razor-sharp steel, 
emergent techniques that leverage bioengineering foreshadow an even greater disruption of 
the ontologies of surgical practice.  Satava & Wolf (2003) name these practices “biosurgery.”  
Satava (2007) suggests that instead of operating at the macro-level of gross anatomy, these 
surgical techniques will be “implemented at the cellular and molecular levels—changing the 
basic biology (and possibly DNA itself) without changing the anatomy but inducing the repair at 
a biologic level” (160).  
I cite these examples not to suggest that they constitute a singular vector of change 
sweeping over surgical practice.  Open-incision and laparoscopic techniques will continue to be 
practiced for some time to come.  I outline them here to provide a context for the discussion 
that follows, which focuses on the material media specificity of the dVSS platform.  Each of these 
surgical apparatuses — the dVSS, LESS, NOTES, Cyberknife and biosurgery — transform 
surgical practices in different ways and refigure relations between surgeons and patients, 
between surgeons and their sensory apparatus, between surgeons and the authority or 
autonomy of their labor practices in diverse and divergent directions.  Addressing all of these 
technologies in a comparative manner falls outside the scope of this dissertation (although I 
perceive the need to consider them in future work).
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Three Components
To this point, I’ve said surprisingly little about the dVSS itself.  The goal of this section is to 
describe the key components that make up the dVSS, to convey a sense of the technology as a 
mobile, shifting set of practices or interfaces, and to proliferate the connectivities that constitute 
the dVSS as an interfacial technology assemblage.   The “System Overview” section of the 2007 
Da Vinci S Surgical System User’s Manual lists the main hardware components of the dVSS:   
“the Surgeon Console; the Patient Cart, which is designed to hold the EndoWrist® 
Instruments, and the Vision Cart.”  Taken together, these three components comprise key 
elements of the dVSS platform.   The Da Vinci S User’s Manual represents these components 
de-contextualized, and, importantly, dis-embodied of both surgeon and patient, two undeniably 
constitutive elements of the dVSS as an apparatus.  The goal of this chapter is to re-articulate a 
“manual eye’s view” of the surgical system.  This will necessitate prying open some of the 
systemic opacity that a traditional user’s manual might leave intact, in the name of clarity, or 
intellectual property.   
To consider the dVSS beyond the manual eye’s view of its three components is 
metaphorically to dissect its surface anatomy, opening up these surfaces to reveal new ones.  It 
is to tease out finer structures, making new technical surfaces and objects visible.  Surgical 
imagery is particularly apt in relation to the articulation of the media specificity of the dVSS.  
Hirschauer describes the surgical practice of dissection as something that materializes or makes 
visible:
Dissection, which is the precision work of making objects visible, is at the same 
time classifying work.  The flesh is dense and compact, stuck together and 
impenetrable.  First, one has to identify something in a crevice opening up, in the 
depths of a wound or on a bloody surface.  During the search for a spermatic 
duct, someone utters 'I can't see anything', and an assistant is told, 'now, this is 
the transversus perinei profundus'.  In the case of microsurgery, this identifying 
work can take hours, in which whitish and red cords are identified as particular 
nerves and vessels and lifted out of their bloody surroundings by slings and 
numbered clamps.”   (1991:  300-301)
In other words, dissection is a cut that structures the conditions of possibility for seeability and 
sayability within surgical practice; further, dissection “cuts across” the discursive and non-
discursive, creating new visibilities and intelligibilities.   
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Hirschauer goes on to suggest, however, that these new visibilities are instrumentalized or 
territorialized according to the abstract machine of the anatomical atlas.  He writes that, as 
dissection proceeds, “[a]nother film seems to be spread out on the patient-body like an 
overlay: the anatomic film.  Dissection aims to present organs in the isolating style of an 
anatomic atlas. The drawings show neatly separated organs; in the patient-body this state must 
first be produced by isolating them with the knife” (1991:  301).  In other words, anatomically-
driven dissection and specification is an attempt to recreate the body according to its own 
image, its image as represented in the anatomical drawing.  It proceeds by restructuring the 
territory to look like the map, sculpting the patient’s tissue in such ways as to resemble the 
anatomical atlas.  It also might be said to effect a certain violence on the patient’s body, molding 
it into an externally-imposed regime of intelligibility.
By contrast the surgeons I observed seemed to pursue a different mode of expository 
dissection.  To be sure, its goal was visibility and intelligibility; the surgeons had to cut to see and 
to see to cut,  both of which required recognizing, at least provisionally, what they were seeing 
and cutting.   Ultimately, for example, their goal was to expose the bladder neck in its 
differential specificity from its surrounding tissues.  And yet more often than not, the practices 
of exposition seemed much inflected by the practice of the craft.  I mean the sense that 
surgeon and knife don’t so much impose a form as elicit one from the patient’s body, which 
exerts its own singular material resistances and fluidities in anticipation and in response to the 
surgeon’s efforts to shape it.   Surgical residents were repeatedly encouraged to “follow the 
plane as long as it’s giving it up,” not so much cutting as tracing along an interface, spreading 
apart the involuted surfaces that constituted it.  This intervention in turn opened up new 
surfaces, constituted new objects, and so on.   
As I work through the three main components of the dVSS, then, I play with both modes of 
expository dissection; on the one hand, I anatomize the dVSS apparatus according to its 
anatomical atlas, the Da Vinci S User Manual.  Consequently, my descriptions work through the 
components of the dVSS in a rather objectified manner.  Occasionally, however, I find a plane or 
interface to follow as long as it’s giving it up (perhaps all the way down to the metal); my 
analysis complicates and reconstitutes the User’s Manual, opening up new planes of analysis, and 
new modes of understanding the dVSS that exceed the instrumental logics of the Manual.
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Component 1:  Surgeon’s Console
The Surgeon’s Console is the primary interface of the surgeon to the surgical system 
and it technically mediates the operating surgeon’s relation to the patient.  This relationship is 
fundamentally tele-somatic, in that it involves both an embodied relation with the dVSS as 
technical apparatus and an 
experience with televisual 
and telehaptic space 
(Richardson, 2003).  As 
illustrated by the image at 
right, the Surgeon’s Console 
allows the surgeon to 
operate while “comfortably 
seated at an ergonomic 
console” which offers a 3-
dimensional image display of 
the surgical field and access 
to hand-operated master controllers and foot-operated pedals (2008 Annual Report).9  The 
master controllers and pedals provide the means for the surgeon to control the surgical 
instruments and endoscope within the patient.   
To operate, the surgeon places her or his head in the console’s viewport; in fact, the System 
requires that the surgeon’s head be in the viewport at all times.  Any looking up or away from 
the viewport locks the surgeon’s instruments, part of the dVSS’ failsafe design.  In this way, the 
dVSS requires a tight coupling of the surgeon to the console.  No one can operate without 
forging the proper bodily orientation to the apparatus.10  The viewport is the surgeon’s visual 
interface with the dVSS, and provides a content-rich view of the surgical field:
Image courtesy of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2009
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9 Comfort and ergonomics here are relative to other surgical practices, such as open and laparoscopic procedures 
which involve standing for long intervals, often while holding awkward body postures. 
10 This also implies a different kind of yoking - of surgeon to a corporation.
When the endoscope is activated, 
the stereo viewer's integrated left 
and right video channels provide 
the operator with continuous 3D 
video, virtually extending the eyes 
of the operator into the surgical 
field. The view port also displays 
messages and icons which convey 
status of the da Vinci S System to 
the Surgeon Console operator. 
(Manual, 2007:  1-6)
The surgeon can view the 3D image in “full-screen 
mode” or can choose to swap to “TilePro™ 
mode,” which displays the 3D image along with up 
to two auxiliary images of “patient critical” 
information, such as a CT scan of the surgical anatomy.11  Icons and text messages are overlaid 
on the video to provide extended information to the surgeon.  In this way, the dVSS’ InSite 
Vision System can toggle between an immediate and hypermediate televisuality.  
With head firmly in viewport and eyes fixed on the Insite Vision display,  the surgeon then 
grasps each master controller with index finger and thumb.  In a gesture reminiscent of a 
Photo courtesy of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2009
Hypermediated TilePro™ View
Image courtesy of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2009
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11 “Or a procedure manual” as was often joked at University Hospital.
conductor calling an orchestra to attention, bringing the thumb and index finger together 
activates the instruments.  
Once activated, the 
instruments mimic the 
motions of the operator’s 
hands:  “These movements 
are precisely and seamlessly 
replicated at the Patient 
Cart, thereby virtually 
extending the operator’s 
hands into the surgical 
field” (Manual, 2007:  1-5).   
The master controllers 
(often referred to simply as “masters”) consist of two main parts, the “orientation platform” and 
the “positioning arm.”   Manipulating the orientation platform rotates the instrument tips and 
opens and closes the grips of the instruments.  Manipulating the positioning arm with gestures 
like reaching and pulling move the instruments in 3-dimensions in the surgical field.  These 
“positioning movements” can be scaled to according to three hand-to-instrument ratios, 
depending on the precision required for a particular task or at a particular magnification:  2:1 
(normal), 3:1 (fine) and 5:1 (ultrafine):
5 cm 
1 cm 
Image courtesy of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2009
Photo courtesy of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2009
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Setting this ratio gears down the surgeon’s movements to match the magnified space in which 
s/he operates.  So, for example, with the scale set to 3:1, movement of the surgeon’s hand at 
the master controller 6 mm to the right only moves the surgical instruments 2 mm to the right.
Finally, the Surgeon’s 
Console’s “foot switch panel” 
affords the surgeon a foot-
activated interface to control 
the dVSS.  In the center of the 
foot switch panel is a rocker bar 
that controls the endoscopic 
camera’s focus (+/-).  The right-
hand foot switches are labelled 
“BI” and “MONO” and are used 
to apply bipolar and monopolar cautery control through instruments equipped for the delivery 
of electro-thermal energy to cauterize, score, and/or incise tissues.  Bipolar cautery involves the 
passing of high-frequency electrical energy through tissue from one electrode to another.  In 
the case of the Maryland Bipolar Forceps, for example, the two “electrodes” are the two 
teethed grasping surfaces of the forceps which compress and vaporize tissue held between 
them.  In monopolar cautery, cautery and scoring of tissue occurs at the point of contact 
between a single electrode and the patient’s tissue.  In monopolar, the patient’s body acts as a 
ground.  The Maryland Bipolar Forceps are often used to deliver monopolar energy, with the 
two teethed grasping surfaces closed together to form an instrument tip that is pressed against 
tissue (usually a “bleeder”) and energy is applied.   The bipolar pedal has a different textured 
“feel” under the foot to help surgeon’s distinguish between the two pedals.  Most surgeons I 
observed removed their shoes and operated in their stockinged feet.   
The two pedals on the left side of the foot switch panel are labelled “CLUTCH” and 
“CAMERA.”   These two pedals allows the surgeon to control the patient side cart’s four arms 
with only two master controllers.  Tapping the CLUTCH allows the surgeon to change which 
arm each controller manipulates.  Swapping robotic arms is signaled by the message 
“Swapping” on the surgical display and an audible tone.  Depressing and holding down the 
Photo courtesy of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2009
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CLUTCH footswitch delinks the master controllers from control of the instruments and “floats 
the Masters in space” (Manual, 9-9)  This process “locks” the surgical instruments in place while 
allowing the surgeon to reposition the master controllers freely in relation to them.  One way 
to describe the function of the CLUTCH is by analogy to lifting and repositioning a computer 
mouse.  Lifting the mouse allows you to move it freely in space without moving the cursor.  
Once the mouse is put back down on a surface, its control of the cursor resumes.  In terms of 
the computer, this technique becomes useful when the limits of screen space and physical 
space fail to align, such as when a mouse runs out of space on a mousepad before it reaches 
the edge of a display interface.  Lifting and repositioning the mouse creates a new set point for 
the orientation of the mouse to the screen, a new mapping relation between hand and cursor.  
In a similar fashion, engaging the CLUTCH allows the surgeon to reorient the relation between 
controller and instrument, in order to assume a more comfortable position, attempt a different 
approach at a targeted anatomy, or in the event that the masters run out of working space.   
When the CLUTCH pedal is released, the masters resume control of the surgical instruments.
By pressing and holding down the CAMERA pedal, the surgeon disarticulates the master 
controllers from the surgical instruments and re-articulates them to control the endoscopic 
camera arm.  Moving the endoscope in 3D space requires moving both hands in unison.  In the 
dVSS training session I attended, the instructor suggested that we think about it like reading a 
newspaper with both hands, pulling it closer to you to read the fine print and pushing it away 
to scan the paper’s headlines.  The dVSS’ Manual describes it terms of manipulating an image, as 
if you were holding a photograph:  
In this mode, the Surgeon Console operator uses both masters at once to 
zoom in or zoom out, pan from side to side, or rotate.  To zoom in, pull the 
image toward you by moving the masters toward your eyes.  To rotate the 
image clockwise, rotate the two masters together clockwise, like a steering 
wheel.  When the pedal is released, the masters will resume control of the 
instruments.  (9-9)
Given the centrality of pedals in the performance of robot-assisted surgery, images and 
references to the foot switch panel are notably absent from promotional materials.  In a way, 
this is not surprising, given how the foot gets overlooked in modern discourses of virtuosity, 
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which prefer to speak of the precise dexterity of the hand.12  And yet, as French prehistorian 
Andre Leroi-Gourhan argues, if the technicity of the hand defined the evolutionary specificity 
of the human, the freeing of the hands for gesture and tool-use relies upon the foot bearing the 
“foundational” responsibility for bipedal human locomotion (1993).   
Component II:  Vision Cart
Source:  (Shevlin et al, 2007:  92)
Continuing the “Manual’s eye” view of the platform, the second component of the dVSS is 
the Vision Cart.  The Vision Cart houses the dVSS platform’s endoscopic image illumination 
and processing hardware.  Properly speaking, the InSite Vision System spans all three 
components of the dVSS:  A centrally located robotic arm on the Patient Cart holds the InSite’s 
dual channel endoscope (production) that traverses fiber optic, HDMI and computational 
pathways through the Vision Cart (transmission) to the 3D display at the Surgeon’s Console 
(reception).  In an effort to continue the narrative conceit of re-constituting the User Manual, 
however, I consider the entire vision system here under the heading “Vision Cart.”  
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12 Much more can be said about the importance of the foot in understanding the gender politics of automating 
skilled labor.  Indeed, if surgery is defined in some sense by skilled practices of sewing,  it is both interesting and 
troubling to place the automation of surgery alongside the gendered labor politics of the contemporary.   The old 
Singer sewing machine was powered by a foot pedal, and defined a significant part of the relationship of the 
female body to the labor practices of piecework.  Further, as Andrew Ross points out, “today, the sewing machine’s 
foot pedal is still very much in business, no longer competing with steam power, of course, but with the CPU 
(Central Processing Unit of the computer), which, at the higher end of garment production, is used to govern 
computer assisted design, ensuring fast turnaround and just-in-time supplies for the volatile seasonal trade in 
fashion lines” (Ross, 2002: 101).   Their sewing skills decidedly undervalued, women still constitute the majority of 
sweatshop labor and therefore stand most to lose from the automation of their skilled craftwork (Ross, 1997:  15).
da Vinci InSite Vision System 12mm 3D HD Endoscope
Photo courtesy of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2009
Fiber optics illuminate the surgical field with bright, white, Xenon light (the same bulb 
technology in contemporary automobile headlights).  Light bounces around the surgical field, 
glancing off glistening anatomy and into the dual lenses of the robotic endoscope, a dual 
channel model with lenses offset at a ratio roughly equivalent the offset of the eyes in the 
human binocular vision system, positioned with focal points that overlap but don’t fully 
coincide.  Non-identical right and left images of the surgical site are transmitted through a 
series of lenses in each scope channel until the photons of the image acquired by the scope 
reach the InSite Vision System’s 3D Camera Head.  The Camera Head contains two HD 
cameras, one for each scope channel.  The HD cameras themselves are 3CCD cameras, so 
photons reaching the cameras are first separated into red, green and blue wavelengths of light 
by a prism.  The prism directs each color to the 2-dimensional capacitor array on one of three 
separate charge-coupled devices (CCDs) which converts the different intensities of light into 
voltage differentials, which are digitally sampled and transmitted to the Camera Control Units 
on the Vision Cart itself.   Light becomes a voltage differential sampled into a digital data-
stream.  The Camera Control Units apply algorithms that adjust gain and control brightness; 
they balance contrast and color saturation.  And, importantly, the CCU’s correct for keystone 
distortion.  Regular users of data-video projectors are familiar with this phenomenon, which can 
be thought of as a highly technicized form of “parallax error.”  To be precise, keystone distortion 
is the horizontal and vertical disparity that result from a rectangular plane being projected off-
center in the X or Z axis (assuming a right-hand coordinate system).  It occurs because the 
computational generation of 3-dimensionality from a 2D image requires that the CCD image 
sensor hardware be positioned at an angle oblique to the endoscope shaft.  Because of the 
material constraints of the video apparatus, the “raw” image data has to be computationally re-
sampled, re-projected, and then the reprojection rectified (inversely mapped) back onto the 
“original” image in real time, as illustrated in the diagram below:
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Source:  (Shevlin et al, 2007:  94)
This computational matrix confounds the relationship between reality and its representation in 
terms of the “reality effect” of the image.  The “original” image both reflects and distorts reality, 
requiring a computationally intense restoration of perspectival realism in the data-image 
stream.13  Once the data-image is geometrically corrected, it is relayed to a Video Signal 
Distribution board that hypermediates the data-image, applying system messages as textual and 
graphic overlays before sending the image to the pair of monitors at the Surgeon’s Console.  
These finally display the data-image as image.  The “restoration” of depth perception to the 
surgeon’s endoscopic gaze relies therefore on a dizzying array of physical and computational 
mediations, translations and transformations.  This “accomplishment” of 3D laparoscopic vision 
also depends upon the specificity of human wetware.  A human observer “adapts their eyes’ 
convergence angle to minimise horizontal disparity at a fixated object, and so achieves a single 
view with depth perception enhanced by stereopsis” (Shevlin et al, 2007:  93).  This is not 
machine vision, where the human observer need not figure into the perceptual loops, but 
rather a prosthetics of vision accomplished in and through the articulation of hardware, 
software and wetware.
The InSite Vision System consequently refigures the surgeon’s gaze in a manner quite 
distinct from the traditional endoscopic gaze.  It reroutes the penetration of autoptic viewing 
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13 Shevlin et al (2007) suggest that a relatively low resolution (512x512 pixel) stereo image pair requires over 10 
million calculations per video frame.  Calculated on a per pixel basis, “the reprojection requires 6 multiplications, 6 
additions and 2 divisions per rectified pixel and bilinear interpolation adds 4 multiplications and 2 
additions” (Shevlin et al, 2007:  95). 
through a circuituous system of fiber optics and video processing units that expands and shapes 
the surgeon’s own optical system.  Magnified and digitally enhanced, the InSite Vision System 
provides the surgeon’s eyes with vision, a vision of real reality, but a reality that has been really 
worked over.  The dVSS thus shifts problems identified with medical imaging onto those of the 
mediation of vision.  It changes not only the nature of what-is-seen but also of seeing-what-is.  
The patient as seen through or with the dVSS platform returns to the surgeon’s gaze as a 
dispersed “field” of spectatorship that cannot be entered without prosthetic support.
Component III:  Patient-Side Cart
The Patient Cart is 
the “sharp end” of the dVSS 
apparatus, described in the 
Manual as the “operative 
component” of the dVSS.   
This core element of the 
dVSS is composed of several 
subcomponents.  First, the 
cart is supported by a 
motorized base used to 
position or “drive” the patient cart in place for an operation.  The base supports robotic arms, 
four in the case of the “S” model, and three in the case of the standard model, although the 
standard model can be upgraded with a fourth arm.  At the top of the cart is an LCD display, 
which displays a two dimensional rendering of what the operating surgeon sees in 3D at the 
Console’s Insite viewport.  In the “S” model, this display is touch-sensitive and allows the 
surgeon at the patient side cart to draw on the screen with digital ink, which appears 
simultaneously in the operating surgeon’s viewport.  This feature, called “remote telestration,” 
affords a mode of visual communication and pedagogy within the apparatus.  Attending 
surgeons use this feature to highlight, for example, an anatomical structure when the surgical 
resident is unsure of what he or she is looking at, or to trace a visual path for the surgical 
resident to follow when dissecting tissue.   Thus, the process of “remote telestration” offers one 
Photo courtesy of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2009
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way in which gesture finds its way into the tele-mediated circuits of exchange through which 
apprenticeship on the dVSS proceeds.  
Telestration:  The attending surgeon traces a path for the resident to cut along.
Image courtesy of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2009
The function of the Patient Cart’s robotic arms is to hold the System’s endoscopic camera 
and Intuitive Surgical’s proprietary Endowrist® surgical instruments.  The Endowrist® 
instruments are one of the centerpieces of the surgical platform and form the basis of ISI’s 
claim to exceptionalism, that the dVSS platform is “Taking Surgery Beyond the Limits of the 
Human Hand™”.  Traditional laparoscopic instruments are rigid and provide only four degrees 
of freedom in their movement within the surgical field; the surgeons I shadowed likened them 
to operating with chopsticks.   Endowrist® instruments, on the other hand, are “wristed” near 
the instrument tip, affording surgeons with greater range of motion and increased dexterity:  7 
degrees of freedom, 90 degrees of articulation, and 540 degrees of rotation.  ISI positions them 
as both “like” (modeled after) and “unlike” (superior to) the human hand, as illustrated in this 
description taken from the company’s website:
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Intuitive Surgical's exclusive EndoWrist Instruments are designed to provide 
surgeons with natural dexterity and full range of motion for precise operation 
through tiny incisions.  Modeled after the human wrist, EndoWrist Instruments 
can offer an even greater range of motion than the human hand.  They truly 
allow the da Vinci® System to take surgical precision and technique beyond the 
limits of the human hand.  Similar to human tendons, an EndoWrist Instrument's 
internal cables provide maximum responsiveness, allowing rapid and precise 
suturing, dissection and tissue manipulation.  The wrist-like movement, 
responsiveness and robotic control afforded by the da Vinci System and its 
exclusive EndoWrist Instruments provide surgeons fluid ambidexterity and 
unparalleled precision. (Intuitive Surgical - Endowrist Instruments)
Intuitive Surgical’s promotional materials go to great lengths to suture the relationship 
between the Endowrist® instruments and the surgeon’s hand — emphasizing their similarity — 
while simultaneously positioning the former as a superior materialization of the latter.  This is 
illustrated by the representational strategies deployed in the images below.  
The image at left superimposes the instrument and the hand in order to highlight their likeness.  
Significantly, however, the hand represented is not a photograph of a particular human hand.  
Instead, the Endowrist instrument is made to coincide with the stylized image of a perfected 
(and endlessly perfectible) digital simulation of the hand.  The image at the right juxtaposes the 
Images courtesy of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2009
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Endowrist instrument with the gloved hand of a surgeon, but the greater number of after-
images that halo around the Endowrist images are intended to signal the superior mobility of 
the instrument’s greater range of motion.
Finally, explicit in the design of the dVSS is a mechanism that both foregrounds and mitigates 
against another limitation of the human hand.  Specifically, the human hand tends to exhibit a 
“natural” or “physiological tremor” that oscillates at approximately 8 - 12 Hz not despite but 
rather because of the biomechanics of steadying the motion of the hand (Elble & Koller, 1990). 
In the interstices between hand and instrument, the dVSS interjects a computational algorithm 
that actively rejects as noise the wetware specificity of the human hand:  “An adaptive 
disturbance rejection scheme cancels the surgeon’s natural hand tremors and enables greater 
accuracy in the placement of the microinstruments, with less danger to neighboring tissue and 
less blood loss” (Lilly, 2005).  Due to this filtering mechanism, the Endowrist® instruments 
function with greater precision and control than the hands that manipulate them.  In rhetoric if 
not in fact, Endowrist instruments exceed the hands that made them.
Image courtesy of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2009
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Command and Control:  Master/Slave Robotics
In industry terms the dVSS is considered a "master-slave" system.14  This designation means 
that the robotic end affecters (the dVSS arms and Endowrist® instruments) only accept and 
respond to commands initiated from the "master console”, the surgeon's console controls.  To 
convey a sense of seamlessness at the articulation of master to slave, ISI’s promotional video 
materials almost always include video footage that portrays the Endowrist® instruments and 
the surgeon’s hands at the master controllers in split-screen and in perfect synchronicity:  You 
move, it moves.  At the crux of this representational strategy is the issue of command and 
control, and the video sequences are intended to convey how perfectly the dVSS follows or 
replicates the hand motions of the surgeon at its controls.  Online FAQs about robotic surgery 
recite the reassurance that the da Vinci robot is “under the direct control” of the operating 
surgeon and cannot operate autonomously.  ISI’s FAQ webpage also declares that “At no time 
does the surgeon….program/command the system to perform any maneuver on its own/
outside of the surgeon's direct, real-time control” (Intuitive Surgical - Frequently Asked 
Questions).  While watching a procedure with the corporate representative from Intuitive 
Surgical responsible for the University Hospital account, he leaned over and whispered, “The da 
Vinci’s not really a robot; it can’t do anything on its own.  It only does what the surgeon does.  
While it could be imbued with artificial intelligence, we intentionally keep it dumb, for safety’s 
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14 Anna Everett cautions against the persistent rhetorical deployment of the master/slave hierarchy in 
conceptualizing technological dependency loops within the digital public sphere.  She describes a quotidian scene 
re-iterated thousands of times each day, with every boot and re-boot of a PC:  
In powering up my PC, I am confronted with DOS-based text that gives me pause…“Pri. Master 
Disk, Pri. Slave Disk, Sec. Master, Sec. Slave.”  Programmed here is a virtual hierarchy organizing 
my computer’s software operations.  Given the nature of my subject matter, it might not be 
surprising that I am perpetually taken aback by the programmed boot-up language informing me 
that my access to the cyber frontier indeed is predicated upon a digitally configured “master/
slave” relationship. (Everett, 2002: 125)
While Everett sees in these deployments “no racial affront or intentionality,” I want to highlight here the way in 
which the etymology of the term robot carries a structure of human oppression within it.  The Czech playwright 
Karel Čapek is said to have coined and popularized the term “robot” in his science fiction play R.U.R. (Rossum's 
Universal Robots), which premiered in 1921 (Ewing et al, 2004; Moran, 2007).  In Czech, the term robota implies 
“forced labor,” and importantly, Čapek’s robots weren’t machines.  Instead, they were bioengineered humanoid 
organisms, human-like, but reduced to the “bare life” necessary for the provision of cheap, reliable and reproducible 
labor.   In the play, Harry Domin, RUR’s general manager, describes the ingenuity of the company’s namesake and 
founder:  “Young Rossum invented a worker with the minimum amount of requirements.  He had to simplify him.  
He rejected everything that did not contribute directly to the progress of work—everything that makes man 
more expensive.  In fact, he rejected man and made the Robot” (Čapek, 1921). 
sake.”  Dr. Ornstein, surgeon and assistant professor of urology at UC Irvine’s Medical Center 
soothes against fears “that the robot will take over.  There's no intelligence involved. The robot 
won't work on its own. It is an extension of the surgeon's arms and eyes” (Young, 2007).  
Ironically, all of this incessant re-iteration and re-affirmation of surgeon control over robot 
docility may unwind the stability that ISI seeks to maintain.  As Heidegger notes, “the will to 
mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human 
control” (1977:  5)  Intuitive Surgical’s efforts to figure the Endowrist® instruments as mimetic 
of and yet superior to the human hand co-exist precariously alongside the company’s equally 
emphatic assertions that these robotic end effectors remain completely, and ineluctably, under 
human control.  Put simply, how can the robot be both superior and subordinate to the human? 
Taken together these representations suturing the hand-instrument relation pursue 
incommensurate ends.  The Endowrist® instruments are positioned as “more human than 
human,” as the perfection and supercession of the human, their dexterity exceeding that of the 
human, measured according to “degrees of freedom.”   And yet the same hand/instrument 
articulation is called upon to do the work of concretizing the command and control that the 
surgeon exerts over the robot.  The split screen video representation dramatizes the hand/
Endowrist® relationship as one of mimicry in the context of subordination may [following 
Bhabha (2004)] function as a relation of instability and ambivalence.  While not wanting to gloss 
over crucial differences between colonial discourse and the technocratic context at hand, 
Bhabha’s analysis nonetheless seems apposite.  The dVSS platform performs as a “slave” system 
that nonetheless mimics (and indeed surpasses) the surgeon-as-master.  It seems to participate 
in
a discursive process by which the excess or slippage produced by the 
ambivalence of mimicry (almost the same, but not quite) does not merely 
‘rupture’ the [master/slave] discourse, but becomes transformed into an 
uncertainty which fixes the colonial subject [robot] as a ‘partial presence.‘  By 
partial, I mean both ‘incomplete’ and ‘virtual.’  It is as if the very emergence of 
the ‘colonial’ [discourse of ‘command and control’] is dependent for its 
representation upon some strategic limitation or prohibition within the 
authoritative discourse itself. (Bhabha, 2004:  123) [additions mine].
It could be said that the representational strategy articulating the relationship between 
surgeon and robot “depends upon a proliferation of inappropriate objects that ensure its 
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strategic failure, so that mimicry is at once resemblance and threat” (Bhabha, 2004:  123).  Like 
the colonial Other produced by the “civilizing” practices of colonial rule (“not quite/not 
white”), ISI’s representational strategies of mimicry produce a complex matrix of embrace and 
disavowal that destabilizes the very ground of (human/nonhuman) difference that it depends.  
The dVSS in this context functions as both resemblance and threat, both of which hinge upon 
the disconcerting displacements of the “not quite”:  Not Human/More Human Than Human.  
Even if one rejects the discursive ambivalence of mimicry and the 
import of a marketing strategy, a brief consideration of the dVSS platform’s 
architecture, a return to its media specificity, suggests that as much as the 
surgeon controls the robot, the robot also controls itself through a series of 
fail-safe mechanisms and watchdog feedback loops.  Together with the careful surgeon at the 
controls, a nested series of “fail safe” mechanisms actively and passively preclude opportunities 
for autonomous action on the part of the robot.  Some of these are under the control of the 
surgeon, such as the pressing the “EMERGENCY STOP” button at the Surgeon’s Console 
(Manual, A-6).  But for the most part, system safety and stability is monitored and enforced by 
System itself.  As the User Manual points out, “when a fault occurs, the system will make a 
determination on whether the fault is recoverable or non-recoverable” and then will pursue 
the appropriate action, locking the Patient Cart’s robotic arms, sounding an alarm, and posting 
an error message on the Console Viewport with instructions for how the surgeon should 
proceed (A-2).  At no point does the surgeon intervene in this process, except the appearance 
of control the system affords by allowing the surgeon to press the “fault-override” button.  In 
the event of “Non-Recoverable Faults,” the dVSS has to be restarted, allowing the robot to 
“regain control” of itself so that it can give over control to the surgeon.  Complete malfunctions 
of the system result in a complete loss of control over the dVSS, and require that the surgical 
team rely on “dVSTAT,” the da Vinci® Surgery Technical Assistance Team, which provides a live 
technical support engineer within 30 seconds of placing a service call during regular business 
hours.  Furthermore, research is underway that effectively reverses the power relations of 
command and control on the platform.  This research explores and tests the feasibility of 
mechanisms (“virtual fixtures”) by which surgical robots can restrict the surgeon’s movements 
to a pre-defined surgical field, with the rest of the patient’s anatomy designated as a “no-fly 
66
zone” (see, e.g. Abbott & Okamura, 2003; Kapoor et al, 2005)  In this sense, the dVSS prevents 
the surgeon from harming the patient (and indeed protects the surgeon from himself!).
In the command and control architecture that sutures the surgeon to robot, issues of authority, 
autonomy and automation fold into each other.  I will come back to this complex articulation in 
the next chapter as I discuss how it plays out in relation to the becoming-robot of the surgeon 
and the becoming-surgeon of the robot.  For now, I simply mark the slippages and disjunctures 
that emerge when attempts are made both to suture the interface between surgeon and robot 
and yet to render the robot as Other, as a docile body for the exercise of mastery and control.  
In what follows, I continue to pursue the trope of ambivalence, through the surgical platform’s 
interplay of distance and immersion and the paradoxical haptic productivity of error.
Distance
Within the space of the typical OR, the Surgeon’s Console is positioned approximately 6 - 
8 feet from the patient and Patient Cart, outside of the sterile surgical field.  This dissociation of 
the Surgeon’s Console from the sterile field theoretically enables the dVSS to be used as a tele-
surgical instrument, the surgeon and the patient geographically dispersed.   Intuitive Surgical’s 
website suggests that they are not interested in developing telesurgical applications at this time, 
even though they were the driving force behind the DARPA-funded SRI research from which 
ISI emerged.   According to the ISI website:
http://www.intuitivesurgical.com/products/faq/index.aspx#4
This is a bit equivocal on Intuitive Surgical’s part.  ISI insists that the dVSS is not for telesurgery, 
even though all of the development was conducted under DARPA funding for telesurgical 
applications that would allow surgical procedures to be conducted under hostile conditions 
(e.g. a battlefield) without placing the surgeon in harm’s way.   In fact, ISI avoids the claim that 
the dVSS constitutes telesurgery because it lost a patent infringement case to Brookhill-Wilk I, 
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LLC (“Brookhill”) in 2003.  This case hinged upon the definition of “remote.”  The litigation 
began in 2000 when Brookhill brought a patent infringement lawsuit against Intuitive Surgical, 
claiming that the dVSS infringed upon claim 10 of U.S. Patent No. 5,217,003 (“the ‘003 patent”).  
This patent established intellectual property rights over any surgical system that transmitted 
televisual images to and received tele-manipulation commands from “a remote location beyond 
a range of direct manual contact” with the patient’s body.  Since the dVSS platform involves, 
potentially at least, positioning the Surgeon’s Console at a distance from the patient, it would 
seem that ISI was clearly infringing on the ‘003 patent.  Brookhill contended that their patent 
applied to any technological mediation that extended “beyond an arm’s length from the 
patient.”  However, Intuitive Surgical successfully argued in US District Court that this 
specification of “remote location” meant “a location outside the operating room.”  A US Federal 
Court of Appeals overturned the District Court’s decision, and Brookhill settled with Intuitive 
Surgical for a one-time fee of $2.6 million.  In return, Brookhill granted unrestricted, perpetual 
and exclusive license to practice any of the Brookhill-Wilk Patent rights.15
Legal maneuvering aside, this is not mere semantic play.  Beyond this explicit ambivalence 
about distance, there are the implications for the changing practice of physical contact in the 
context of care.  The telemediated distance that the dVSS introduces — the surgeon no longer 
at the patient’s side, but 6-8 feet away—puts the patient literally out of reach and out of touch, 
and confounds notions of care based upon physical intimacy and phenomenologies of touch.  
From the surgeon’s phenomenological perspective, this new distance from patient is often 
experienced as disconcerting, especially for the veteran surgeon.  Dr. Sierra, for example, 
expressed a certain alienation from the patient, which he described as a both a loss of 
connection and control.  As he put it,
I don’t know how I’d describe it . . . a loss of connection, maybe . . . I’m really most 
comfortable when I’m at the patient’s side.  I feel like I’m more in control of the 
situation, particularly if something goes wrong.  [Laughs]  I guess I’m more 
comfortable being the conductor than the first violin.
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15 As McLean & Torrance (2008) point out, this “loss” was a major victory for Intuitive Surgical, affording them the 
freedom “to operate in the cybersurgery market exclusively, unencumbered by further patent liability. By contrast, 
anyone who attempts to enter the market with any surgical instrument that allows the a surgeon to stand away 
from the operating table must now be prepared to defend itself in a patent infringement lawsuit” (6).
Notably, Dr. Sierra recoups his place in the surgical hierarchy by refiguring the spatial position of 
the operating surgeon’s assistant from an assistive to directorial role.  Another example:  When 
I entered the OR on the first day of my observations, I was immediately positioned as a 
spectator to other spectators, as somebody watching somebody play a video game.  The 
patient’s body was completely elsewhere.  We all watched the surgery play out on the screen, 
watched the operating surgeon play on the screen.  Like teenagers playing Nintendo, the 
spectators praised certain actions — “Nice move” — and one of the more experienced 
“gameplayers,” the attending surgeon, directed the play:  “No , you want to move over there.  
That’s it, now cut.”  And yet the cool and seamless layering of sights and screens was 
occasionally interrupted by sounds and smells that dis-located the “gameplay” from the screen 
back to the patient’s body laying just within my peripheral vision, off to the right.  We saw the 
tissue parting under the scissor blades on the screen, but heard the sharp “clip” sound from 
under the drapes, where the real tissue was removed.  We watched the boil of blood at the tip 
of the cautery as the surgeon took care of a bleeder; smoke briefly occluded our view on the 
screen.  But the sound of the sizzle and its pungent smell emanated from somewhere less 
localized.  These odd dislocations comprise the excess of the patient body within the corporeal 
space that the dVSS materializes.  On the one hand, the dVSS enacts both the cut and the 
cautery and provides a high definition visualization of each.  On the other hand, the snip and 
sizzle, not to mention the stench, are the traces of a body otherwise forgotten in its technical 
suspension or supercession.  Technology thus both evokes and effaces the body, generating a 
shuttling back-and-forth of “visibilities” across the visual, aural and olfactory registers.
Smoke from cauterized tissue occludes the view of a radical nephrectomy
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Accordingly, the dVSS embodies an ambi-valence of intimacy and distance, technological 
“high” culture and “natural” care, rational and so-called intuitive systems of interaction.  The 
operating experience is a highly technically mediated interface with the patient’s body.  The 
surgeons with whom I interacted, however, repeatedly insisted that this interface was both  
“intuitive” and “natural”, especially insofar as the technologies engaged reproduced or mimicked 
the eye-, hand- and instrument-orientation of open surgery.  Unlike traditional laparoscopic 
surgery, which flattens the display of the surgical field into two-dimensional televisuality, the 
Surgeon Console’s InSite Vision System restores depth to the televisual image.  Further, if the 
fulcrum physics of traditional laparoscopic instrumentation inverts the relationship between 
hand movement and instrument tip (in laparoscopy, to move the tip of an instrument upward, 
the hand grasping the instrument must be moved downward), the dVSS re-inverts the 
orientation of hand to instrument, thereby restoring “natural” motion.  Finally,  as the images 
below attempt to convey, when seen through the dVSS stereoscopic viewer, the instrument tips 
appear to align with the surgeon’s hands at the controls, increasing the sense that the 
instruments are virtual extensions of the operator’s hands.16 This realignment remedies how 
the specificity of the now-traditional laparoscopic apparatus “decouples” surgeons’ “oculo-
Images courtesy of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2009
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16 For a complementary perspective on how this cognitive phenomena of suturing what is seen and what is 
experienced as “my body,” see contemporary work on “mirror-box” therapy and “If I Were You:  Perceptual Illusion 
of Body-Swapping” (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008)
vestibular axis for visual orientation from their haptic-proprioceptive axis for 
manipulating” (Satava, 1998:  142).  I move my hands here but see the instruments move over 
there, on the screen.  This requires a differently skilled body than open or robotic surgery, akin 
to the most “non-immersive” video game play.  Working in this way, dVSS corrects for a 
technologically-imposed disability.  If MIS laparoscopes disengage the “proper” orientation of the 
body, then the dVSS platform restores it.
 Immersion
The dVSS repairs the very distance upon which it depends.  It goes further yet to provide an 
immersive experience, the feeling of being truly “inside” the patient.  As I noted to myself, the 
dVSS provides:
the experience of virtual reality but it’s not virtual reality.  It’s real — real reality.  The 
quality of the image, while HD, is not such that I am looking at an open procedure.  
You still have the sense that this is a mediated, somewhat constructed image.  But 
you soon fall into an immersion in that space and the docs talk about feeling like 
they’re really inside the body.  The tendency of all the surgeons is to zoom in closer 
and closer and closer, particularly the novice surgeons.
 As a complementary practice, the more experienced surgeons tend to recommend resisting 
the zoom, the play of visual movement in and out.  In one instance, Dr. Sierra charged the 
resident performing the surgery:  “Don’t move your eyes.  Keep the camera where it is right 
now.”  I asked him later why.  As a result of the tendency to zoom in closer and closer, he said 
that one loses a sense of spatiality, the perception of both scale and depth.  Dr. Sierra also 
noted that the “stable vantage point has a kind of efficiency to it, if you can find a point from 
which to operate comfortably without having to constantly shift the camera around.”  By 
“efficiency,” Dr. Sierra intended to signal how “staying put” functioned as a means of 
economizing motion, eliminating “unnecessary” movements to speed up the pace of a 
procedure.  But equally implicit in this disciplining vision to “stay put” is the presumed efficiency 
of Cartesian perspectivalism in mastering the bodily interior and seeing “into” interior truths.  
Prosthetics of Human Encounter
It is not surprising that ISI’s promotional materials often picture the dVSS in an 
anthropomorphized form, such as in the image of the Patient Cart below.  The way in which 
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the platform is posed positions the TilePro LCD display as head, with the robot arms extending 
from the “torso” supported by the motorized base which protrudes forward like a pair of feet:
Courtesy of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2009
By media extension, the dVSS performs a prosthesis of human encounter.  As ISI indicates,  “the 
da Vinci S HD Surgical System integrates 3D HD endoscopy and state-of-the-art robotic 
technology to virtually extend the surgeon’s eyes and hands into the surgical field” (http://
intuitivesurgical.com/products/davincissurgicalsystem/index.aspx).  Accordingly, the system at 
once removes the surgeon from direct contact with the patient and superattenuates his or her 
connection to “the surgical field,” i.e the patient’s body.  The prosthesis of human encounter 
depends upon a structural homology to the body of the surgeon.  The dVSS becomes an 
“information system” with eyes (3D endoscope), hands (Endowrist® instruments and even a 
brain with the “computational capacity of 7 decent laptops. . . and the operating code streches 
beyond 1.4M lines” (“Da Vinci S robot II.,” 2009, February 10).  In addition to the ambivalence 
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of mimicry, then, this (often anthropomorphized) structural formation produces a dual dynamic 
of distance and immersion. 
Touch
Thus far, I’ve laid out how the dVSS emerges within a discourse of surgical (r)evolution, one 
that involves both an augmentation of the surgeon’s faculties and a reduction in trauma on the 
patient’s body.  But as McLuhan notes, any media extension of the sensorium often involves an 
amputation, and so within the historical trajectory of open to laparoscopic surgery, a story of 
loss of sensory plenitude is latent.  Vision becomes reduced to the two-dimensional video 
screen image.  Touch is severely attenuated; the haptic feedback experienced through the 
laparoscopic tool handles in no way approximates the rich sensations received by the hand in 
open surgery.  The resistance of tissue to the probing intervention of the instrument is felt, but 
radically diminished by the fulcrum physics of the rigid laparoscopic tools.  And these 
instruments cannot transmit temperature, texture, viscosity — all the detailed qualities that 
once constituted the surgeon’s tacit knowledge of the body.  
The innovation of the dVSS is that it restores visual depth perception and realigns the 
surgeon’s visual and the motor axis.  It does this by operationalizing a structural homology 
between the system and the human body.  From the point of view of the surgeon, eyes and 
hands are brought back into “proper” alignment.  The dual-camera endoscope and related 
image processing unit both mimics and capitalizes on the human binocular vision system, 
producing the effective perception of dimensionality and depth in the televisual endoscopic 
image.   As a result, the surgeon experiences a certain immersion in the patient’s body, aided by 
the “intuitive” nature of the dVSS surgeon console interface.  Unlike the laparoscopic apparatus, 
eyes and hands align with the “point-of-view” perspective of the surgeon, creating the 
experience that the robot’s Endowrist instruments are the surgeon’s hands, and that the 
surgeon is peering directly into the patient’s abdomen, even though in physical space neither 
eyes/endoscope nor hands/instruments align at all.  This experience of distance is not fully 
sublimated by the dVSS interface, in part because the surgeon’s perceptual system does not fully 
merge with the dVSS interface.  Surgeons still hear the sounds from physical space, sounds 
directionally spatialized in ways not consonant with the dVSS’ “intuitive” eye/hand alignment:  I 
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cut here, in front of my eyes, but hear the cut somewhere over there.   I cauterize here, but 
hear the sizzle over there; the smell takes longer to reach my nose than in an open procedure, 
further spatializing the sensory distance between surgeon and patient.  The material 
configuration of the mediating technologies comprising the dVSS thus raise the dual dynamic of, 
and tension between, immersion and distance.  This dynamic tension is a question of the 
interface, the mutual articulation of bodies and machines on which I will focus greater attention 
in Chapter 3.  For now, I want to consider the interface as a question of touch; specifically, touch 
as a ground of caring practice.
Both touch and aurality can be related to humanist figurations of care.  For example, “really 
listening” to patients—to their narration of symptoms, fears and aspirations—is often cited as 
technique that conveys that a doctor “really cares” about her or his patients.  The performance 
of active listening, of course, does not apply in relation to care in an intra-operative surgical 
context, except in the cases of conscious neurosurgery and minor procedures not involving 
anesthetic.  But the tactile sense of caring, of attending to and with a “human touch” does apply 
in this context.  Surgery can be associated with acts of violence; a sentient body would 
experience unbearable pain under the surgeon’s knife.  But surgeons such as Richard Karl are 
cognizant of the tactile facets of caring-for that accompany the controlled trauma of surgery.  In 
his memoir Across the Red Line:  Stories from the Surgical Life, Karl writes:  “We irrigate the 
abdomen with warm saline.  We are very gentle, lest we disrupt some other nonhealing tissue 
and make him worse.  These are acts of surgical tenderness” (2002, 63).  On a list of “acts of 
surgical tenderness” I would also include a surgeon’s “taking care” during the opening and 
closing a surgical incision to create as small a wound as possible, tracing a cut that can be closed 
with minimal and inconspicuous scarring.  For example, in one open operation I observed, to 
correct for post-operative complications following a robotic procedure, the attending surgeon 
made the decision to close the operation himself, a task usually relegated to the surgical 
residents.  His motivation for doing so was, I think, driven by a certain guilt that the failure of his 
initial operation had resulted in an emergency surgery, where care could NOT be taken in 
making the first cut, resulting in a large slash across the patient’s navel.  In opening, the surgeon 
had removed much of the discolored scar tissue.  And in closing her incision, Dr. Kinema 
decided to forgo the much quicker but more imprecise stapler and instead chose to manually 
74
sew her incision closed, even using finer gauge sutures than he would normally use to close.  
The choice of suture meant that even greater care had to be taken, more stitches thrown, but 
ultimately resulting in a much cleaner, tighter closed incision and a minimal, and perhaps 
eventually imperceptible scar.  Finally, I would include a whole myriad of unconscious and 
conscious acts that resist the reduction of the patient to mere object on the operating table.  
While the patient’s chest, for example, is often used as a “tray” for holding instruments during a 
procedure, I also observed surgeons gently squeezing their patient’s arm, or shoulder, etc.  
Through these forms of tactility, at least two forms of care are practiced:  the affective show of 
concern for another human being, and the guarding against harm or leaving an ugly trace of 
surgical violence. 
My argument is not that touch is somehow inherently caring or care-giving.  Touch, like 
speech, can be violent and violating.  But I do maintain that caring touch requires a certain 
modicum of tactility, requires enacting an experience of multi-sensory embodied connectivity 
between interlocutors.  In this sense,  the dVSS is positioned ambiguously in relation to caring 
touch in the surgical context.  On the one hand, the precision of the Endowrist instruments do 
create the conditions of possibility for greater care-taking within an operation, of sparing 
precious nerve tissue in a prostatectomy for example, tissue crucial for maintaining continence 
and sexual function post-operatively.    On the other, its cold steel robotic arms and teethed 
and bladed instruments are the antithesis of what we tend to think of as instruments capable of 
conveying caring tactility.  
Contemporary researchers actively pursue the integration of a richer sense of haptics into 
the interface of the dVSS and other telemediated surgical platforms (see, e.g. Culjat et al, 2008; 
Reiley et al, 2008; Okamura, 2006).  I make no claim here about whether these efforts will 
succeed or fail.  If, as I maintain, care on the tactile register requires a multimodal and embodied 
experience of the other, I hope that they will.  What interests me here are what resources for 
caring tactility the dVSS platform affords, and by what mechanisms a rudimentary sense of 
tactility emerges from its interface with the surgeon.  While Lenoir (2002) suggests that the 
dVSS incorporates the PHANTOM force feedback system, this is not the case.  At this point in 
time, the dVSS lacks any engineered haptic mechanism that would allow surgeons to experience 
even the basic forces that the robotic arms exert on the patient’s tissues during an operation.   
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Because of this lack, tissues can be more easily damaged by an inattentive or novice surgeon.  
Tying sutures tightly without breaking them is one of the more difficult tasks for a novice da 
Vinci surgeon to master.    
ISI claims—and my own experience on the dVSS confirms—that the dVSS platform is not 
entirely devoid of a haptic, tactile experience.  The surgeon at the console does experience a 
limited haptic sensation when instrument arms collide or when manipulating tissues in the 
surgical field.  If not explicitly engineered into the system, on what mechanisms, then, does this 
haptic sensibility depend?  In part, haptic experience on the dVSS platform depends upon the 
role the human visual system contributes to our sense of touch.  ISI refers to this sense of 
tactility as “haptic visuality” (or, occasionally, “visual tactility”) to capture the way in which seeing 
something happen on the dVSS display gets experienced, substitutively or synesthetically, by the 
surgeon’s hands at the master controllers (Hagen et al, 2008; Bethea et al, 2005).  Simply put, 
the hands experience what the eyes see.  On one level this adds further credence to the 
multimodal sensory knowledge that a surgeon brings to her craft, knowledge that gets carried 
in the muscle memory of the skilled and experienced surgeon.  When tying off a suture, for 
example, surgeons do not sense the force they exert on the Vycril suture based on 
proprioception and touch alone; subtle visual cues also provide feedback on how much tighter 
a suture can be cinched.  This knowledge is made explicit in the training of surgeons on the 
dVSS.  Dr. Sierra, for example, instructed a student frustrated about breaking yet another suture 
that he would eventually learn to see the tensile limits of the suture through such visual cues as 
the blanching of tissue or the glisten of moisture that beads up on a length of suture as it is 
pulled taut.   As David Rosa (ISI’s senior marketing director) puts it, “You make up for the loss of 
sense of touch with what you’re seeing with your eyes . . . how far tissue is stretching, if it’s 
blanching, how far you’re pulling your instruments apart if you’re tensioning a 
suture” (Cleaveland, 2005).  
Phenomenology also asserts the entwinement of the visual and the tactile in shaping our 
experience, as does Roland Barthes’ theorization of the punctum, the “prick” of the 
photograph, and Laura Marks exploration of haptic visuality in the cinema, how certain modes 
of video invite the viewer to see haptically:  “the eyes themselves function like organs of 
touch” (Marks, 2002:  2).  Certain strands of cognitive neuroscience also suggest strong ties 
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between the human visual system and embodied experience.17  For example, Alva Noe (2004) 
argues against the primacy of the “retinal image” model of visual perception, where the eye’s 
function is analogous to a camera and the only “data” for vision is the image which the retina 
records.  Instead, Noe posits that vision involves enactment, a much more kinesthetic and 
synesthetic mode of perception based on the anticipation (and memory) of touch, of whole-
body interaction and exploration with objects in the world that unfolds over duration, instead 
of the photographic “instant”.
Even more interesting for my purposes, however, is the manner in which the limited haptics 
of the dVSS result from error that is not a malfunction; namely, the productive excess of the 
complex cybernetic feedback system behind the master-slave relation so crucial to the media-
specificity of the dVSS platform.  As noted earlier, ISI suggests that the master-slave relation is 
one of “seamless translation” between the movements of the surgeon and the movements by 
the robotic arms controlling the Endowrist® instruments.  Cleaveland (2005) interviewed Bill 
Nowlin, ISI’s director of software systems, on the issue of haptics on the dVSS platform.  
Cleaveland writes:
The da Vinci system does provide some force feedback, derived from the error 
signals in the position loops. “I would describe it as a variant of bilateral force 
reflection,” says Nowlin, “and what that means is that the error produced 
between desired and actual at the patient-side manipulator is used to generate 
a feedback signal that the master and, therefore, the surgeon feels.” This is not 
true force feedback, he points out, for a simple reason: “If that were completely 
linear and if its scale factor were one, if its gain were one, then that would be 
true force feedback. It would also violate Bode’s theorem and a few other things 
and would be unstable.” (2005)
As I will attempt to outline, this disjuncture between desired and actual is not dysfunction; to 
the contrary, the primacy of error motors the robot body as much as it generates tactility 
within the system.  Without knowing for certain the precise mechanism by which the dVSS’ 
positioning feedback loops generate haptics through error — the technology remains largely 
blackboxed — I can outline the contours of this process by extrapolating from some of the 
patents that ISI has taken out on robotic surgical technologies.  Patents protect knowledge as 
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17 I’m also aware of studies that leverage neuroimaging techniques to dramatize how simply visualizing something
—in the “mind’s eye” or even on television— activates the same neuropathways as would be activated if someone 
were actually doing the same thing. 
intellectual property not by black boxing knowledge, but instead by elaborately defining and 
specifying it.  Patent claims stake a claim on knowledge as a property that can be defended 
from infringement.  They define the contours and boundaries of that property.  They are 
therefore useful tools in understanding the media specificity of complex technical objects.  In 
this section, then, I draw upon two ISI patents:  “US 6,722,053 B2:  Aspects of a Control System 
of a Minimally Invasive Surgical Apparatus” and “WO 2007/111749 A2:  Method for Handling 
an Operating Command Exceeding A Medical Device State Limitation in a Medical Robotic 
System.”  
As I outlined earlier, the dVSS is a master-slave robotic system.  Ideally, the robot’s end 
effectors do not move except as initiated by the master controllers at the surgeon’s console.  In 
the logic of robotic engineering, the perfect master-slave system is one that achieves perfect 
mimesis between master and slave, where the surgeon’s actions are seamlessly reproduced by 
the end-effectors, without excess or loss, except for the active cancellation of that which is 
deemed expendable from or excessive to the movements being reproduced, such as human 
hand tremor.  As Hansen Medical describes it in relation to their Sensei surgical robot, “You 
Move, It Moves.”  I see ISI’s often repeated assertions of the seamlessness of the master-slave 
translation as an effort to sublimate the instability that translation inserts into systems of 
exchange, be they semiotic, computational or electro-mechanical.  The movement of the hands 
at the master-controllers does not translate into a one-to-one correspondence of movement 
at the end-effector in the surgical field.  Nor is the system designed to do so.  Instead, on a 
superficial level, it both scales the motion reproduced (according to a specified ratio) and filters 
motion that occurs at the same frequency as human hand tremor.  One might still imagine that 
translation according to a mechanics of simple mechanical gearing, but this is not the case.   The 
interface between master and slave in this robotic system is computationally-derived as much as 
its mechanically-driven.  
To elaborate, there are some elements of the master-slave relation that adhere to the 
physics of the direct application of physical force.  One might say the master-slave logic of the 
laparoscopic apparatus is mechanically-driven:  Force applied to the handle-end of the 
laparoscopic surgical tool is directly translated into force exerted at the sharp end of the tool, 
albeit in an inverse direction (downward force on the handle results in upward force at the 
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instrument tip).  The ratio between force applied and force delivered is a function of how 
deeply the laparoscopic tool is inserted into the patient’s abdomen.  (Think of the fulcrum 
effect of a see-saw.  If the fulcrum of the see-saw is exactly centered, then force delivered on 
one end should match force exerted at the other. 18  The closer the fulcrum is to one end of 
the see-saw, the greater the force differential produced.)  Force-translation is also a function of 
the material properties of the laparoscopic shaft (e.g. how stiff or flexible the instrument shaft 
is will also affect the force-translation ratio).  
But the dVSS also introduces computationally-derived forces into the master-slave interface 
that complicate the master-slave logic exponentially.   The mechanical linkages of the 
laparoscopic system--the rigid shaft of the laparoscopic tool--break down at the fiber-optic, 
informatic interface that connects the Surgeon’s Console to the Patient Cart.  The physics of 
force move through spaces of simulation and back again.  The seamless translation of surgeon 
movement into end-effector action proceeds through a complex of computational algorithms, 
as indicated by the block diagram below:
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18 Not accounting for the counter-force of gravity.
Parsing through dense patent language is difficult at best, but allow me to outline several key 
operational logics in this diagram.  First, the movement of the master controllers does not drive 
the slave end-effectors.  Instead, this movement is “captured” by an array of position and 
velocity sensors (814) in the joints of the master control hardware apparatus.  The relative 
position of the various segments of robot arms is measured at their joints at a sampling rate of 
1300 Hz (1300 times per second).  Each of these measurements is a numerical value that 
represents a position in joint space at a particular moment in time.  It is important to appreciate 
that the position represented in joint space is not a Cartesian coordinate system.  Rather, it is 
translated into Cartesian space by the application of forward kinematics algorithms (691).  
Kinematic velocity, too, is a product of computation, derived by measuring the degree and rate 
of change in the joint space position values.  As noted in my discussion of the Surgeon’s 
Console at the beginning of this chapter, these velocities and relative position values are both 
scaled down (according to the scale factor set by the surgeon) and filtered (to eliminate the 
oscillations of physiological tremor).  What these computational procedures produce is a 
simulated or virtual model of the manipulations desired of the slaved end effectors (812).  
Control is exerted at this virtual domain on the “simulated desired”, ensuring that the position 
and velocity values desired do not exceed preset tolerance levels.  If they do, they are 
processed accordingly to bring them back into an acceptable range.  This controlled desired 
simulation is then translated from Cartesian space back to joint space through inverse 
kinematics, producing a tolerance-delimited simulated model of the desired joint positions and 
velocities.  
Crucially, this desired model does not directly drive the end-effectors, either.  Note the 
symmetry of the block diagram.  Just as sensors at the master controller capture the position 
and velocity of the surgeon’s manipulations, identical sensors in the joints at the end effector 
are capturing the movement of the end-effector, again producing a representation of end-
effector kinematics in joint space.  The slave joint controller (848) then compares the actual 
joint position and velocity measurements as computed from the end-effector sensors against 
the simulated desired joint positions and velocities.   The difference between the “simulated 
desired” and the “actual” is, functionally, positional error quantified numerically, as a deviation 
from zero. 
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It is finally this quantification of error that then drives the slave end-effectors.  Rather than 
being driven “to” a position in Cartesian space, the actuator motors in the end-effectors are 
driven with a torque geared to reduce the error differentials between desired and actual in 
joint space to zero.  This proceeds via a feedback loop in the upper right corner of the block 
diagram, 1300 times per second.  Joint controller (848) outputs the disjuncture between 
desired and actual to an output processor (854) that drives the motors in an attempt to 
reduce that disjuncture to zero.  This results in actual displacement of the end-effector in 
Cartesian space, a displacement which is sensed at the joints in the end-effectors (849 and 
processed (851) to create a new representation of actual end effector position and velocities in 
joint space.  This new actual is fed to the joint controller (848) where it is compared against the 
“simulated desired” model again.  The feedback loop repeats itself until the positional error is 
reduced to zero, whereby the “state” of the slave end-effector and the master controller 
coincide.   Of course, the system is much more dynamic than this explanation conveys, for the 
“simulated desired” model is refreshed at 1300 Hz as well.
So how, then, does error produce haptics within this configuration?  Haptic feedback is not 
simply a function of calculating the force by which the patient’s tissues “push back” against the 
robotic end-effector, and then translating that into actuation in the joint space of the master 
controller.  The force exerted by instrument collision with patient tissue does get picked up by 
the force sensors at the slave end-effector, as indicated by the lower-right of the block diagram 
(868).  But the production of torque that drives the slave actuators to approximate the 
“desired” also produces force that must be taken into account when analyzing the data from 
the force sensors.   In overly simplified terms, the motor-induced force needs to be subtracted 
from the tissue-induced force in order to generate semi-meaningful force-feedback data.  But 
even this force-feedback data does not drive the haptic output at the master controller alone.  
Instead, the dVSS platform also generates force feedback that is a function of the degree to 
which the movements of the surgeon at the console exceed the pre-delimited tolerance limits 
that are calculated in the virtual domain of the simulated slave (812).  Haptics, then, is error-
driven and is as much an experience of reflexivity— of recoiling from a preset dVSS tolerance 
limit— as it is a “virtual” experience of the elasticity and density of human tissues encountered 
by the Endowrist® instruments.  
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In essence, then, the entire system that drives both the end-effector actuators to perform 
the tele-surgical operations and the limited haptics experienced by the surgeon at the master 
controller emerge out of disjunctures in a virtual matrix that measures desire against limit, the 
desired against the actual, productively.  Consequently, the limited haptics produced by the dVSS 
platform is either a compensatory one that channels yet another mode of embodiment 
through the visual register (haptic visuality), or, where it does engage tactility and 
proprioception, it does so according to a complex logic of productive error.  Therefore, the 
condition of possibility for caring touch on this surgical platform, limited as it may be, emerges 
out of the productivity of error and the necessity of the limit.  The vexed relationship between 
care, fallibility and error is something I return to in the context of the next chapter, where I 
discuss the “becoming robot of the surgeon” as a figure of both machinic virtuosity and 
degraded alienation.  Error makes a reappearance as the purported “other” of machine virtue, 
leading discourses of patient safety in contemporary medicine to conflate safe medical care 
with the mitigation of error, if not its elimination.
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—  3  —
T H I N K I N G  ( AT )  T H E  I N T E R F A C E
Docking the Robot
Docking the robot creates a 
tight and material coupling between 
human and machine in the 
operating rooms at University 
Hospital. Once the patient is 
anesthetized, catheterized, prepped 
and draped, the operating table is 
tilted back into a “Trendelenburg 
position,” the patient’s feet higher 
than his head.  The patient’s legs are 
also spread apart to accommodate 
the Patient Side cart, whose sterile-
plastic-draped and crab-like form is 
parked unceremoniously along the 
OR’s back wall.
The docking procedure begins with first incision, the surgeons creating one 12 millimeter 
and four or five 8-millimeter incisions precisely mapped out with a centimeter ruler on the 
patient’s abdomen.  The “extra” incisions allow the assisting surgeon to insert the 
“sucker” (suction) and/or a traditional laparoscopic forceps into the surgical field.  Each of the 
incisions is intended for a trocar, a plastic cannula or “port” which will serve as a pathway for 
the dVSS’ Endowrist® instruments to slide smoothly into the body cavity without damaging the 
patient’s abdominal wall.  The first trocar is inserted in the incision directly above the navel.  This 
trocar, a bit larger than the others, will hold the 12 mm endoscopic camera.  It has a special 
Image courtesy of Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2009
collar through which a pneumatic tube will supply the CO2 necessary to inflate the abdominal 
cavity.  The insertion of the first trocar carries the greatest risk of damage to the abdominal 
organs; it is inserted “blind”, without the benefit of endoscopic visualization.  Surgeons proceed 
by touch, first enlarging the incision with a scalpel and their fingers, pulling up on the patient’s 
abdomen while twisting the trocar deeper into place with careful but deliberate force.  
Surgeons then feel their way forward, seeking the “give” that signals the trocar’s successful 
progression through the peritoneum.  Once this first trocar is inserted, the patient’s abdominal 
cavity is inflated with CO2 and the endoscopic camera is inserted into the abdomen, giving the 
surgical team their first view of the surgical field, a glistening terrain of pink intestines, bladder 
and yellow visceral fat underneath the smooth dome of the peritoneum’s serous tissue.  
The surgeon’s first visualization task is to ensure that no underlying organs were damaged 
by the blind insertion of the trocar.  Once the integrity of the insertion is ascertained, the 
endoscope is maneuvered to provide a “view from below” while the surgical team inserts the 
remaining trocars into the abdominal cavity.  As each trocar is twisted into place, the endoscope 
shows first the trocar’s tip stretching against the resistive peritoneal membrane.  It blanches 
white, and then the trocar’s tip ruptures through.  These trocar insertions are constitutive of the 
bodily penetrations required of “minimally invasive” surgery.  While in fact these incisions exact 
very little trauma, the stubborn manner by which the body’s tissues resist penetration by the 
trocar is remarkable to watch. The moment of rupture is both anticipated and carnographic. 
Once the trocars are in place, the circulating nurse “drives” the dVSS’ Patient Cart into 
position between the patient’s legs.  While the dVSS-as-automobile is a trope that recurs across 
many different contexts within the course of an operation, the docking procedure tends to 
elicit the most references to car culture.  Maneuvering the refrigerator-sized Patient Cart into 
place is surprisingly difficult.  Proper position is crucial to ensuring that the robot’s arms can 
move through their full range of motion without collision or other encumbrance.  And the final 
location—”close, but not too close . . . a little to the left, now back up a bit”—can make or 
break the proper angles of approach for a particular procedure, in this case a robotically-
assisted radical prostatectomy.  Painfully banal “car jokes” abound:  “Hey, you’re pretty good at 
that! But can I trust you to parallel park my [insert model of ridiculously expensive car here]?”  “Look 
out, you almost backed over Grandma!”  “Watch out everybody, student driver!” “Vrooom, vroom, 
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vroooooooom, vrooooom”…. Once positioned, brakes are applied to hold the cart firmly in place.  
Neither cart nor patient can move once the docking process is complete.  As one surgeon put 
it, “in a tug of war with the robot, the patient will lose every time.”  
Source:  da Vinci S User Manual
With the Patient Cart parked, the surgical team manually extends each robot arm over its 
respective trocar.  The camera lens is cleaned off and inserted first, interlocking with the camera 
arm.  The rest of the trocars and arms articulate with the snap of a latch.  Finally, the 
appropriate Endowrist® instruments are snapped into place.  A LED flashes while a microchip 
in Endowrist® instrument housing communicates with the Patient Cart, both revealing the 
instrument’s identity (as a fenestrated Maryland bipolar, for example) and verifying that it has 
not yet exceeded its limited lifespan (usually 10 procedures).  Once properly vetted, the “sharp 
end” of the instrument descends, noiselessly, into the surgical field.  A blue LED light on each 
robotic arm indicates that the dVSS is ready to accept the operating surgeon’s control.
* * * *
This scene foregrounds a myriad of layered and interlocking interfaces, the most obvious 
being the dramatization of a critical coupling of human and machine, the mutual articulation of 
patient to robot through the process of docking.  Docking is the moment that an operation 
becomes robotically-assisted; it serves as a token for the essential confusion of human and 
mechanical (re)production that such a coupling initializes.  The scene ends in the expectation 
that the surgeon will take control, and appropriate the patient/robot apparatus to intervene on 
the patient’s prostate cancer.  Taking control, however, requires that the surgeon, too, interface 
with the robot.  As with docking, the surgeon seated at the controls must assume the proper 
body-orientation vis a vis the robot in order to “make” the apparatus function.1  At this point, 
he/she is also effectively “docked,” raising the twin specters of the becoming-robot of the 
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1 As the concluding analysis of the last chapter dramatically illustrated, the seamless translation of surgeon’s gesture 
to Endowrist® instrument, of “making them move,” cannot be conceived as control in any simple or 
straightforward manner.
surgeon and the becoming-surgeon of the robot.  In this chapter, I want to confront the 
machine/flesh synchronization that occurs at both “ends” of the operational system and the 
problem/promise of the interface it suggests.  The multi-layered mediation of the relationship 
between the surgeon and patient raises the basic question:  how does the dVSS system focus 
and specify the interface?  This question in turn raises one that is much larger :  what does or 
can it mean then to perform “care” at the interface?  How does focusing life at the porous 
border of body and machine implicate care?  As I proceed to elaborate the nature of the 
interface, even to the extent that the complex computational system that “drives” the dVSS 
embeds the kind of error we usually identify with human practice otherwise perfected by 
machines, I want to insist upon the inadequacy of the liberal humanist fallback on care as a 
matter of uniquely human, unmediated affect and touch.  The triumphalist technological fantasy 
that care would improve with the elimination of human imperfection is also an illusion.  Beyond 
the dualism of human-vs.-machine, and the regressive claims to one-or-the-other to which it is 
prone, I also want to suggest that it is precisely at the sometimes attenuated articulations of 
human and hardware that new possibilities for care emerge.  This will be the primary focus of 
my concluding chapter.  For now I want to show just how prominently and multiply 
“interfaced” the dVSS is, and then to dramatize the intensive enmeshment of doctor/machine/
patient within a matrix of authority, automaticity, and the automaton.  How does the machine 
complement or compromise the authority of the surgeon?  How does his/her authority, as 
secured in and around the dVSS, change or challenge norms of care?  In other words, I want to 
think from and at the interface about possibilities for care. First however, I must pursue the 
primary focus of this chapter :  to display the intensity of the interface within a matrix of 
authority, automaticity, and the automaton, the intensive, medial networks in which patient and 
surgeons meet.
What is an Interface?
What is an interface?  The IEEE Standard Computer Dictionary provides this definition: 
A boundary across which two systems communicate.  An interface might be a 
hardware connector used to link to other devices, or it might be a convention 
used to allow communication between two software systems.  Often there is 
some intermediate component between the two systems which connects their 
interfaces together.”
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Central to discussions of interface is an articulation that is at the same time a communication 
between systems, between hardware components, between software components, or between 
hardware and software.   Often, this articulation is made to enable joint operation of the 
interfaced devices.  Complicating this further, the term can also be used to specify a mediating 
device that connects other interfaces.  Interfaces layer upon interfaces, making the notion itself 
difficult to parse in the concrete.  This is particularly true of complex technologies like the dVSS.  
On one level, the device itself is an interface in the sense of being a mediating component 
between two interfaces:  the surgeon’s tools and the patient’s skin.  And yet it itself is comprised 
of numerous interfaces that translate, for example, mechanical motion of the master 
manipulators into digital information processed computationally and then output at another 
interface that translates the digital information into the mechanical motion of the surgical end 
effectors.
 In relation to technology, the contemporary meaning of the term is usually deployed to 
mark the site and methods of interaction between humans and technological devices.  Human-
computer interaction, therefore, takes place at the “user interface.”  As I type this, I rely on the 
user interfaces of screen, keyboard and mouse to interact with my laptop to co-produce this 
text.  As Steven Johnson explains,  an interface is not a transparent, passive connector or 
conduit for interaction:
What exactly is an interface anyway?  In its simplest sense, the word refers to 
software that shapes the interaction between user and computer.  The interface 
serves as a kind of translator, mediating between the two parties, making one 
sensible to the other.  In other words, the relationship governed by the interface 
is a semantic one, characterized by meaning and expression rather than physical 
force. [emphasis in original] (1997:  14)
Johnson’s definition, however, tends to reduce thinking at the interface to a question of meaning 
production and negotiation - which is not surprising, since his focus is on software and not 
hardware, where the former is often thought of strictly in terms of symbol manipulation.  
Hardware interfaces do exert physical force.  Furthermore, Johnson’s understanding of language 
as semantics does not address the complexities of power/knowledge, the articulation of the 
seeable and the sayable according to what Foucault calls a diagram of power or what Deleuze 
refers to as an “abstract machine.”  If software is a language, it is a peculiar one, marked less by 
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meaning production than by what Ian Bogost (2007) calls procedurality.  The point of writing 
software is to execute as much as it is to represent.   Seen from this perspective, software 
becomes a materially performative medium:  “When media become things, we enter a world of 
operationality, a world not of interpretation but of navigation.  We do not ‘read’ them so much 
as ‘do’ them (‘Just Do It’), or do with them” (Lash & Lury, 2007:  8).  Bogost (2007) makes the 
stronger claim that procedurality not only defines software’s mode of operation, but that 
“procedures found the logics that structure behavior in all cases… when we do things, we do 
them according to some logic, and that logic constitutes a process in the general sense of the 
word” (7, emphasis in original).  My intention in invoking procedurality or operationality is to 
signal how medicine’s use of these terms creeps into the context of the computational 
interface and, conversely, how medical care is increasingly proceduralized.  I also want to 
reinforce the fact that interfaces mediate on more than the level of the semantic, the plane of 
meaning.  The interface is a zone of articulation for affect (in the sense of the capacity to affect 
and to be affected) between bodies, be they human, electro-mechanical or code (Hansen, 
2006).  The interface of hardware, software and human wetware both enables and constrains 
action, what humans and computers can do together, in the doing that the interface performs.  
This is particularly true for the dVSS.  As a surgical platform, an apparatus of hardware and 
software, the dVSS’ interface enables and constrains expression, which in this case is gesture and 
action, the surgical operation.  
A genealogy of the term “interface” underscores this broader emphasis on affectivity.   The 
OED indicates that the term “interface” first emerged in the 1880s, and denoted “a surface 
lying between two portions of matter or space, and forming their common 
boundary” (Interface, n., 1989).   The first known use of the term is attributed to Bottomley 
(1882):  “The term interface denotes a face of separation, plane or curved, between two 
contiguous portions of the same substance” (Interface, n., 1989).  Interestingly, this early (and 
quite abstract) use of the term interface suggests a Deleuzian processual metaphysics of the 
fold.  Here interface does not presuppose a boundary between different substances (identities) 
that express difference derivatively in their coming together.  Instead, this definition of interface 
asserts the ontological priority of difference, the processual productivity of interfacing as an 
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engine of subjectivation and individuation, fundamental to the production of knowledge, 
subjectivity and agency.  
The next entries in the OED date from the early 1960s discourses of systems, information, 
communication and media theory.  Here an interface is a “means or place of interaction 
between two systems, organizations, etc.; a meeting-point or common ground between two 
parties, systems, or disciplines.”   In his 1962  The Gutenberg Galaxy, Marshall McLuhan, for 
example, describes the “meeting of medieval pluralism and modern homogeneity and 
mechanism” as the Renaissance “interface” (141).  He elaborates, 
An age in rapid transition is one which exists on the frontier between two 
cultures and between conflicting technologies.  Every moment of its 
consciousness is an act of translation of each of these cultures into another.  
Today we live on the frontier between five centuries of mechanism and the new 
electronics, between the homogenous and the simultaneous.  It is painful but 
fruitful.  The sixteenth century Renaissance was an age on the frontier between 
two thousand years of alphabetic and manuscript culture, on the one hand, and 
the new mechanism of repeatability and quantification, on the other. (McLuhan, 
1962:  141).
In these terms, the interface is the “contact zone” between what Foucault might call two 
positivities or epistemes, or what cultural studies might describe as the friction between the 
residual, the dominant and the emergent.  Importantly, then, the interface is a space of 
communication as well as miscommunication, of translation as well as agonistic difference.  The 
interface is more than the meeting of different ideas or ideologies; it is also the meeting of 
different knowledge/power formations, systems of governmentality and, quite literally, protocol.  
The interface presents itself as a system of communication and the point of mediation and 
connection between communication systems.  This includes, for example, disparate 
transportation systems.  As Carey (1989) reminds us, in the 19th century “the movement of 
goods and people and the movement of information were seen as essentially identical 
processes and both were described by the common noun ‘communication’” (15).  Accordingly, 
the OED stipulates one definition of the interface as the nodes and relays between systems of 
communication, such as buses, trains, subways, or in contemporary terms, networks and 
circuits:  “The advantages of high-speed transport were piddled away at the nodes or 
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interfaces: from bus to train, train to train, city terminal to airport terminal, check-in counter to 
loading gate, and so on.” (Interface, n., 1989).  Because these interfaces were sites of translation 
and exchange, possessing disparate and perhaps asynchronous temporalities, the interface should 
also be seen as a site of loss and all the anxiety that loss evokes.  Translation is never seamless.  
For instance, re-presentation across different linguistic or graphical registers confronts both 
excess and loss.  The translation conveys both more than one means and less, and sometimes 
something completely unintended.  The same can be said for networks and systems of 
exchange — luggage and letters misplaced in transit; data packets dropped due network 
latency; the transmission of authority lessened along a chain of command, etc.  
This is particularly clear in another early deployment of the term—this one found in Albert 
Battersby’s 1967 contribution to the literature on “operations research,” the foundations of 
which have been traced to Charles Babbage.2  Network Analysis for Planning and Scheduling 
elaborates techniques for visualizing and optimizing the execution of complex projects by 
leveraging network theory.  In developing the post-war technique of “critical path analysis,” 
Battersby asserts that “events should be established at stages where the work passes from one 
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2 Lewis (2007) explicitly makes a case that Babbage should be recognized as a pioneer in the field of operations 
management.  Lewis links Babbage’s attempts at building his “Difference Engine” (an automatic, mechanical 
calculator designed to tabulate polynomial functions:  in essence, Babbage created plans for an early mechanical 
computer) to the study of optimizing mechanical and mental processes as algorithms.  Babbage’s analysis of the 
sorting, pricing and distribution operations on the postal industry also inspired Sir Rowland Hill to develop the 
English “Uniform Penny Post” in the 1840s.  
department to another; these stages are known as interfaces” (1967, 116).  Battersby uses the 
graphic above to illustrate the interfaces between different functions in an organizational 
network.  Later in the same text, Battersby refers to interfaces as divisions between zones of 
authority:  “The divisions between zones are called ‘interfaces’ and they are important in that 
any arrow (including dummies) which crosses an interface means that responsibility is being 
transferred” (1967:  246).  Because the interface in this discourse functions as the hand-off 
between nodes in a bureaucratic process, these interfaces were subject to intense scrutiny and 
administrative control to minimize inefficiency and other modes of organizational “loss.”3  The 
interface is the point at which authority and responsibility are both specified and transferred, 
displaced or even usurped.   The interface is thus a site of control, given the inherent or perhaps the 
inevitability of failure.  It contains and conditions the power necessary to fuel given systems, 
attempting to enforce and maintain certain relations and directionalities of exchange. 
Discourses of computational loss and failure are particularly powerful today, dependent as 
many of us are on computers as prosthetics of memory, as means of expression and 
communication.  From the PC’s notorious “Blue Screen of Death” to the important email 
memo that never arrives, from jittery streaming video webcasts to the corrupt Microsoft Word 
term paper one neglected to back up, computational interfaces are haunted by always 
imminent breakdown in a manner than mimics their bureaucratic predecessors.  
Computers are not flawless.  Errors typically occur at the juncture between 
analog and digital states, such as when a drive’s magnetoresistive head assigns 
binary symbolic value to the voltage differentials it has registered, or when an e-
mail message is reconstituted from independent data packets moving across the 
TCP/IP layer of the Internet, itself dependent on fiber-optic cables and other 
hardwired technologies.  All forms of modern digital technology incorporate 
hyper-redundant error-checking routines that serve to sustain an illusion of 
immateriality by detecting error and correcting it, reviving the quality of the 
signal, like old-fashioned telegraph relays, such that any degradation suffered 
during a subsequent interval of transmission will not fall beyond whatever 
tolerances of symbolic integrity exist past which the original value of the signal 
(or identity of the symbol) cannot be reconstituted. (Kirschenbaum, 2008:  294).
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3 In contemporary medicine, the “hand-off ” between shifts of medical personal is one such “interface.”  Research 
aimed at addressing “the problem of error” in contemporary medicine often cites this moment as a critical 
juncture in the continuity of patient care, particularly susceptible to inefficiencies and miscommunication.
At the crux of even the highest performance computational interface lurks the threat of error, 
of a system fault — Abort?  Retry?  Fail?  While the illusion of error-free virtuosity structures 
our perception of the technological, the reality is that the performativity of any signal passed 
through the interface—call this its effectivity—relies on constant resuscitation (i.e., whenever 
the signal risks falling outside of the tolerances of “data integrity”).  Von Neumann (1951) makes 
this observation as well early on in the history of computer science:  digital computers produce  
“no error whatever” only “as long as the operation of each component produces only 
fluctuations within its preassigned tolerance limits” (294).
The computational concept of the interface is germane to this dissertation because the 
“paradigm shift” that robot-assisted surgery represents hinges upon the interposing of a 
computer between the surgeon and the instruments operating on the patient’s tissues.   The fact 
that the interface between surgeon and patient is computational is not incidental; 
computational interfaces, like all interfaces, have an orientation.4  I argue that understanding the 
interface in these terms is key to understanding the politics of the dVSS:  the computational 
interface orientation of the DVSS sets the conditions of possibility for various “futures” in 
relation to the automation of surgical practice and the knowledge politics of embodied skill.  It 
also articulates a generalized terrain for considering the mediality of these politics.  Let me 
turn, then, to two distinct ways in which the term “interface” is used in relation to computers 
and computation, first by considering the notion of the computational interface as “skin” and 
second by a longer engagement with the specialized discourse of computer science and the 
use of the term “interface” within the framework of Object-Oriented Programming (OOP).
Graphical User Interface as Skin
The graphical user interface (GUI) of a software or hardware assemblage is often called its 
“skin”.   The term “skin” is usually invoked to describe the surface appearance of the interface, 
and it is often counterposed to the underlying system.   PROSKIN (http://www.proskin.org), a 
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4 Ahmed (2006) reminds us that bodies and objects become oriented to each other through the specificity of 
their interfaces, which can be shaped by both the physical materiality of the objects themselves, as well as their 
social materiality.  Her analysis centers on the “philosopher’s table” in shaping the queer orientation of 
phenomenology.  The table is both a physical and a social object; it is a place where one gathers, but also marks the 
gendering of spaces of domesticity.
research project focused on methods to more effectively customize and personalize the GUI 
skin of a wide range of technologies, explains the concept in this way:
A skin is considered to be the appearance of the user interface, including 
graphic, haptic, and/or aural patterns…Skins are used typically to change the 
“look and feel” of the interface components, often a cosmetic change alone (i.e. 
the colours change or a background image is applied, but the interface 
components remain unaffected in location, attribute or function).  (quoted in 
Starioleski, 2008:  35)
Skins in this sense are often interchangeable with themes, such the ability to customize the look 
and aesthetic feel of the Mozilla Firefox web browser by downloading and “applying” an add-on 
theme:  https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/browse/type:2  In the context of current best 
practices of web design, the skin of the website — its graphical design and layout — should 
ideally be completely separated from the site’s content, its “data.”  Following these web 
standards means coding the web page’s aesthetics in a separate CSS (Cascading Style Sheet) 
file, that is then linked to the XHTML content.  Different stylesheets (skins) can be applied to a 
single XHTML content page.  The website CSS Zen Garden vividly illustrates the diverse ways 
that CSS can skin a single HTML file (http://www.csszengarden.com/). 
This notion of interface as skin seems fundamentally opposed a platform approach to 
technology.  How so?  The platform approach is interested as much in the underlying code of 
software as it is in its GUI, as much with the affordances of a particular chipset as it is with the 
industrial design of the computer chassis.  What is the relation between the interface and the 
platform?  Is the skin “that which overlays,” a mere surface?  Vernacular uses of the term 
“computer interface” tend think of it as a particular type of skin, as superficial exterior or 
epidermal film, as a mode of expression that overlays or merely presents a technologically 
determinative “core.”  This enveloping skin is identified with appearance (the canvas or screen 
upon which meaning is visually inscribed).  It metaphorically excludes the porousness of 
corporeal skin and its tenderness; it’s capacity to be pierced, cut, and variously to bleed, seep 
and weep (Probyn, 1996; Ahmed & Stacey, 2001).  Scholars who imagine the cinematic or 
television screen as permeable skin on the other hand characterize it as a passage, a scene of 
appearances playing out the fantasy of moving between the interiority and the exteriority of 
the televisual hardware, on rays of light, or pixels if you will.  The image of climbing into or out 
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of the TV screen as if it were window is consistently entrancing, precisely because it dramatizes 
or promises the fantasy of transgressing a boundary.  The solidity of the CRT, LCD or plasma 
screen becomes permeable.
I find it productive to conflate platform and interface, or rather to assert their fundamental 
inseparability (like two sides of the same piece of paper; different and differentiable, this and 
that,  but profoundly dependent upon one another -- in other words, interfacing).  Imagining a 
“platform-interface” interface in this way renders current approaches to new media and 
medicine inadequate.   As Wendy Chun (2006) explains, these approaches are marked by a gap 
or division through which interfaces might be constructed.  Chun writes, 
to exaggerate slightly, the screen divides new media studies into these two 
fields.  Visual culture studies stem from the Anglo-speaking academy and 
generally treats the interface, or representations of the interface, as the medium.  
The second approach, media archaeology, although inspired by Marshall 
McLuhan and Foucault, is mainly Germanic (most specifically, it emerges from 
the ‘‘Sophienstraße’’ departments of Humboldt University in Berlin).  Taking as 
its ground zero McLuhan’s mantras of ‘‘the medium is the message’’ and ‘‘the 
content of a medium is always another medium,’’ media archaeology 
concentrates on the machine and often ignores the screen’s content.  
Archaeological studies critique visual culture studies’ conflation of interface with 
medium and representation with actuality; visual culture studies critique the 
archaeologists’ technological determinism and blindness to content and the 
media industry. (2006, 17)
Enfolding the semiotics of the screen and the technologies of their (re)production puts screen 
and technological “guts” on the same ontological plane.  What would it mean to “do” media 
studies in this way?  I suggest that Alt’s elucidation of the “object orientation” of contemporary 
computation points the way, both through his methodology (he attends to the computer-as-
medium and also gets into the “guts” of code) and his conclusions (that object orientation and 
computational mediality exist on the same plane, as different perspectives—“this and that”—on 
what is fundamentally the same phenomenon).  
The “Object Orientation” of the Interface
In his forthcoming essay “Objects of Our Affection,” Casey Alt seeks to understand how 
and when computation “became a medium” (2).  It is often forgotten that the word 
“computer” originally referred to human workers who performed numerical calculations.   And 
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as Alt points out, it was this notion of calculation that defined both the material practice of 
computing as well as its relation to the Enlightenment project of engineering freedom:
In the beginning there was the Calculating Machine.  Whether that of Pascal, 
Leibniz, or Babbage, the Calculating Machine represented the ultimate 
Enlightenment dream.  It was the fullest material expression of humanity’s most 
rarified process of rationality: an autonomous, mechanical device that could 
automatically compute mathematical solutions.  It was the promise of an 
engineering miracle that would liberate our creative minds and active bodies 
from the sedentary tedium of complicated numerical tasks.  Perhaps no one 
despaired of this problem more than Charles Babbage, who, in considering the 
mathematical labor required in compiling and verifying various astronomical 
tables in the early 19th century, uttered his legendary lamentation:  “I wish to 
God these calculations had been executed by steam!”
However, as Alt then proceeds to point out, our contemporary sensibility about computers 
treats them as media, not calculators.  In profound ways, computers both enable and shape our 
access to the world; they mediate.  So how, then, did the computer make this leap from 
“machines that calculate” to “machines that mediate”?  It could be claimed that the adoption of 
the graphical user interface—a screen technology that both presents and frames a “virtual 
world” produced by computer graphics—fueled this shift.  Certainly the emergence of 
television (and the much longer history of the desire for televisuality, of using media 
technologies to overcome mediations of time and space) precedes and shapes the early 
development of the computer’s visual interface.5   Insofar as television was conceived of as a 
“window on the world”, so too the provisioning of computers with a graphical user interface 
harnessed a similar sense of mediation, perhaps most evident in the emergence of “windows” 
as the dominant metaphor for that interface (Spigel, 1992; Friedberg, 2006).
Alt’s brilliant analysis takes a different tack, one more in line with taking seriously the 
material specificity of the computational platform.  This allows him to articulate both the 
genealogy and the stakes of the emergence of computation-as-medium.  Alt’s central thesis is 
that “computation became a medium when the concepts of medium and interface were 
implicitly embedded in computation at the material level of the programming language itself,” an 
event Alt attributes to the emergence of the object-oriented programming paradigm 
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5 Importantly, Margaret Morse (1998) articulates how the use of computer graphics on television, in turn, shaped 
our contemporary notions of televisual space as well as influenced emergent notions of “virtual reality.”
(forthcoming:  2).   Alt cites several systems that prefigure the object-oriented programming 
paradigm, such as the programming approach used to develop Stephen Russell’s 1962 
computer game Spacewar!, Ivan Sutherland’s 1963 graphics application Sketchpad, and the 
creation of the simulation programming language SIMULA-67 by Norwegians Kristen Nygaard 
and Ole-Johan Dahl in 1967 (forthcoming:  5-6).  
It is the work of Alan Kay, however, that motors Alt’s argument, particularly Kay’s work with 
the Learning Research Group at Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center (PARC).  As part of his 
efforts to create the first laptop computer, the Dynabook, Kay developed the first properly 
object-oriented programming language, Smalltalk-72.   Importantly, as Alt points out, the 
material level of the programming language of Smalltalk is not simply the symbolic, the realm of 
software, but necessarily includes hardware as well.6  As computer scientist Tim Rentsch wrote, 
More than a programming language, Smalltalk is a complete programming 
environment, all of which reflects the object oriented philosophy…Smalltalk 
may be thought of as comprised of four pieces, viz., a programming language 
kernel, a programming paradigm, a programming system, and a user interface 
model… Thus the user interface is built on the programming system, which is 
built following the programming paradigm and using the programming language 
kernel… Although I have represented the pieces as separate and independent, 
they are not, really.  In fact, they are inseparable and very interdependent.  Not 
only could each piece itself not exist in a vacuum, the design for each piece 
influenced the design for all the other pieces, i.e., each design could not exist in 
a vacuum. (Rentsch, 1982:  52; quoted in Alt, forthcoming:  11)
Rentsch’s comments suggest that object-orientation in the Smalltalk programming paradigm is 
not just a language, but an entire environment, a total platform.
Alt ambitiously argues that the emergence of OOP should be read not simply as a 
conceptual shift useful for thinking about computation in a new way, as mediated 
communication instead of calculation.  Instead, his claim is that OOP enacts a shift in the 
historical formation of computationality itself, at the level of its operations, its code.  In his 
words,
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6 This is arguably the case for all software.  In his essay, “There is No Software,” Friedrich Kittler argues that 
“software does not exist as a machine-independent faculty” (2005).  For Kittler, whose materialist approach to 
media informs this dissertation, this is because “All code operations, despite their metaphoric faculties such as ‘call’ 
or ‘return’, come down to absolutely local string manipulations and that is, I am afraid, to signifiers of voltage 
differences.”
object-orientation is not merely a way of thinking about computation that just 
happens to lend itself to viewing computation as a medium, rather object- 
orientation is the medialization of computation. That is, it is both historically and 
conceptually impossible to conceive object-orientation and computational 
mediality apart from each other, as they are in fact only different perspectives 
on the same phenomenon. (forthcoming: 2)
Alt then proceeds to outline the contours—to conduct an archaeology—of the “abstract 
machine” of object-orientation.  Before proceeding, however, Alt first describes the act of 
programming under the paradigms of low-level machine and assembly languages as well as later, 
“third-generation” procedural programming paradigms that preceded OOP but still continue to 
co-exist alongside it.  I gloss over them quickly here.  
Programming in machine and assembly languages is, Alt tells us, a process of delineation.  In 
this paradigm, the task of the programmer is to break down into steps the operations 
necessary to complete a particular computational task, and then “order these operations into a 
linear, flat, stepwise list of instructions for the processor to execute ” (forthcoming:  15).  The 
process of delineation thus requires the programmer to translate “a macro-level task into a 
linear list of every single processor operation required to achieve the desired result”, 
conceptually to “think through the processor, to anticipate its logic at the most granular 
level” (forthcoming:  15).  The procedural programming paradigm introduced a shift in the 
conception of programming from a process of delineation to a process of organization.  Alt 
explains that “whereas delineation consists of creating linear sequences of instructions for the 
processor, organization privileges human readability and an economy of instructions over linear 
literalness” (forthcoming:  16).  In procedural programming, functionally-related or commonly 
repeated lines of code are grouped together to form a single block of code, which is alternately 
referred to as a procedure, subroutine, or function.  This block was assigned a human-readable 
name so that the coder could re-execute the entire block of code simply by “calling” its name 
at any point in the code.  Procedural coding thus introduces a hierarchy of control into the 
conceptual space of programming.  The “master” program calls the subroutines, which take 
control over the processor, execute, and then return control the master program.  While much 
more compact than low-level programming, the form of the procedural program is still a line: 
“execution of the program remains the same since control jumps back and forth to different 
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points in the line as different procedures and control statement loops are executed in order to 
reproduce the original list of linear instructions” (Alt, forthcoming:  17).
In contradistinction to the procedurality of the line, the “encapsulation of objects” 
characterizes the conceptual space of OOP.  Object Oriented Programming is organized 
around “objects” and “classes” rather than actions or operations.  What do these terms denote?  
A class is an abstract definition of a computational entity, a definition which includes all of its 
characteristics (attributes or properties) and all of the things it can do (methods or 
operations).  For example, the class “scalpel” consists of the traits shared by all scalpels:   
sharpness, hardness, blade shape, length, circumference, grip shape, and so on.  It also consists of 
all the things a scalpel can be called upon to do, such as slice or perforate.  An object is an 
instance of the class, instantiated at run-time.  One could say that a class’s only existence as such 
is as an object.  So, using class “scalpel” as an example, the object “10 blade scalpel” is 
instantiated only when the piece of software is run.   This object consists of both the data that 
makes this a particular instance of the class (e.g. surgically-sharp 440C stainless steel, pencil grip, 
blade curved along the cutting edge with flat back) and the capacity to perform all the 
operations of the class (in this case, cutting and perforating).  Cultural critics might find it useful 
to think of the instantiation of objects at run-time in terms of the turning, the performative 
subjectification that occurs with the interpellative hail.  Objects become when they are called.  
If, as I have discussed, previous programming paradigms viewed a “program” as the linear 
execution or control of the processor from one line of software code to the next, then OOP 
turns this definition inside out.  OOP proliferates the program, multiplies the lines of code that 
co-operate (and, by extension, the loci of control within these multiple spaces of 
operationality).   In the place of a line, OOP opens a conceptual plane in which objects are 
instantiated and interact.   The single line of code becomes multi-threaded, a parallel 
architecture.  Alt explains that OOP “sunders the cohesiveness of the program into a number 
of independent entities whose interactions emerge to approximate the end goals of the 
program” (forthcoming:  18).  
Objects in OOP are thus said to be “encapsulated;” they are self-contained and their 
properties and operations are hidden from each other.   In simple terms, OOP objects are 
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black-boxed.   Objects do not “know” the particularities of another object’s properties or its 
methods, except as these are explicitly exposed by that object.   The definition (specification) of 
an object’s exposure is called an interface — properties and abilities are exposed at the 
interface according to the specifications defined by the object.  For Alt, this exposure signals the 
mediality of computation by inserting the concept of interface at the very level of its code.  As 
Alt conveys, “an object’s interface is a public face for the object that describes which of the 
object’s internal methods may be requested by another object, the necessary format for making 
each request, and the sort of message (if any) the requesting object should expect in response 
to the requesting message” (forthcoming:  24).  At the macro-level, the computer interface 
enables and shapes our access to the world.  Computers mediate.  Even at the micro-level of 
the computational object, interfaces are equally crucial in enabling and shaping an object’s 
access to and interactions with other objects.  
How do objects interact in OOP?  They send messages.  They communicate.  Again, the 
communication is shaped by means exposed at the interface.  Using another surgical tool as an 
example, one can imagine a computational object “Ravitch stapler” that exposes its ability to 
staple tissue, designated here as “staple( )”.7  The method “staple( )” is available at the object’s 
interface.  It is therefore, in the Heideggerian sense, “ready at hand.”  The surgeon-object may, 
by sending the proper request [e.g., SqueezeHandle(“Ravitch Stapler”, “transverse colon”)], call 
upon the object to implement its method staple() on the property “transverse colon.”   The 
surgeon-object cannot call a method that the stapler-object hasn’t exposed.  Non-exposed 
methods are both private and protected.  But if an object receives a properly formatted 
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7 More precisely, the method is exposed, but exactly how that method is implemented is not.  For example, the 
subroutines that constitute the method “staple( )” may themselves be hidden, black-boxed.  The surgeon-object 
need not worry about them in order to implement the staple ( ) method.
 staple ( ) {
  advance single staple into staple driver chamber ( );
  fire driver( );
  crimp ( );
  reset staple driver ( );
  return staple;
  } 
Practically speaking, this means that the methods and properties contained within the method staple( ) can be 
changed without having to re-write any segments of the code that call upon it.   The ability to staple may be made 
much more efficient or effective but the surgeon still “calls” it with the same message, staple ( ).   In this way, 
objects both hide internals and present functionality through their interface.
message from another object, the sending object can expect the receiving object to perform 
accordingly:  perform an operation, return certain data, message other objects, and so on.  
Because of the “normative” nature of inter-object communication in OOP, the interface is 
commonly referred to as a social contract.  It is a promise to the other objects in the program 
that it will implement its interface as specified.  An interface defines no actual functionality itself; 
instead, it exposes the functionality of the object of which it is an interface.  It acts as a contract 
to other users (objects themselves), a sort of guarantee that the object in fact implements the 
methods defined by its interface.   This is not to say that there is no error or system failure in 
OOP.  Interfaces can be poorly defined. Messages can be malformed.  Objects return 
unexpected data or the wrong data types. Properties can be unintentionally exposed.  The 
“social contract” of the OOP interface, like all contracts, can be broken.  Some contracts can be 
broken without too much impact; software acts buggy, but doesn’t freeze up.  Other contracts 
when broken force the user to resort to CTRL-ALT-DELETE or to reboot the system entirely.
Let me thematize and reiterate some key elements of the conceptual space of OOP 
outlined thus far.  First, in OOP, objects are the proliferation of programs, self-contained 
computers in the sense of calculation, bundled with their data.  Second, objects are 
encapsulated; this encapsulation produces an interior and an exterior to objects.  Alt suggests 
that this gives objects a kind of “subjectivity,” which I would characterize as an after-effect of the 
individuation of encapsulation.   In any case, from the point of view of other objects, interiority 
is irrelevant.  Objects don’t “care” about what goes on inside other objects.   Third, objects are 
known only through their interfaces:  the messages they send (communication) and the 
methods they implement (practices).  An object’s “identity,” then, is thoroughly performative 
from the point of view of other objects.  Computational objects communicate and interact in a 
mediate fashion, through their interfaces, through the methods they expose that materially set 
the terms for communication and the shape of action.  Finally, interfaces function as a sort of 
systemic social contract, a public declaration of obligation to other objects within the same 
computational space.  Importantly, Alt suggests that this social space extends to the human as 
well.  Object orientation, through the concept of the interface, subsumes computer users 
themselves.  Alt elaborates:  
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interface is also the means by which the concept of the human user enters the 
program.  Just as interfaces dictate possible interactions among objects, they 
similarly proscribe possible interactions between objects and human users.  As a 
result, users are made to inhabit the space and medium of the other objects 
and are treated as objects themselves. (forthcoming:  25). 
Interfaces, then, bring forth the mediality of the human and invite its participation in broader 
circuits of mediality.  “In creating the possibility for computational mediality, object-orientation 
opens the rigid, linear logic of serial computation onto the brute messiness of the world” and 
extends an invitation to “the entire breadth of lived experiences” (forthcoming: 27).
To summarize, in OOP the interface exposes the methods of an object, placing it in 
interface-mediated communication with other objects, the mediality of computation that is 
nonetheless a seemingly ethical space.  Remarkably, the interface in OOP resembles Agamben’s 
theorization of the ethical opened up or exposed by the gesture:  “The gesture is an exhibition 
of a mediality:  it is the process of making a means visible as such.  It allows the emergence of 
being-in-a-medium of human beings and thus opens the ethical dimension for 
them” (Agamben, 2000:  58).  The exhibition of mediality not only opens up the ethical, but 
opens onto the political.  For Agamben, “politics is the sphere of pure means,” the space of 
means as such, means without end(s) (2000:  59).  Alt, however, concludes his essay with a 
much different meditation on the ways in which the human user gets incorporated into the 
logic of object orientation.  For Alt, far from opening the political, object orientation ultimately 
forecloses on the possibilities that computational mediality opens up.  Instead, it invites the 
entire world into its “self-fulfilling, self-reinforcing feedback loop” (forthcoming:  27).  The turn 
that Alt’s argument takes at the end of his essay is sharp enough to cause whiplash, and I’m not 
entirely certain I understand its contours.  Alt’s critique seems to hinge upon a linkage of object 
orientation to the legacies of cybernetics, which, he contends, are less about addressing 
problems in the world than about “creating a believable simulation” (forthcoming:  27).  Object 
orientation “proves” itself by being able to illustrate how more and more of the world can be 
modeled (represented?) according to the logic of object orientation itself.  He puts it 
emphatically when he writes: 
the only way to increase the validity of an object-oriented simulation is to 
model more and more of the world as object-oriented.  As such, object-
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orientation is as much about recasting our entire view of the universe as 
exclusively object-oriented as it is about using object-orientation to “solve” certain 
problems in the lived world. (Alt, forthcoming:  27).
Here Alt’s and Agamben’s understanding of the ethical/political dimensions of the medial, of the 
interface diverge.  Unlike Agamben’s means without end(s), Alt seems to take issue with the 
particular ends that he sees object orientation pursuing — a self-referential feedback loop 
rather than using computation to solve pressing problems in the world.  My hunch is that 
Agamben’s figure of “means without end(s)” will prove useful as I pursue a richer mode of 
understanding the politics of care.  For now, I simply want to highlight what happens when Alt 
brings the human into interface with object-orientation:  the articulation of human and the 
platform of object orientation results in an rather apocalyptic implosion, a future vision of 
hyperreal simulation that ultimately alienates us from lived experience, and the messiness of the 
world.  In philosophical terms, OOP achieves agency, but excludes contingency.  Within its logic, 
the mutual constitution of human and machine results in an ever-constricting disciplinary 
productivity that (re)produces itself, endlessly.
On the specter of the mutual articulation of bodies and machines
The specter of the becoming-machine of the human and the becoming-human of the 
machine is a common theme in both science fiction and public discourse about contemporary 
technoculture.  As the line between the human and the machine becomes more and more 
blurry, what will become of us?  And, equally, what will they do to us?   The dVSS is just one 
node in a much broader field of the techno-human, although I would argue that the hopes and 
anxieties that accompany it share a continuity with the affects structuring that broader field.  
Our contemporary moment is one of ubiquitous and crucial body/technology articulations.8  
Much of the cultural criticism that has been written about the intensity of the contemporary 
moment falls into three loose and overlapping categories, each of which elevates the body/
technology interface as a crucial site of inquiry.  The first category highlights the tight coupling of 
humans & technology in the contemporary moment.  Here I would place much of the work 
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8 To describe the contemporary moment in such a manner does not, however, necessarily claim exceptionalism for 
the present—the history of media technologies, for example, suggests that the ubiquity of body/technology 
articulations is “always already new,” that technology has always defined the limits of the human/body, that, in fact, 
the human should be theorized according to an “originary technicity” (see, e.g. Hansen, 2006).
that follows from Haraway’s deployment of the notion of the cyborg, as well as various takes 
on the manner in which contemporary bodies experience the world as mediated through 
technologies of the screen, and even various riffs on posthuman prosthetics and augmented 
reality.  The second category highlights the increasing sense that “nature” (of which human 
bodies are a part) can be produced (and reproduced) through technical means.  Here I would 
place work on new reproductive and cloning technologies (see, e.g. the work of Sarah Franklin 
and Charis Thompson), tissue economies and biocapital (see, e.g. the work by Kaushik Sunder 
Rajan as well as Cathy Waldby and Rob Mitchell) as well as work on virtual reality that makes 
the synthetic production of environments its central problem.  The third category highlights the 
notion that the human body is itself a technology.  Work in this domain collapses (or examines, 
post-facto, the purported collapse of the distinction between) bodies and machines, bodies and 
code.  Here I would locate work that focuses on emerging definitions of life based on models 
of computation or informatics (Kate Hayles), contemporary cognitive neuroscience and AI 
research, and perhaps even much of the theoretical work that deploys Deleuzian machinic 
logics, chosen perhaps for their descriptive power in charting contemporary configurations of 
power and knowledge, relations that often/always involve bodies and technologies.   This triple 
typology is, of course, a radical simplification, but I offer it as a framing mechanism for what 
follows, a detour through theory that explores the general problematic of the mediated 
interface in the more specific context of the mutual articulation of bodies and technologies.  If 
my central problematic is how to think about care in the context of contemporary 
technomedicine, where care is often positioned as an irreducibly human capability, this detour 
will hopefully provide a theoretical frame for understanding both the becoming-robot of the 
surgeon and the becoming-surgeon of the robot and present a foundation on which to 
consider the technicity of care in the concluding chapter.
This detour will proceed through the work of three authors:  Don Ihde’s (2002) Bodies in 
Technology) Lisa Cartwright’s (1995) Screening the Body:  Tracing Medicine’s Visual Culture, and 
Catherine Waldby’s (2000) The Visible Human Project:  Informatic Bodies and Posthuman 
Medicine.  I have selected these three authors because their respective work touches on a 
common domain of inquiry -- bodies and/in the practice of medical-scientific imaging 
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technologies.9  As I move through this analysis, I want to foreground what each theorist offers 
in terms of making more precise the nature of the human/machine interface.  Furthermore, I 
want to consider the degree to which each of these authors open up or foreclose on the 
project of engaging with the politics and ethics of the human/machine interface immanently,  at 
and from that interface.  I find it useful to provide a brief precis of my analysis here, to better 
focus the more detailed explication that follows.  Ihde (2002) offers the important observation 
that when discussing humans and technologies, the analytic primitive needs to be the body-
technology relation, an approach which complicates our understanding of the prosthetic by 
adhering to a principle of symmetry:  the human/technology articulation not only prosthetically 
extends human capabilities but it also extends the “reach” of the technical into our experience 
of what it means to be human.  Ihde, however, stabilizes the potentialities of this en-folding by 
suggesting that, in the end, technology needs to answer to the experiential frame of the “human 
invariant.”  In other words, after arguing that the human and the technical cannot be thought of 
independently from their interfacing, Ihde introduces an extra-interface human, one that 
moreover is not or has not been radically transformed by technicity itself.  Cartwright (1995), 
on the other hand, deftly argues that material ontologies of “the human” proceed from the 
immanence of the human/technology interface.  Like Ihde’s, Cartwright works from the 
analytical primitive of the human/technology relation.  However, rather than working from a 
phenomenological perspective, what Ihde calls the human experience of itself as a body-in-
technology, Cartwright focuses on the ontological productivity of the interface.  In simple 
terms, the human can only be articulated as such at and through its interfacing with 
technologies.  Cartwright, however, sees the human/technology interface as primarily a 
disciplinary one that connects up with larger cultural projects to discipline the social body that 
ultimately collapse the human into the implosive rationality of technoscientific systems that 
privilege measurement and objectivity, an argument remarkably similar to Alt’s above.  Finally, in 
my analysis of Waldby (2000) I highlight her particular version of the productivity of the human/
technology interface, for which she draws from Heidegger’s notion that both nature and 
technology possess techne, in the sense of a “bringing-forth,” but that modern technology’s 
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9 As Annemarie Mol points out, the intellectual technique of “relating to the literature” is neither a straightforward 
nor innocent practice (2002: 2-26).  It is itself a production of particular bodies—disciplines, authorities, domains of 
expertise, and objects of knowledge. 
particular mode of “bringing-forth” is to render the world as a “standing reserve” or use value.  
Waldby, however, reads Heidegger against the grain of his critique of technology, to articulate an 
ongoing biotechnogenesis of the human/machine.  Through this process, new human/
technology interfaces put the putative stability of the human at risk, but do so with the promise 
of opening up the future to “unforeseen possibilities for new modes of embodiment, 
translation, extension, supplementation and loss” (Waldby, 2000:  49).10  Waldby ultimately 
points the way, I argue, to a research agenda that seeks to construct “a modest cartography of 
our present” (Rose, 2007:  5).  According to Rose, a cartography of our present “would not so 
much seek to destablize the present by pointing to its contingency, but to destabilize the future 
by recognizing its openness.  That is to say, in demonstrating that no single future is written in 
our present, it might fortify our abilities, in part through thought itself, to intervene in that 
present, and so to shape something of the future that we might inhabit.” (2007: 5).    Following 
my detour through theory, then, I return to the dVSS to map the ways in which the surgeon and 
the robot, in their becoming-together at the interface, disrupt configurations of authority and 
autonomy and open up several possible futures for thinking about the automatic.
Embodiment and/in Technology
I will begin my discussion of different conceptions of the body/technology interface with a 
focus on Don Ihde’s Bodies in Technology.  As we shall see, Ihde’s phenomenology 
circumscribes his conceptual framework, and places certain epistemological valences on his 
conception.  Ihde focuses on a particular relation between bodies and technologies – relations 
of embodiment, or more precisely, our sense that “we are bodies in technologies” [italics mine] 
(2002:  138).  Ihde opens his book with the suggestion that our experience of embodiment 
proceeds according to three senses.  The first body-sense, which Ihde calls “body one” involves 
the phenomenological sense that “we are our body,” that our bodies provide us with a sense 
(literally, through sensation) of “our motile, perceptual and emotive being-in-the-world” (2002:  
xi).  Ihde’s body one is the active, perceiving being-a-body from which we experience the world 
around us.  Body one is “both preconceptual and precultural, and without this sense of body, 
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10 That this biotechnogenesis is ongoing might open up some affinities between Waldby and Agamben, insofar as 
both seem to suggest that the opening of the political, of future possibility, is without end(s).
there is no experience at all” (2002:  17).11   In a way, Ihde is trying to capture some sense of 
the biological body here – the specificity of the human sensory apparatus, including 
proprioception and a sense of the organic sensory capabilities of the flesh.   
 Ihde’s “body two” is our experience of our bodies in “a social and cultural sense” (2002:  
xi).  To illustrate this sense of embodiment, Ihde cites the variability across cultures of what 
body parts are experienced as erotic zones (2002: xi).  Later he discusses “skilled” perception in 
another attempt to describe our sense of body two, such as the ability of an archeologist to 
spot a fossil where others may simply perceive rocks (2002: 39).   The experience of body two 
inflects or overlays the experience of body one with socially/culturally inflected perception.  
Body two also resonates with what Ihde calls a “Foucaultian framework”:  “Foucault’s body is 
thoroughly a cultural body . . . The body objectified by the medical gaze in the clinic, the body of 
the condemned in the regicide, and the subjection of bodies within all forms of discipline are 
culturally constructed bodies” (Ihde, 2002:  17).  Following Foucault, we might consider this 
sense of embodiment technological as well – the sense of embodiment one has as worked/
worked over by social technologies.  But Ihde takes care to indicate only “echoes” of this body 
in his notion of body two, for “to follow an almost total body two direction” is not his project: “I 
shall not go that way” (2002: 70).  Instead he wants to keep both body one and body two in 
operation, for they both underline “situatedness” in particular ways (where “situatedness” is, for 
Ihde, rigorously asserted as situatedness in a phenomenological lifeworld).  Ihde finds the work of 
Iris Young exemplary in its mutual recognition of body one and body two. He cites her 
“Throwing Like a Girl,” “On Pregnant Subjectivity,” and “Breasted Being” as a “model 
development” that recognizes that “[b]odily motion, pregnancy and breasts are real in both 
bodily-physical senses and the sociocultural senses that situate these phenomena” (2002: 70).  
Ihde refuses to collapse one body into the other, while recognizing their entanglement.
Ihde suggests, then, that there is a third dimension of experience,  a “body three” that 
traverses the experience of body one and body two with the “dimension of the technological 
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11 It is unclear whether Ihde would also consider body one “pre-technological.”  He says that the experience of the 
body in technology, what Ihde calls body three, traverses both body one and body two, suggesting to me that for 
Ihde, the primordial experience of body one has resonances with Hansen’s notion of the “originary technicity” of 
embodiment, for we do, in fact, experience our bodies in a technological relationship (our hands as tools, for 
example, or even language as tool).
(2002:  xi).  This is the sense of embodiment most relevant to the discussion at hand, although I 
would argue that technicity informs bodies one and two (see above and footnote XX) and 
may, in fact, be inseparable from them in practice.  Body three is “the relation of experiencing 
something in the world through an artifact, a technology” (2002: xi).   Ihde stresses that body 
three is relational (and, I would add, mediational); body three inheres in the experience of 
relationality, of being a body in [relation with] technology, a relation that transforms both the 
body and the technological artifact.  In fact, Ihde argues that the aspect of relationality is the 
smallest unit of analysis one should engage when considering bodies-in-technologies.  Drawing 
upon his 1990 Technology and the Lifeworld, Ihde uses his refutation of the NRA’s claim that 
“Guns don’t kill people; people kill people” to illustrate that, once in-relation one can no longer 
speak of technologies-in-themselves, nor of bodies-in-themselves.  One can instead only speak 
of the human-gun relation-in-itself in relation to other technological artifacts, other bodies.  In 
such an account, “where the primitive unit is the human-technology relation, it becomes 
obvious that the relations of human-gun (a human with a gun) to another object or another 
human is very different from the human without a gun” (Ihde, 1990, cited in Ihde, 2002:  93).  In 
a way, then, Ihde’s focus shifts here from the embodiment of a body to the embodiment of an 
assemblage – the experience of the relationality of bodies-in-technologies.  For Ihde, this 
relationality has several important dimensions (I will discuss three), and yet, as I hopefully will 
make clear, all hinge upon Ihde’s primary identification of bodies with embodiment, and his 
focus on our experience of body three. 
First, the embodiment of body three is the experience of the extension of the here-body.12  
In other words, a primary experience of body three, of our bodies in technology, is the way in 
which a technology extends our body’s sensorium (our vision, our touch, even our 
proprioception) “through” a particular technology.  A telescope extends our organic capacities 
for vision; a blind person’s cane extends her reach and her sense of touch; a hammer extends 
both one’s sense of touch as well as one’s proprioceptive sense.  “The very materiality of the 
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12 Ihde makes a distinction between two other experiences of our body – our embodied here-body, and our 
quasi-disembodied image-body.  To illustrate the difference, he speaks of a classroom exercise where students are 
asked to describe the experience of jumping out of a plane.  Those that speak of the here-body experience 
describe the stomach-tightening of the fall, the wind on their face, etc.  Those that speak of the image-body 
experience describe a plane, a body exiting the plane, falling, etc.  Ihde asserts the primacy of the here-body and its 
full plenary sensation as the norm which makes the experience of the image-body possible. 
technology allows this extendability (sic)” (Ihde, 2002:  7).   In other words, Ihde asserts, 
extendibility is not generalized; it is specified by the limits and possibilities of the materiality of a 
technology.
Second, this extension is also only a quasi-extension.  Technology does not extend the full 
plenitude of our perception, the full bodily sensory awareness that constitutes our engagement 
with the world.  Ihde explains, for example that “the hardness—but not the coldness—of the 
nail is experienced through the hammer; the multidimensional ‘click’ of the sidewalk cement and 
its textured resistance is felt through the cane, but not its grayness” (2002:  7).  We must use 
the rest of our sensorium to “fill in” aspects of the experience not provided through the 
technical extension (Ihde, 2002:  7).13  Here, it seems, Ihde is advancing a version of McLuhan’s 
theory of the relationship between the body and the media:  media technologies are 
extensions of the human sensorium, but every such sensorial extension is also an 
“amputation”, one that instigates a consequent re-ordering of “sense ratios” (McLuhan, 1994:  
45).  And yet Ihde’s not so confident in the ability of a technology to truly “abstract” a single 
sense to the exclusion of others.  He calls the ability of a body-technology artifact to effect this 
abstraction a “quasi-illusion” (2002:  38).  It may be, as Ihde discusses at length in his chapters 
on “Visualism in Science” and “Perceptual Reasoning,” that the sciences have a tendency, a 
“cultural habit,” to “produce, display, and reiterate what counts for evidence in visual form,” to 
reduce the perception of “truth” to the plane of the visual, a “forgetfulness of the plenary or 
whole-body perception that Husserl called the forgetfulness of science” (2002:  37; 54).   But 
this does not mean that science has effected an amputation or reduction in perception per se.  
While the “forgetfulness of science” may have led Husserl to differentiate the abstractness of 
science from the “fullness” of the lifeworld, Ihde points out that in making such a distinction, 
Husserl “forgets” that “a technologically embodied science never leaves the lifeworld” (2002:  
xvi).  Ihde uses therapeutic medicine as a means to recuperate Husserl’s forgetting.  Even 
amidst the ocularcentricity of modern medicine, Ihde points out that “the examination of a 
living patient is undertaken by a whole series of hands-on practices . . . . one can say that 
therapeutic medicine, in practice, did not forget or abandon the lifeworld plenary-bodily mode 
of engaged knowledge” (2002:  57).  Even in experiencing body three, the body in [relation to] 
108
13 Ihde’s observation here adds further credence to the ‘haptic visuality’ surgeons experience at the dVSS viewport.
a particular technology, our experience of body one and body two exceed the ability of body 
three to fully exhaust, cancel out, determine or otherwise delimit our embodiment of the 
lifeworld.  So in one sense, the supposed suppression of situated embodiment is simply a 
Cartesian “god trick.”
A third key aspect of Ihde’s conception of the how bodies and technologies are mutually 
constituted can be found in his inflection of  science studies’ foregrounding of the “symmetry” 
of human and non-human actants in the concluding paragraphs of his text.  After repeating that 
body three, technical embodiment, is a “relation between the human and the technologies 
employed”, he remarks on three aspects of this relation.  First, he writes, “all human-technology 
relations are two-way relations. Insofar as I use or employ a technology, I am used by and 
employed by that technology as well” (2002: 137).  Here Ihde acknowledges a basic symmetry 
– one must afford agency and effectivity to human and non-human actants.  Second, in asserting 
this basic symmetry, Ihde grants technology’s agency over us, over our human bodies.  Ihde 
writes, “bodies, our bodies, adapt to different kinds of technologies and technological 
contexts” (2002: 138).  Put simply:  We adapt to our machines.14   Following from this, Ihde 
outlines the third aspect of human technology relations:  “the technologies must adapt to us.  A 
scientific instrument that did not or could not translate what it comes in contact with back into 
humanly understandable or perceivable range would be worthless.  It would lack the 
anthropological invariant that points to the implied limits of the machines we build and 
use.”  (2002:  138).  To understand what Ihde means, let me take a few moments to detail how 
he reads the history of imaging technologies in science.  Certainly, for Ihde, this history is a 
history of the extension of sight into new realms.  For many authors, however, this extension 
ultimately displaces the scientific observer as the ground of knowledge – at some point the 
certainty of “seeing for oneself ” gives way to epistemological instability and anxiety.  The 
extension of perception ultimately cedes to the displacement of perception, from human to 
machine.  The human is no longer the arbiter of perceptual evidence.  Cartwright, we shall see, 
makes much of the destabilization of the observer in technical mediation of perception.  It is 
telling, then, that Ihde doesn’t see this displacement as a cause for anxiety, as evidence of 
epistemological unmooring.  He certainly acknowledges that, with particular technologies, 
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14 Here I might highlight another affinity with McLuhan:  “We become what we behold.”
perception ceases to be technologically extended and instead becomes technologically 
constituted.  Imaging moves “beyond ordinary visual capacities” and becomes “second sight 
imaging,” employing everything from “the infrared and ultraviolet ranges of the optical 
spectrum” to invisible “gamma to radio waves”, translating these invisible traces into datasets 
that are in turn translated into false-color, algorithmically-manipulated, enhanced visualizations 
(2002: 47).15  And yet, Ihde remains unflustered.  
Why?  Because Ihde maintains that all forms of technological embodiment must ultimately 
answer to what he variably refers to as the “human invariant,” the “anthropomorphic invariant,” 
the “anthropological invariant.”   This human invariant both limits the extent of our possible 
adaptation to technology (we adapt, but only as far as our biology allows) and determines the 
directionality and terms of technology’s adaptation to us (which Ihde identifies as a horizon of 
translatability – the ability of a particular technology to translate its perceptual extensions back 
into the “human perceptual range” (2002:  138).]   Ihde’s “human invariant” is this: all forms of 
technical embodiment have “the necessity for there to be a bodily perceiver” (2002:  48).16  
Science, for example, may have moved from “direct bodily perceiving” to “translated and 
technoconstituted imaging” and yet “with, through, and among these instruments, the scientist 
also always remains a bodily perceiver—that is, the reflexive retroreferent of scientific 
activity” (2002:  48).   Thus, for Ihde the danger is not in the desire to see more, to extend 
vision into new realms.  Nor is there danger in the fact that this extension of perception 
proceeds through layer upon layer of technical mediation.  Instead, for Ihde the key danger is 
the desire for “pure transparency,” to escape the “limitations of the material” – bodily and 
technological materiality (2002: 13-14).
In summary, then, Ihde develops a keen sense of technological embodiment that is multiple, 
experienced as relations of perceptual extension.  Bodies and technologies have two-way 
effects – we are transformed by technologies and technologies are transformed by us . . . but 
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15 For a fantastic description of all the translations, filters, enhancements, calibration – in short, all the work – that 
goes into producing PET images as evidence in contemporary medicine, see Dumit (2004).
16 Virilio (1994), notably, is not convinced of the anthropomorphic invariant, and instead expresses concern about 
“the possibility of achieving sightless vision whereby the video camera would be controlled by a computer” (59).  
Accordingly, Virilio warns “we are moving from a civilization of the image to a civilization of optics.  This leaves open 
the possibility of an ‘optical correction’ of the world—the reconstruction of perception according to the machine.  
The machines themselves have become opticians.  This is an unprecedented event.” (2005)
within limits:  the limits of the materiality of technology, and the materiality of the body’s 
sensory apparatus.  
Productive Bodies / Disciplined Bodies – Bodies, Technologies and Power
Lisa Cartwright’s conception of the body/technology interface in Screening the Body:  
Tracing Medicine’s Visual Culture departs in significant ways from Ihde’s conception.  As I’ve 
already alluded, Cartwright and Ihde differ significantly on their interpretation of the historical 
trajectory of visualization technologies in science and medicine.  Cartwright explicitly condemns 
as complicit with the “Enlightenment” project narratives such as Ihde’s, where technical 
embodiment is characterized as augmentation and extension: 
The imaging of the body’s interior space in medicine and science has suggested 
to some scholars a narrative of Western advancement characterized by 
technology’s prosthetic augmentation of the sensory powers already built in, as 
it were, to the scientific observer’s body.  This argument suggests that devices 
designed to visualize physiological processes in effect enhanced researchers 
perceptual powers, extending the observer’s epistemological domain into 
previously uncharted territories—an Enlightenment project that continues in 
today’s medical imaging technologies.  (1995:  23)
I can note in Cartwright’s skepticism toward “sensory powers already built in, as it were” to the 
body we have a radical departure from Ihde’s three bodies.  Ihde would say that Cartwright 
takes the way he chose not to go – toward an interrogation of what he would call Body Two.  
But, as I hope I will make clear, Cartwright’s conception is no mere “social construction” – in her 
conception, technologies are productive of materiality.
Cartwright’s project interrogates the deployment of cinematography as a laboratory 
technology and its consequent entanglement in the emergence of physiology as a discipline in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  For Cartwright, the cinematic apparatus, along with 
other graphical techniques of observation and experimental control in the early physiology lab, 
articulated the conditions of possibility for physiology’s constitution of its object of knowledge – 
“life itself.”17  As Cartwright explains in her introduction, the cinematic apparatus was a “crucial 
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17 It is important to point out that in contemporary terms, physiology refers both to the mechanical, physical and 
biochemical functions of the human body, and to their study.  One can read Screening the Body as a cartography 
of the specific practices that maps the co-emergence, the tight co-extension of the body and its study along the 
lines of The Birth of the Clinic as well as the body and its discipline in Discipline and Punish.
instrument in the emergence of a distinctly modernist mode of representation in Western 
scientific and public culture—a mode geared to the temporal and spatial decomposition and 
reconfiguration of bodies as dynamic fields of action in need of regulation and control” (1995:  
xi).  
Cartwright explicitly articulates her project as an extension of Foucault’s work in the The 
Birth of the Clinic.  Cartwright transports Foucault's project from the domain of pathological 
anatomy (where bodies are technically produced as objects of knowledge -- through 
techniques of the corpse - as spatialized entities, the "body itself"18 as a opaque volume, where 
disease is, potentially at least, localizable and mappable) into the domain of physiology.  In this 
domain, Cartwright’s focus is on the technical productivities of cinematograph, where “the 
cinema was used as a technique to rejuvenate pathological anatomy’s object of study, the 
corpse, rendering life an elusive and seductive object of scientific conquest” (xiii).19  To put it 
another way, if the techniques of anatomy, Bichat’s “opening up a few bodies”, produced bodies 
amenable to the clinical gaze—a spatial body composed of solids and surfaces, the body proper 
to anatomical mapping, the localization of disease to lesion—then the techniques of the 
cinema, as a graphic practice, produced bodies amenable to the “vivifying physiological gaze”—a 
processual, temporal body.  Cartwright writes that physiology “regarded the body in terms of 
its living functions and processes, and its practitioners devised methods and techniques to 
facilitate a temporal, dynamic vision of the body in motion” (1995: 11).  
Already in my description of Cartwright’s project, I hope one can see the clear outlines of 
her version of the “mutual constitution” of bodies and technologies.  For Cartwright, 
technologies are practices that render bodies intelligible according to their systems of 
inscription.  This inscription should not be seen, however, as merely a representation of the real.  
Instead, this technical inscription is a material practice, with material effects.  Cinema is a 
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18 Foucault writes that the medical gaze “plunges into the space that it has given itself the task of traversing . . . In 
anatomo-clinical experience, the medical eye must see the illness spread before it, horizontally and vertically in 
graded depth, as it penetrates the body, as it advances into its bulk, as it circumvents or lifts its masses, as it 
descends into its depths” (1994:  136).  In other words, the anatomo-clinical gaze produces “the body itself ” in the 
very techniques of autopsy, “the very space of the organism” (Foucault, 1994:  136; 191).
19 Cartwright’s use of the term “rendering” is key:  rendering affords to the technological apparatus the ability to 
both interpret and produce an object in the world (render as in “giving a rendition of ”) and to produce a field of 
effects, enact a disciplining of the object produced (as in “to render a person immobile”, for example, or in a more 
Foucaultian sense, to “render a body productive and efficient”). 
temporal, graphic inscription practice that doesn’t just render visible pre-existing biological 
processes, but instead produces processual bodies in the act of writing them.20 If early 20th 
century physiologic laboratory techniques are materially implicated in the incorporation 
(embodiment or formation) of the very bodies they purport to produce knowledge of, it is 
perhaps a function of the experimental set-up required to render “life itself ” perceptible.  If 
anatomy produced body-knowledge through the “techniques of the corpse”, designed to open 
up bodies to visual perception, physiology had to pursue more oblique means.  “Life itself ” – 
the processual body – was not amenable to direct sensory perception.  Physiological principles 
weren’t visible in the corpse.  At best they were made visible through the induction of various 
forms of “rigor mortis” on the living body – as in Bernard’s “experiments in destruction,” where 
he severed the two principle nerves of the face, one by one, thereby, or so he thought, allowing 
their respective life functions to “present themselves in circumstances or conditions in which 
nature does not show them” (Bernard, quoted in Cartwright, 1995:  27).  However, as 
Cartwright argues, “what is ultimately shown is nothing more than an absence, a body stripped 
of its capacity to perform the function in question” (1995: 27).  Consequently, physiology’s 
object could be apprehended only through a technical, instrumental triangulation.  As Marey put 
it, “we are constantly obliged to use apparatuses in order to analyze things” (Dagnognet, quoted 
in Cartwright, 1995:  24).   In other words, in order to “present” life for analysis, bodies and the 
instruments used to analyze them had to be articulated tightly together.  Here one could read 
Cartwright’s experimental setup alongside Ihde’s discussion of the human-gun – except 
Cartwright’s focus is on the productivity of the coupling, and not on its experience.  Cartwright 
cites the invasive methodology of the horse heartbeat studies conducted by Marey and 
Chaveau in the late 1870’s.  In order to render the workings of the movement of blood by the 
heart, Marey and Cheveau setup a heart-ampoule-kymograph relation.  Air-filled ampoules 
were inserted directly into the beating heart of a living horse, and the ampoules were coupled 
with a kymograph, which graphed the pressure changes in each chamber.  Here we have the 
horizon of translation that Ihde references, but for Cartwright, the important issue is not so 
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20 In a similar manner, Alan Sekula and John Tagg have identified how static photography functioned in the 19th 
century in attempts to render criminality into a stable characteristic of deviant bodies, somehow inhering in body 
morphology.
much the translation but the interpenetrating body-technology coupling needed to even initiate 
it.  As she elaborates,
This experiment marks a dual shift in methodology:  a shift toward movement 
as a characteristic state of the body, and a shift toward implanting a technology 
of observation directly into the body studied—a technique that joins technology 
and the living body rather than using technology to sacrifice the body for the 
sake of analysis.  Marey and Chaveau had devised an apparatus in which the 
technology and the life form it interrogated were made into a generative and 
interdependent system.  As the horse’s body motored the inscription device, so 
the kymographic inscription reconfigured the conception of the living body 
from within, rendering it an ordered living system—a system best represented 
by graphical, temporal forms like the calibrated kymographic line or the 
incremental cinematic image, for example.  (Cartwright, 1995:  24-25) 
Cartwright’s emphasis is not so much on the translation effected by the interface, but on the 
interface itself, the coupling of bodies and technologies to produce particular visibilities and 
regularities.  (As I argue in what follows, this use of the Foucaultian language of disciplinarity is 
intentional.)  
If experimental cinematographic technologies are productive of particular bodies in 
Cartwright’s analysis, the mode of their operation is not simply on the individual body.  The 
mutual constitution of bodies and technologies is social as well as individual.21  The bleed 
between laboratory and popular cultures is ever-present in Cartwright’s work.  Throughout her 
text Cartwright is careful to connect laboratory control over “life itself ” with larger cultural 
projects to discipline the social body, projects that exceed a particular technological apparatus 
(Foucault would calls these more abstract configurations of discipline “diagrams of power”).  As 
Deleuze notes, commenting on Foucault’s Discipline & Punish, “machines are social before being 
technical.  Or rather, there is a human technology which exists before a material technology.  
No doubt the latter develops its effects within a whole social field; but in order for it to even 
be possible, the tools or material machines have to be chosen first of all by a diagram and 
taken up by assemblages” (1998:  39).  Cartwright thus argues that cinematographic techniques 
in the lab functioned in the service of a broader cultural apparatus of discipline, a social 
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21 If this is a position similar to Ihde’s, it is an involuted one.  Certainly for Ihde the individual body is also the social 
body, but the valence is quite different here, inflected not with the experience of embodiment, but the experience 
of being subjected to embodiment.  “Insofar as there is experience, it is experience suffered or wrought upon 
human bodies” (Ihde, 2002:  17).
technology geared toward disciplining both individual bodies as well as populations into what 
Foucault calls “subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile’ bodies.  Discipline increases the forces of 
the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of 
obedience) . . . [D]isciplinary coercion establishes in the body the constricting link between an 
increased aptitude and an increased domination” (Foucault, 1979:  138).  For example, in 
Cartwright’s discussion of Marey’s chronophotographic motion studies of the human body, she 
points out that technologies intended to inscribe the movements of the individual body are 
geared at the same time toward the social body.  The analysis of the individual body is meant to 
have productive effects on the social body, increased but controlled “aptitudes.”  She writes that 
Marey’s chonophotography “functioned as a disciplinary technique, then, insofar as it facilitated 
the establishment of a productive dynamic economy of the body.  By theorizing the 
physiological forces that drove the body to move, think and act, Marey contributed to the 
determination of a more efficient rate of locomotion, or a more effective use of the limbs in 
the military, in industry, and in athletics” (1995, 37). 
In establishing this “productive dynamic economy of the body”, these disciplinary techniques 
of the body incorporate not only the observed body, but the body of the observer as well. 
Recall that physiology was self-conscious of the need for instrumental intervention in order to 
render its object to perception.  Experimentation required intervention – unlike observation, it 
had to intervene in nature in order for nature to present itself.  Experimentation necessarily 
moves “beyond noninvasive observation.  Touching is no longer a neutral intermediary between 
physician/experimenter and body/object; touch constitutes ‘action on the body’ insofar as it 
alters the object it investigates” (Cartwright, 1995:  28).  In other words, the terms of 
experimentation required that the body of the observer intervene upon the phenomena 
studied and not just observe it.   Much like the “technically constituted perception” discussed in 
relation to Ihde, here we have another opportunity for epistemological anxiety.  This anxiety is 
created not by the displacement of perception from human to technology, but rather by the 
slippage between “nature presenting itself ” but “only by experimental intervention,” the 
intervention of the observer.  Here, the scientific observer is not Ihde’s “human invariant” that 
grounds technical mediation in the “necessity of a human observer.”  Far from invariant, in 
Cartwright’s conception the technical observer is that one more variable to be disciplined and 
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controlled, managed in order to optimize the “monitoring, regulating and ultimately building ‘life’ 
in the modernist culture of Western medical science” (Cartwright, 1995:  xi).
Consequently, if there are limits in this conceptualization, the limits are not imposed by the 
materiality of the human body, nor the materiality of technology as Ihde’s conception would 
have it.  While Cartwright wants to argue that the materiality of the living body itself resisted 
and disrupted the experimental apparatus as a dynamic force “that eluded and reflexively 
disciplined the gaze of the technical observer,” ultimately her argument locates resistance not in 
the materiality of the living body, but in the implosive rationality of the system itself (1995:  39).  
Indeed, as her discussion of François-Franck’s “graphocinematographic apparatus” suggests—
with its involution of techniques of calibration dispersing agency throughout the 
“heterogeneous elements of the apparatus  . . . the kymograph, the clock, and the film image, as 
well as the bodies of the observer and the observed”—that the apparatus eventually gets 
entangled in the logic of its own disciplinary regime (Cartwright, 1995:  43).
In sum, and in contrast to Ihde’s body-technology relation mutually conditioned by the limits 
of materiality, Cartwright’s conception offers us a diagram of power-knowledge, of bodies and 
technologies tightly coupled and mutually disciplining/disciplined in an ever-constricting 
formation of disciplined productivity.
En-Framing the Body – Informatic Bodies and Posthuman Spectacle
If Ihde’s sense of the mutual constitution of bodies and technologies revolved around 
embodiment, and Cartwright’s conception hinged upon the materiality of disciplinary 
incorporation, in The Visible Human Project:  Informatic Bodies and Posthuman Medicine, 
Catherine Waldby’s conception of the body/technology interface emerges through Heidegger’s 
notion of “en-framing.”   
As she begins her discussion of en-framing, Waldby makes two observations about 
contemporary biomedicine.  First, she enumerates all the clinical, surgical, hospital and 
laboratory techniques that “indicate the extent which the computer screen has become the 
dominant way first-world medicine frames its object”:  endoscopic surgery, computer 
modeling, telemedicine,  MRI, and so on (2000:  25).  Second, Waldby notes the prevalent 
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framing of the body’s molecular organization as a cybernetic system:  “This proposition has 
been articulated in molecular biology, immunology, endocrinology and other medical disciplines 
which understand the body as a network of informational systems, working through code, 
signal, transcription, interference, noise, and the execution of programmes” (Waldy:  25).  For 
Waldby, both of these modes of framing provide biomedicine with powerful and productive 
techniques for instrumentalizing matter (into economies of biovalue, which I will discuss later).  
In order to better capture the active, productive process of instrumentalizing matter to yield “a 
profit of knowledge”, Waldby thus shifts her terms – from framing to Heidegger’s en-framing 
(ge-stell).  
In brief, Heidegger’s “en-framing describes a particular way of producing technical objects, of 
bringing objects forth into presence” (Waldby, 2000:  27).  For Heidegger, all technology is “a 
mode of bringing forth” (1977:  13).   Techne, the root of technology, implies not simply the 
application of techniques, but also a poetic productivity, a poiesis.  This poetic mode of techne is 
a mode of “making present of things which is not limited to technical production but extends 
to the auto-productivity of living beings and to artistic production” (Waldby, 2000: 28).  In other 
words, Heidegger identifies in nature a fundamental technicity, the auto-poiesis of nature, 
nature’s techne; it is the mode by which nature (humans included) reproduces itself by an open 
bringing-forth.  This open bringing-forth nonetheless constitutes relationships according to a 
sort of ethical economy, of responsibility and indebtedness.  As Weber (1996) points out, 
poiesis “designates a relationship of being-due-to.  This in turn involves not merely a private or 
negative relation:  to be “due to” is to appear, to be brought into play thanks to something 
else” (63).  
According to Heidegger, modern technology still participates in the mode proper to 
technology, the mode of “bringing-forth,” but with a particular inflection that proceeds 
according to a radically different economy than poiesis:
The revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not unfold 
into a bringing-forth in the sense of poiesis.  The revealing that rules in modern 
technology is a challenging which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that 
it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.  (Heidegger, 1977: 14)
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In other words, for Heidegger, the en-framing of modern technology is an emplacement, a 
setting aside of nature as a form of “standing-reserve,” as potential “use value.”   Instead of 
traditional technics which bring-forth in the sense of revelation, modern technics is “a driving or 
goading forth:  ex-ploiting, ex-tracting, ex-pelling, in-citing . . . an extracting of that which 
henceforth only counts as raw material” (Weber, 1996:  69).  As Waldby writes, under this 
conception “the operation of modern technology is to order the world as use value and 
immediate resource to make it knowable and accessible, ready to hand, through such 
ordering” (2000:  29).  [I’ll note here in passing the similarities between the Heideggerian 
account of modern technicity and the Foucaultian account of modern disciplinary power.]
 Waldby’s own conception of the mutual constitution of bodies and technologies 
exhibits an ambivalent relationship to the negative valence in Heidegger’s concept of en-
framing.  On the one hand, she reads biotechnology’s “gearing of the material order of living 
matter” and biomedicine’s particular instrumentalization of bodies as a project of en-framing, a 
technics that sets aside a standing-reserve of what Waldby calls “’biovalue’, a surplus value of 
vitality and instrumental knowledge which can be placed at the disposal of the human 
subject” (2000:  19).  She locates the Visible Human Project within the long history of en-
framing technics in biomedicine, where economies of sacrifice yield profits of biovalue.  “This 
surplus value is produced through setting up certain kinds of hierarchies in which marginal 
forms of vitality – the foetal, the cadaverous and extracted tissue, as well as the bodies and 
body parts of the socially marginalized – are transformed into technologies to aid in the 
intensification of vitality for other living things” (2000: 19).  In the Visible Human Project, the 
cadaverous bodies of the socially marginalized – the male criminal body of Joseph Jernigan and 
the anonymous female body – are instrumentalized (sacrificed, indeed obliterated) in order to 
produce supposedly normative human anatomical archives for the advancement of medical 
care.  On the other hand, she suggests that she wants to read Heidegger’s notion of technics 
“against the grain of its apparently anti-technological biases” (2000:  19).  Against a simplistic 
version of modern technics which rests on a “simple expropriation of a given nature,” the 
instrumentalization of raw material, Waldby wants technics to signify “the open-ended 
participation of the natural world in technology” (2000: 19).  Rather than seeing biotechnology, 
for example, as an expropriation of nature, Walby suggests that “biotechnology could, in 
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general, be considered a mode of instrumental ‘address’, an exploratory form of intervention 
which is also an invitation, soliciting an active compliance from the productive capacities of living 
matter. Biotechnology seeks to instrumentalize the already instrumental capacities of living 
entities along particular lines” (2000:  19).   To be sure, Waldby would concur that technics 
always involves what Heidegger calls the “destining of revealing”, or what we might call, relating 
back to Cartwright, a disciplining of nature’s technics (1977:  25).   And yet Waldby wants to 
defend the openness, “the contingency of technics, its driven and ongoing nature, and the 
incalculability of its consequences” (2000:  49).  She continues with a powerful statement of her 
position, and I quote her at length:
[A]ny transformation in technologic, particularly biotechnologic, will risk the 
putative stability of the human and send it out of phase, into non-coincidence 
with the existing terms of its naturalisation.  New bodies of technique produce 
new forms of commensurability, new calibrating networks, which in turn lend 
themselves to particular ways of materially gearing the world.  Shifts in forms of 
calibration change the trajectories of technics in which the human takes place, 
the operational conditions of its production and reproduction.  They open it up 
to unforeseen possibilities for new modes of embodiment and translation, 
extension, supplementation and loss.  Transformations in repertoires of 
technique introduce discontinuities and open-ended forms of instability in the 
material conditions which locate the human, shifting the terms of its enablement 
and disablement.  The human is hence a category and status in a constant play 
of discontinuous mutation and provisional restabilisation, which must work with 
whatever field of technics is present.  (Waldby, 2000:  49)
Here we have a vision of “mutual constitution” occurring in a dynamic field of forces, technics 
materially addressing living matter according to particular directionalities of productivity, 
sometimes in phase, and sometimes out of phase with the existing terms of “nature”, the 
already instrumentalized capacities of living matter (“itself ” a shifting field).  Each new 
technology, each new attempt at material gearing of the world produces stabilities and 
displacements, unforeseen possibilities and new forms of agency, and new forms of control.  
If each technology attempts to instrumentalize already instrumental capacities along 
particular lines, Waldby then proceeds to map residual, dominant and emergent technicities 
(while she doesn’t use those terms, the movement is implicit in her text – from the manner in 
which the body is instrumentalized in the anatomical atlas to the archival data practices of the 
Visible Human Project to meditations on emerging forms of virtual surgery).  At every point, 
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Waldby articulates what she calls the “media specificities” of medicine.  For example, in her 
chapter “Theaters of Violence,” Waldby explores the “differential specificity” of the Virtual 
Human Project as “a transformation of the material possibilities of the anatomical body 
inaugurated by a move from the book to the screen” (2000:  59).22   She considers how the 
material technicity of the book form of the anatomical atlas “allowed medical knowledge to 
take form….but in a particular way, the form enabled by the particular conditions of possibility 
presented by the book” (2000:  70).  She also engages with the Visible Human Project as a 
different media specificity, a different technics, that yields different instrumentalizations, imposes 
different directionalities on the “bringing-forth” of the human, and opens the space of different 
performativities for bodies:  volumetric rendering, point of view animation and morphability and 
digital photorealism all open up a performative space for the Virtual Human to function not as 
model but as surrogate object for modern medical practices (2000:  70-78).   As a surrogate, 
the figures of the Virtual Human Project open up “certain kinds of possibilities for surgical 
navigation and transformation of living bodies” (Waldby, 2000, 21).   Accordingly, Waldby 
speculates in an open-ended way about possible biomedical futures that emerge in the 
instabilities these figures both represent and perform:  actual/virtual, living/dead, flesh/data, an 
uncanny—yet ongoing—biotechnogenesis.
What Waldby offers is an analytic through which to see the dVSS one version of ongoing 
biotechnogenesis.  The bio-techno creative process (a poeisis of new human/technology 
interfaces) puts the putative stability of the human at risk, but do so with the promise of 
opening up the future to “unforeseen possibilities for new modes of embodiment, translation, 
extension, supplementation and loss” (Waldby, 2000:  49).23  Waldby ultimately points the way, I 
argue, to a research agenda that seeks to construct “a modest cartography of our 
present” (Rose, 2007:  5).   I now return to the dVSS with the aim of a modest cartography of 
the peculiar “present” it embodies:  the ways in which the surgeon and the robot, in their 
becoming-together at the interface, disrupt configurations of authority and autonomy that open 
up onto several possible futures for thinking about the automatic.
120
22 Waldby draws on Weber (1996) for this notion of differential specificity.
23 That this biotechnogenesis is ongoing might open up some affinities between Waldby and Agamben, insofar as 
both seem to suggest that the opening of the political, of future possibility, is without end(s).
The dVSS is a particularly powerful apparatus within contemporary surgical medicine 
because it invokes the specter of robotic automation, the slippage of a human domain of 
practice into the machinic, and all the blurring and sublimation that happens in that movement, 
which I describe as the becoming-machine of the surgeon and the becoming-surgeon of the 
machine.  The dVSS embodies and enables the practice of technical rationality in what has been 
historically been seen as a fundamentally craft practice, the “art” of surgery.  This robotic 
apparatuses amplifies existing tensions in surgical practice, between care and cure, between 
cognitive and manual work, between art and science.  The dVSS forges new articulations 
between humans and machines in this professional domain, and raises both the specter and the 
dream of automation and the overcoming of human fallibility through technical means.
Interface Exigencies:  The Surgical “Demand” for an Interface
In his essay “The Virtual Surgeon:  Operating on the Data in an Age of Medialization,”  
Timothy Lenoir makes the observation that because the “surgeon is on the outside” and the 
“targeted anatomy is on the inside,” surgery “demands an interface” (2002: 37).  At a moment 
when the verb interface has been generalized to reference any connecting, bringing together, or 
meeting, the claim that surgery demands an interface seems like a commonsense and rather 
banal observation.  Certainly surgery involves the interface of doctor to patient, of outside to 
inside, of scalpel to anatomy.   So what difference does it make to think of surgery as/at an 
interface?  First of all, the concept of the interface puts the question of mediation front and 
center.  More specifically, it focuses the question of movement at the interface:  movement inside 
and outside the body and the inscription and exscription that attends that movement.  The 
exscriptive movement marks where bodily interiors are written outwards onto a myriad of 
screens and other interfaces.  The inscriptive movement marks where bodily interiors are 
written into with discourses of biomedical progress and the encounter with and crossing of 
“new frontiers.”   Again, Lenoir claims that “surgery demands an interface” (emphasis mine).  It's 
interesting to me that he characterizes the subject-object relation between surgery and 
interface with the verb "demands."  His intention is to outline the practical problematics of a 
surgeon being outside and anatomy being inside - a chasm that needs to be practically bridged 
or mediated for surgical intervention to happen at all.  But in contemporary surgery, the 
demand for an interface can be conceptualized in at least three other senses as well.  First, 
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surgery demands an interface in the sense of having an ethical obligation to use as "minimally 
invasive" surgical techniques as possible in order to minimize bodily trauma, speed recovery and 
minimize infection risk.  Second, these new surgical techniques create a context that demands
—in the sense being exigent—a re-consideration of the nature of the ontology of surgery in 
the face of changing practice parameters.  And third, insofar as emergent surgical interfaces 
suggest an increasing abstraction of the patient into an "information equivalent", the surgical 
interface seems to demand a re-engagement with the question of care, the interface-as-
connection with the patient qua human being.  I’ll note here as well a fourth sense of demand, 
demand in terms of the logic of the capitalism.  “Surgeons love their toys” is an oft-quoted 
euphemism, and it is interesting to consider the manner in which surgery creates a demand for 
ever-innovating interfaces, in order to provide “cutting edge” surgical care.  Morris-Suzuki (1984) 
also claims that an industry re-tooling itself for automation sees an emphasis on never-ending 
innovation for the production of surplus value, which she calls the “perpetual innovation 
economy” (114).  Additionally, the use of a particular interface in the training of surgical 
residents creates a market for that interface.  For example, at University Hospital urology 
residents perform radical prostatectomies using the dVSS on a daily basis, whereas open or 
traditional laparoscopic procedures are a much rarer occurrence.  The residency program 
literally produces da Vinci surgeons, surgeons for whom the practice of surgery is dependent 
upon access to Intuitive Surgical’s product.  Accordingly, pedagogy is complicit with the 
production of a particular demand for consumption, complicit in creating a demand for Intuitive 
Surgical’s products.
The pedagogy of the dVSS projects a surgical authority that is no longer linked to expertise 
per se but is haunted by “automaticity” dispersed across the apparatus and yet managed within 
the relatively stable hierarchy of the OR.  The surgeon’s authority persists at the interface, 
understood in this chapter broadly in these five ways:
1. Interfaces differentiate entities, but even early notions of the interface recognized on a 
conceptual level how the interface produces difference as much as it marks the coming 
together of two previously distinct entities.  This observation is important for my purposes, 
insofar as I think that dealing with the politics of authority and care in contemporary 
medicine needs to work at and from the interface, with an understanding that the human has 
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an originary technicity, that the human emerges in the exteriorization of the tool, the earliest 
of which is language. 
2. Interfaces enable joint operation, but at the expense of autonomy.  If the human/tool 
relation is the proper analytic for grappling with technological interfaces, then the prosthetic 
enhancement of surgical practice that the surgeon/dVSS apparatus enables transforms the 
autonomy of both surgeon and robot.  The surgeon and robot, in their interfacing, are both 
becoming-robot<>becoming-surgeon in complex and contradictory ways.
3. Authority and the specificity of the interface are linked.   Interfaces are sites where 
authority is exercised, transferred, transformed and undermined.  Increasingly, it is also at the 
surgical interface where the surgeon is held accountable, particularly in the context of 
increased public surveillance of “error in medicine.”
4. Relatedly, interfaces are site of communications, both informatic and material.  And the 
site of organizational and communication breakdown.  Importantly,  contemporary 
computational interfaces also informate; they produce data about what transpires at the 
interface.
5. Finally, interfaces are not neutral, but make demands.  The “exposure” of  the interface in 
OOP suggests a broader terrain of obligation and responsibility that the interface opens up.  
The surgical interface is no exception:  institutional, economic, ethical and political demands 
play out at the dVSS surgical interface. 
For the rest of this chapter, I want to consider the dVSS interface in relation to some of 
these themes.  As the scene that opens this chapter evokes, the human/technology articulation 
of the dVSS is a dual articulation that might be illustrated as follows:  
patient <> dVSS <> surgeon
For the sake of clarity, and because my research interlocutors were surgeons and other medical 
professionals, I’m going to focus on the right-hand articulation, the surgeon robot interface.  I 
begin by describing the way several key and interrelated terms structure some of the tensions 
in contemporary medicine, surgical practice in particular, and then consider in turn how the 
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interfacing of dVSS and surgeon amplifies or complicates these tensions, as well as creates new 
ones:  authority, autonomy, automaticity and automation. 
The Skilled Surgeon - Autonomy Lost?  Between authority, automaticity and automation
In his important book,  The Social Transformation of American Medicine, Paul Starr traces 
the rise of medicine’s professional sovereignty.  He explores how the medical profession 
transformed historically from the nineteenth century where “the medical profession was 
generally weak, divided, insecure in its status and its income, unable to control entry into 
practice or to raise the standards of medical education” to the twentieth, where doctors 
became “a powerful, prestigious and wealthy profession [that] succeeded in shaping the basic 
organization and financial structure of American medicine” (Starr, 1982:  8-9).  Importantly,  
Starr’s study historicizes the elite status of the medical profession, inviting the recognition that 
medicine’s social and scientific authority and autonomy are historical accomplishments that 
could have been otherwise.  In other words, Starr conducts what Nikolas Rose calls an 
“geneaology of the present,” an attempt to destabilize the present by illustrating its contingency 
(Rose, 2007: 4).    
One of Starr’s main arguments is that the power and prestige enjoyed by the medical 
profession at the present moment is indeed contingent, and perhaps on the wane.  He writes 
in his concluding chapter, “The Coming of the Corporation,” that “[i]n the twentieth century, 
medicine has been the heroic exception that sustained the waning tradition of independent 
professionalism…But the exception may now be brought in line with the governing rule.  
Unless there is a radical turnabout in economic conditions and American politics, the last 
decades of the twentieth century are likely to be a time of diminishing resources and autonomy 
for many physicians, voluntary hospitals, and medical schools” (Starr, 1982:  420-421).  
Since Starr wrote of the coming corporatization of medicine over 25 years ago, we might 
ask if indeed the system of medicine in America has slipped from physician control, “as power 
has moved away from the organized profession toward complexes of medical schools and 
hospitals, financing and regulatory agencies, health insurance companies, prepaid health plans, 
and health care chains, conglomerates, holding companies,and other corporations”  (1982:  8).  
The answer, of course, as with all such conjecture, is that Starr’s predictions have been realized 
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unevenly, and in contradictory ways, according to social, economic and technical forces that he 
did not and could not anticipate.24  For example, his prediction that a doctor “surplus” would 
introduce a “zero-sum game” of competition where “the gains of one physician, or group of 
physicians, will have to come at the expense of other physicians or other providers” has simply 
not emerged (Starr, 1982:  421-425).25 While the reasons are complex and outside the scope 
of this dissertation, far from facing a surplus, contemporary medicine, and surgery in particular, 
seems to be facing a shortage of personnel, and facilities for them to train, particularly at the 
residency level, which would seem to shore up the power of the profession according to an 
economics of scarcity.  The role of the internet, on the other hand, was completely 
unanticipated by Starr and has a radical effect on the relative authority of physicians in 
governing patient access to and mastery of medical knowledge outside of the physician-patient 
dyad..  
In other words, what I am arguing is that the sovereignty of the physician is still very much 
in question, and in flux, and my goal in this section is to understand how, and in what 
directions, the dVSS is mediating upon the surgical profession’s authority and autonomy.  
Ironically, Starr opened his book by remarking on how the medical profession has served 
historically as a remarkable counter-example to the argument that increasing technology within 
a profession results in a decrease of professional autonomy (1982: 16).  Not so with other 
artisans through history, the most commonly-cited example being the impact the Jacquard 
Loom exacted on the skilled textile weaving profession.  Automating technology such as the 
Jacquard Loom is often associated with the following impact:  The technology displaces the 
highly skilled worker, usurping his/her tactile intelligence.  The highly skilled work can be 
replaced by cheaper, unskilled labor; as a whole, the profession is “deskilled.”  The skilled artisan 
is not necessarily unemployed.  Her or his skill in creating textiles might allow movement into 
management, the planning department, whereby her or his expertise is used to create new 
textile designs for the machine to execute.  
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24 Starr himself acknowledges the openness of the future as he closes his book:  “But a trend is not necessarily fate.  
Images of the future are usually only caricatures of the present.  Perhaps this picture of the future of medical care 
will also prove to be a caricature.  Whether it does depends on choices that Americans still have to make” (1982:  
449).
25 For an analysis of the contemporary employment outlook for physicians and surgeons, see Cooper (2008) and 
Cuschieri (2003).
It is unclear whether or not the dVSS and technologies like it will become medicine’s 
jacquard loom.  It a fun prospect to argue:  Surgery is not automated.  Yes, but several 
trajectories point the way.  Any monkey can do it, after all.  Yes, but even if the manual practices of 
surgery could automated, don’t forget that “a skillfully performed operation is 75% decision-making 
and 25% dexterity” (Darzi, 1999: 887).  You’d still need a human surgeon to supervise, right, to make 
those crucial decisions?  I guess.  There’s pressure to cut costs, though, so maybe the total 
number of surgeons will at least be cut back.  A single surgeon, for example, might oversee an 
entire surgical ward of autonomous dVSS robots.  That might be good, actually, since there’s going 
to be a shortage of surgeons.  In any case, I’m not worried, because it’s my surgical judgment that 
matters, and they can’t automate that!   Right?  Right?!
The Robot is In:  Displacing Surgeons’ Authority
Shands, University of Florida publicized an event promoting a demonstration and test drive 
of the dVSS to its staff of surgeons with the flyer pictured above left.  The declaration “The 
Robot Is In!” and an anthropomorphized picture of the Patient Side Cart figure prominently at 
the top.  The human surgeon was notably absent.  Scripps Mercy Hospital announced the 
hospital’s acquisition of a dVSS with a different marketing strategy.  Punning on the surgical 
platform’s name, da Vinci, Scripps Mercy’s advertisement suggested that because its surgeons 
“have joined forces with another genius — da Vinci®” that their “state-of-the-art program 
brings patients the best of everything—the amazing precision of robotics, the expertise of 
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experienced surgeons and the compassionate care that’s synonymous with Scripps Mercy 
Hospital.”  When I asked Dr. Kinema about this advertising strategy, he scoffed.  “That’s just 
billboard medicine.  They use the robot to attract patients to their hospital.  But do they even 
use it?26 . . . I want to make my own commercial someday.”  Kinema is an amazingly talented 
amateur filmmaker in his spare time.  He gestured with his hands, roughly sketching a television 
screen.  
Picture this:  The commercial opens with a pair of janitors in a dimly lit 
basement, sweeping the floor.   As they sweep, the broom of one of them—the 
new guy—bumps up against this hulking object in the corner, which is draped in 
a white sheet.  The sheet shifts a bit, revealing a robotic arm and some 
cobwebs.  The new guy recoils.  “What the heck is that?”, he asks.  “Oh that?” his 
colleague snorts.  “That’s one of them da Vinci robots.  The hospital bought that 
about four years ago.   Haven’t used it since.”  Then the screen fades to the 
University Hospital logo, and a voice booms, “University Hospital.  We actually 
use our robot.”
A central theme that stands out from my observations as University Hospital is the degree to 
which the surgeons saw the emerging technology as a displacement of their authority as 
providers of medical care and possessors of medical knowledge and surgical skill.  The surgeons 
I interviewed all relayed stories about how the dVSS figured more prominently than their 
reputation in terms of attracting patients to have their prostate cancer treated at University 
Hospital.  During one of the first interviews I conducted with Dr. Sierra, he explained why 
University Hospital purchased its first robot.  University Hospital’s main competitor in the area 
had bought one the year before, and they were getting all the referrals.  Patient load at 
University Hospital was dropping off.  “Turns out, people were asking their primary care doc for  a 
referral for the robot whenever their PSA test results came back high.  I mean, they might not even 
need surgery and here they are asking for the robot!  But you know what?  When we bought our 
robot, things evened out again.  I guess it’s okay; it gets them in the door and they have the benefit of 
my experience and judgment in terms of their treatment course.  Most of the time they don’t need 
surgery.”
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26 Dr. Kinema’s reaction was not a critique of the particular institutions referenced above.  As Kinema is well 
aware, the University of Florida and Scripps Mercy’s Minimally Invasive Robotic Surgery Program are in fact very 
active centers for the practice of robotically-assisted surgery in the United States.  Instead, he was reacting strongly 
to the general advertising strategy of foregrounding robotic hardware to promote a surgical center. 
Dr. Azmeer, a senior gyn-oncology fellow, described how her patients were often 
disappointed when she told them that they’d be having a traditional laparoscopic instead of 
robotic hysterectomy.  “When they say that, I tell them ‘Hey, you need to trust my judgment!’”  It 
did not surprise me, then, when the dVSS proved to be a controversial issue during an early 
morning Grand Rounds at University Hospital.  Dr. Sierra had just finished presenting on the 
progress in establishing robotic surgery on the Urology surgical service.  His focus had been on 
patient outcomes as the metric by which to measure the success of the program.  A question 
came from the second row of the audience, someone clearly senior among the surgical staff:
Question:  “Is it true that the technology is driving more prostatectomies, perhaps 
unnecessarily?”
Dr. Sierra:  Well, my income is not dependent on volume, which is a good thing 
[laughs] because I actually spend more time talking people out of surgery, in favor of 
watchful waiting.  That’s the most complex part of our job, that kind of diagnostic art.  
But I am seeing a change in referral patterns.  More patients are coming here from 
across the state.  I imagine that’s because we have the robot.  I expect that once 
these things become more ubiquitous we’ll see referrals more grounded in more 
traditional factors like surgeon expertise and the prestige of the hospital.
The dVSS redirects patient flows away from the “traditional” bases for deciding on a surgeon:  a 
surgeon with “good hands and good judgment,” preferably in a hospital with good reputation 
(Zetka, 2003: 12). 27   It functions within contemporary surgical medicine as an affective force, 
not only claiming patient attention and desire, but also displacing the surgeon as the main 
attraction.  The desire for the robot is seen by these doctors as an affront to their authority.  It 
puts in question their expertise as arbiters of who must go under the knife and who need not, 
eliminating its apparent transparency as a defining “good.” 
Second, the high costs of the dVSS means that the contemporary surgeon is bound in new 
ways to the hospital as an administrative entity.  A surgeon's autonomy hinges upon her or his 
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27 Zetka (2003) offers this elaboration on what constitutes good judgment and good hands in the context of 
surgery:  
Surgical judgment develops in response to the existential difficulties inherent in working with varied and 
unpredictable anatomy.  It denotes a type of wisdom that is acquired over time through direct 
experience.  This attribute is the core skill that is most highly valued in the surgical culture.  Surgical 
judgment is what separates  good surgeons from poor ones.  Good hands are the action counterpart to 
surgical judgment.  The concept denotes working wisely in a treatment modality that demands 
quickness, instantaneous responses to contingencies, and manual dexterity.  (12)
relative mobility in relation to any particular hospital administration.  The reliance of the 
surgeon on the dVSS, and by extension the resources of a hospital to provide one, mean that 
the surgeon is institutionally bound and diminished.  Of course, surgeons are generally 
institutionally bound to the hospital; unless they have their own clinics they require access to 
the high tech operating rooms and expensive diagnostic equipment that only a large corporate 
hospital can provide.  But by entering into interface with the dVSS, by becoming da Vinci 
surgeons in the sense that access to the robot is required to practice their craft, the dVSS 
makes institutional affiliation all the more a matter of emplacement since the number of 
hospitals possessing even one dVSS represents less than 15% of available hospital employers.28   
He/she is at best the supplement to technical edifice, that positions him/her far removed from 
the country doctor who had little prestige but whose “little black bag” afforded a great deal of 
autonomy and mobility.   The question of surgeon autonomy takes on additional significance in 
the context of academic medicine.  If, as Bousquet observes, “the new realities of managed 
education strongly correspond to the better-understood realities of managed care,” then the 
autonomy of academic faculty operating in a teaching hospital is doubly-bound, by managed 
care and managed education (2003:  233)     Further, when asked why they chose University 
Hospital for their Urology residency, every single resident I interviewed said “the robot.”  It 
wasn’t the prestige of the attending surgeons who would mentor them, nor the prestige of the 
institution itself.    The robot was the primary affective force in shaping student desire in the 
market of surgical residencies.  Residency experience on the robot was seen, unequivocally, as 
the ticket to secure future employment, a shortcut in the pursuit of upward mobility.  
Automobility
Given how authority, autonomy and their diminishment intimately connect with issues of 
mobility and immobility, I am reminded of a moment in the scene that opened this chapter :  the 
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28 The career autonomy of the surgeon is marked by its mobility, or at least the potential for mobility if the 
surgeon chooses:  “Like the university professor, the full-time staff member of the medical school and the teaching 
hospital tends to have a national or even international ‘clientele’:  while his “practice” depends upon holding a 
position in an organization, his career tends to be one of high mobility, moving from one organization to 
another.” (Freidson, 1970:  113).  Freidson (1970) might be wrong to equate autonomy with mobility, however, at 
least in relation to the contemporary university faculty.  As the current proliferation of adjunct faculty in the 
contemporary University suggests, the enforced autonomy of casualization can be equally problematic; adjuncts 
operate under the sort of perpetual and enforced mobility that marks the casual worker, a mobility derived from 
the fact that the institutions that employ them have no investment in them beyond their labor.  
everyday act of docking the robot eliciting a series of references to and jokes about driving and 
the automobile.  Driving the patient cart into place is only one moment in which the figure of 
the automobile appears at the surgeon/dVSS interface.  Intuitive Surgical, for example, structures 
their demonstrations of the platform at professional meetings around the “test drive,” and even 
provide a script to their sales force instructing them on how to highlight and demonstrate 
certain features of the dVSS during these test drives.  For example, the suggested method for 
illustrating the range of motion of the Endowrist® instruments is to ask surgeons seated at the 
Console to act like they’re starting their car :   “I want you to roll your hands around as if you 
are turning keys in your ignition. Can you see how much range of motion you have with the 
EndoWrist instruments?” (da Vinci® S™ Test Drive Pitch).   
“Driving the robot” can be read as a means of taking control in the context of the 
diminished authority and autonomy described above.  It is a means of re-asserting authority 
and of displaying and exerting expertise.  In computer support circles, the exhortation “Let me 
drive” is often uttered in frustration at the incompetency of the user trying to follow the tech 
person’s instructions, even if it gets phrased as the more polite:  “Do you mind if I drive?”  
Displacing the user from the keyboard not only allows the computer technician to display his 
virtuosity in diagnosing and fixing an ailing computer, it reinforces the “incompetency” of the 
user, who loses the opportunity to learn by doing.  In my observations,  a frustrated attending 
surgeon would often take over the controls with a curt “Let me drive!” in order to intervene 
when a resident was bungling a procedure.   Interestingly, in my observations the phrase “why 
don’t you let me drive?” also functioned in the OR as an ostensible gesture of care, of looking 
out for the well-being of the doctor, as well as the safety of the patient, as in:  “You’ve been 
operating for 3 hours now, doctor.  Why don’t you let me drive now?”
 Per the da Vinci surgeon’s increasingly immobility vis a vis the institution, and her or his loss 
of authority in cathecting patients, all of these figures of the automobile at the surgeon/robot 
interface might be productively read in terms of an attempt to operationalize at the interface 
what Hay & Packer (2004) call “automobility”:  
Understood as an expression of auto-mobility, the car is but one kind of 
assemblage that has become integral to regimes of mobility wherein specific 
modes of transport are conceived to be a means to self-sufficiency, wherein 
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self-transport is conceived as a basis for states of freedom and independence, 
and wherein ideals of self-transport, self-sufficiency, and advanced states of 
freedom (the fully automatic) bleed into one another.  (Hay & Packer, 2004:  
212)
The dVSS gets figured as a car, I argue, so that the da Vinci surgeon can recuperate a sense of 
self-sufficiency and experience freedom and authority within the space of the OR, even as the 
surgeon’s automobility diminishes without.   Critically, Packer (2003) points out that the 
“freedom” of automobility is a regime of disciplined mobility.  The mobile subject that the 
automobile creates and enables entails new modes of governmentality.  Packer reasons that 
because “governing a mobile society…demands disciplining individuals differently,” automobility 
consequently creates new “lines of articulation between governance, mobility, and the ‘safe 
subject’” (2003:  153).  In brief, being a “good citizen” means learning to be a “good driver.”  
Later in this chapter I’ll discuss in more detail how the dVSS is implicated in broader disciplinary 
efforts to mitigate “error in medicine,” but for now I simply want to make the analogous 
connection to the automobile that Packer makes possible:  the dVSS, as an apparatus of 
automobility, is also governed by discourses of safety and risk.    
From the Auto-Mobile to the Automatic
Automobility is a convergence of two modes of agency:  autonomy and the automatic.  
Autonomy means self-governance; its etymology derives from autos (self) and nomos (rule or 
law).   The meaning of automatic, on the other hand, comes from the etymology of the term 
“cybernetic,” which means “self-steering” or “automatos” which literally means “self willing.”    
The automatic is a precondition for autonomy, but they are not the same.   One must have the 
capacity for automation (the ability to act on one’s own accord) as a condition of possibility for 
autonomy (to self-generate the rules according to which one acts).  Autonomy implies a 
primary indeterminacy that is made determinate or “driven” by the human subject; the 
automatic is determined, implying self-sufficient mobility, but the inability to follow anything 
beyond a pre-scripted path.   Attewell (1990), drawing on figures from Marx and Harry 
Bravermann, outlines the following contrast between (autonomous) craft worker and 
(automatic) machine operator:
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a craft worker decides how to accomplish a particular piece of work, chooses 
the appropriate tools and procedures, and is self-directed in the work.  This 
contrasts with, say, a machine operator, who is told what to do, is given 
instructions, tools, or procedures on how to do it, and is overseen by 
management. (441)
Accordingly, the automatic seems to divide into 2 primary figures at opposing poles of value 
within contemporary surgical practice:  the specter of the automaton and the virtuoso of 
automaticity.
The Automaton
The sense of automation as becoming-automaton is often cast within the narrative of a fall; 
the surgeon, once a autonomous “hero,” falls from that privileged space of authority and 
becomes yet another “cog in the machine.”  Loss of autonomy means one is reduced to the 
automatic in the sense of becoming-automaton, an alienated sense of becoming-robot.  In his 
memoir, Intern:  A Doctor’s Initiation, Sandeep Jauhar writes of being drawn into this sense of 
automaticity:
By this point in my internship, I had already come to appreciate that there was a 
fundamental disconnect in the hospital.  Good relations with patients weren’t 
rewarded; efficiency was, which meant focusing on the work at hand, operating 
with a kind of remote control, in front of computer screens and nursing charts 
and requisition forms, and on the phone. (2007:  118)
Contemporary paradigms of evidenced-based medicine are often derided as “cookbook 
medicine,” the blind following of pre-defined protocols, limiting one’s practice to performing 
only the procedures that managed care allows.  The logic of the protocol takes on the 
unbending tyranny of the line that circumscribes the “low-level” programming languages that I 
described earlier.  Disaffected, care becomes executing one’s “operating instructions,” line by 
line.  This sense of becoming-automaton is also tied to the capitalist restructuring of healthcare, 
as Cooke et al outline in their “American Medical Education 100 Years After the Flexner 
Report”:  
the harsh, commercial atmosphere of the marketplace has permeated many 
academic medical centers.  Students hear institutional leaders speaking more 
about “throughput,” “capture of market share,” “units of service,” and the 
financial “bottom line” than about the prevention and relief of suffering.  
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Students learn from this culture that health care as a business may threaten 
medicine as a calling. (2006:  1340)
While the surgeons I interviewed and interacted with never spoke about experiencing this 
alienation directly, they certainly warned about “factory medicine,” citing a peer institution that 
owned multiple dVSS platforms, and “all they did, day in, day out, was back-to-back 
prostatectomies,” the specter of the total automation of the craft shop.  
Machinic Virtuosity — Automaticity as Virtue
Some surgeons, however, see machine-like automatism in a different light.  Prominent 
surgeon-author Atul Gawande, for example, advocates the “becoming-machine” of the 
surgeon.  He cites a small medical center outside Toronto, Shouldice Hospital, that has turned 
hernia repair into factory science.  Surgeons at Shouldice do hernia operations and nothing 
else.  As a consequence, each surgeon performs 600-800 hernia repairs a year, more than most 
surgeons do in a lifetime.  As a result, they have cut operating times, cut costs, and reduced the 
hernia recurrence rate from an average 10-15% of all cases to “an astonishing 1%” (Gawande, 
2002:  38).  What some surgeons might see as a dystopic vision of mindless automatons in the 
lock-step of alienated labor, Gawande sees as virtuosity:  “To describe one case is to describe 
them all:  I watched three surgeons operate on six patients, and none deviated even a step 
from their standard protocol…[P]hysicians should be trained to act more like 
machines” (2002:  39).  Gawande is not alone:  Automaticity is often defined as the goal of 
surgical skill training.  Hirschauer, for example, uses the metaphor of machinic virtuosity to 
describe a surgical team operating at maximum efficiency:  “Alarms signals can be heard 
whenever a cog in the works of the operating team is out of order and threatens to stop the 
whole apparatus.  Normally, however, the surgeon-body with its rhythmic activity functions like 
a machine:  no words being said, instruments slide into hands snapping shut” (Hirschauer, 1991:  
297).   
A term coined in the late 1970s, automaticity names a mode of cognition associated with 
expert virtuosity, a state in which skilled actions become so deeply embedded in the embodied 
repertoire of the surgeon that the surgeon need not think about the steps involved. S/he 
simply acts.  Hence, 
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the term “automaticity” refers to the ability to perform a task with little effort 
and few attentional resources. Highly experienced individuals (experts) can 
often perform multiple tasks simultaneously with little or no performance 
decrement, whereas novices often struggle with a new and difficult task, and 
their performance is severely impaired when they attempt to engage in another 
task at the same time. (Stefanidis et al, 2008:  211)
Having to stop and think signals incomplete training.  “Don’t think, act!”  Surgeons are exhorted 
to go “automatic.”  While an intern may need to consult his or her handbook, the master has 
mastered the skill by virtue of having completely somaticized it.  Neurosurgeon Katrina Firlik 
suggests that, in this sense, even brain surgery isn’t brain surgery:  “If you have an expanding 
blood clot in your head, you want a skilled brain mechanic, and preferably a swift one.  You 
don’t care if your surgeon published a paper in Science or Nature” (2006:  4).  For a 
neurosurgeon confronted with a bleeding cranial sinus tear, “there’s no  role for thinking here…
I ask for two things, automatically:  a large piece of gel foam and a large cottonoid” (Firlik, 2006:  
97).   The human surgeon is and is not recovered by automaticity, by their becoming-machine, 
for so-called mindless automatism shuttles between the specter of alienation and the marker of 
virtuoso expertise.
(Human) Fallibility and Machinic Virtuosity
Exhibiting automaticity at the dVSS interface would seem to be a panacea to human 
fallibility:  the becoming-machine of the surgeon coupled with the already-machine of the robot
—perfect procedural precision and the consequent elimination of surgical error :
Western medicine is dominated by a single imperative—the quest for 
machinelike perfection in the delivery of care.  From the first day of medical 
training, it is clear that errors are unacceptable . . . When I’m in the operating 
room, the highest praise I can receive from my fellow surgeons is “You’re a 
machine, Gawande.” (Gawande, 1998:  149)
As I have already described, ISI emphasizes the dVSS as an apparatus that overcomes the limits 
of the human.  It filters out physiological tremor.  The “ergonomics” of the Surgeon Console’s 
interface is intended to mitigate against the encroachment of fatigue.  Early on in my research 
for this dissertation, my son Noah and I happened upon a CBS News Report on surgical error 
(March 17, 2008).  Following the report, Noah observed:
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I know people at hospitals are there to help me, but it makes me scared because 
they could mess up, I mean, they’re only human.  They make mistakes.  They’re not 
like robots that are programmed, like robots who know how to do everything and 
know everything they’re programmed.  People, they can mess up.  But robots, they 
don’t get tired.
The aura of machinic virtuousity is another expression of the affective force of the dVSS.  It is a 
fantasy of “seamlessness” and “superhuman” (or in the eyes of my son, “Superhero”) care.  But 
in embodied relation, at the interface of becoming-robot-surgeon, it cannot of course 
transcend the human.  Nor can it transcend error.  I’ve already written about how the 
productivity of error is built into the very logic of command and control of the dVSS.  Here, let 
me discuss how the aura of machinic virtuosity unravels around the question of error. 
First, the dVSS interface opens up onto the possibility of the technological invention of the 
accident, or what Virilio calls the “artificial accident” (2007:  15).29  Virilio’s point is that the 
technological accident proceeds from the process of biotechnogenesis itself.  He writes, “there 
is no accidentology, but only a process of fortuitous discovery, archaeotechnological invention.    To 
invent the sailing ship . . . is to invent the shipwreck.  To invent the train is to invent the rail accident 
of derailment”  (2007:  10).  Following Viriliio, we might then say that far from mitigating against 
error and the accident, the dVSS produces the robotically-assisted surgical accident, the 
unrecoverable system fault.  Borden (2007) accounts some of the artificial accidents that occur 
at the surgeon/robot interface:  mechanical failure of wrist and arm; camera error and 3D 
display blackout, power supply failure, master failure, slave failure and software errors.  At the 
ongoing interface of biotechnogenesis, then, is the creation of entirely new taxonomies of 
errors, new configurations of failure, new matrices of vulnerability.  ISI’s dVSTAT technical 
support stands ready to respond to these by telephone helpline, within 30 seconds for US 
domestic users (but 15 minutes for international users, suggesting that the distribution of 
catastrophe might become a function of geography).  
Another site of “artificial” fallibility is the ways in which both surgeon and dVSS get caught 
up in logics of obsolescence.  Like the lifespan of a cutting edge technology like the dVSS, “a 
physician’s life is a constant, and losing, battle against obsolescence” (Ravitch, 1987:  125).    
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29 Virilio counterposes the artificial to the natural, not the real.  It’s not that artificial accidents are fake, but that 
they are the products of technicity.
Having an “obsolete” system is a site of vulnerability; creation of incompatible software versions 
or point releases of firmware that no longer go through development cycles to add 
functionality, maintain security or fix bugs.  Fatigue and the “wearing out” of the aging body are 
as much a product of the last century’s perception of / production of the body according to 
the laws of thermodynamics and the mechanics of the motor (see, e.g. Rabinbach, 1990).
Third, a paradox exists at the heart of skill and automaticity.  Attewell (1990) argues that, 
from a neo-Weberian perspective, a skilled profession requires the failure of practice to 
establish skill as such.  Attewell describes the logic by which skill
depends on the absence of an effective technique or technology to produce the 
desired outcome.  A skilled occupation is one that cannot reliably do what it is 
called on to do.  Work that cannot be carried out effectively every time 
becomes a resource around which those who are employed at the work build 
their claims to being especially skilled. (Attewell, 1990:  438)
Even beyond the entanglement of failure in the performativity of skill, recent research on error 
in surgery suggests that errors occur most often by expert surgeons, those who operate most 
within the mode of the machinic, of automaticity.  In other words, the same cognitive 
mechanisms that are the mark of expertise make the expert, the surgeon with the most 
naturalized technosoma, the most fallible to error.   The ideal behind automaticity is that the 
surgeon, not having to think about how to throw a stitch, can instead be ready for the 
contingencies of surgery — the unexpected.  Instead, it’s more likely that the surgeon will be 
distracted.  “Off-loading” to lower level processing circuits of the brain the cognitive work of 
having to concentrate or “think hard” about one’s suturing practice, for example, simply frees up 
the mind to wander.
To Err is Human:  The Problem of Error in Medicine
In 2000, the Institute of Medicine published its landmark report “To Err is Human:  Building 
a Safer Health System,” which placed the “problem of error” firmly in the public consciousness.  
The report revealed that somewhere between 44,0000 and 98,000 deaths occurred each year 
as a result of medical error.  Of these, approximately 12.5%, or between 5,500 and 12,250 
deaths, were the result of “surgical adverse events” (Champion et al, 2008:  284).  The IOM 
Report recommended a “systems approach” for mitigating against medical errors.  As many 
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from within and without the medical community have pointed out, this systems discourse raises 
complicated and entangled issues regarding personal responsibility and individual accountability, 
particularly when the “system fails.”  Moreover, the systems approach exacerbates tensions 
between traditional protocols of accountability in surgical apprenticeship and practice (such as 
the M&M conference) and the new “systems” apparatus of error mitigation and risk 
management.  The “To Err is Human” define error as “failure of a planned action to be 
completed as intended” — an error of execution — or the “use of the wrong plan to achieve 
an aim”— an error of planning (2000).  In 2004, DARPA sponsored a “Conference on Surgical 
Errors” consensus meeting to further hone the taxonomy of error for surgery-specific 
practice.    The result was a taxonomy that specified both degree (minimal, minor, and major) 
and type (errors of perception, errors of cognition, and technical error) (Champion et al, 2008:  
285-286).  More than 50% of surgical errors are said to be technical errors.  Champion et al 
(2008) subdivide technical errors into slips and lapses.  Slips are failures caused by distraction, 
by not being careful, whereas lapses occur when “the necessary knowledge is lacking to solve a 
problem” (Champion et al, 2008:  286).  
My interest in laying out the taxonomy above is not in its accuracy, in its ability to properly 
name surgical error.  Instead, I’m more interested in how this taxonomy creates an expanding 
yet ever-more-specified environment of risk, of potential accident.  And how this environment 
is, in turn, generative of calls not only for surgical skills training, but also for more objective 
assessment of that training.   As Packer (2003) puts it, “risk is something to be avoided, while 
safety is the positivity that organizes conduct.”  I argue that risk and the organization of conduct 
to mitigate it both play out at the interface of the dVSS in particular and powerful ways.  In 
concluding this chapter on “thinking (at) the interface,” I want to explore how the dVSS 
participates in these circuits of error specification and regimes of conduct to mitigate them.  If 
the 19th century Scientific Management techniques of Taylor and Gilbreth analyzed the micro-
movements of the worker in the name of efficiency, contemporary surgical assessment 
leverages the same architecture in the name of safety.
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Informating at the Surgical Interface:  The daVinci® Research Interface
In the last chapter I detailed the complex mechanism by which the dVSS “seamlessly 
translates” the surgeon’s movements into the movements of the robotic arms.  Rather than 
mechanically-driven by the master manipulator, the movements at the slave end effectors are 
computationally-derived.  Crucial to the mediations at the master/slave interface are an array of 
sensors that sample the positions of each of the joints in the dVSS, 1200 times per second.  
Intuitive Surgical provides another interface into this sensor data, an API (application 
programming interface) that they have dubbed the da Vinci® research interface.  The dVSS 
surgical interface not only automates, it informates:
“What is it, then, that distinguishes information technology from earlier 
generations of machine technology?  As information technology is used to 
reproduce, extend, and improve upon the process of substituting machines for 
human agency, it simultaneously accomplishes something quite different.  The 
devices that automate by translating information into action also register data 
about those automated activities, thus generating new streams of information. 
(Zuboff, 1988:  9)
In other words, as the da Vinci surgeon operates at the console, interacting with the various 
interfaces that constitute the dVSS platform, s/he generates a digital data stream of all the events 
that are enacted at the interface.  This data, as procedural input (in Bogost’s sense) not only 
operates the system, but it serves as a dynamic representation of that system, meta-data on the 
doing.  A record is made of the entire operation from the point of view of the computational 
interface. 
This “recording” is not stored on the dVSS platform itself, but streamed in real time from a 
server on the platform over a standard TCP/IP connection, the same protocol used for 
communication over the Internet, to a researcher’s computer running client software.  The API 
is an object-oriented interface; data is encapsulated and the API exposes the data-stream in a 
read-only fashion.  The API exposes no methods for affecting the data, no means for “remote 
control” of the robot.  Additionally, the granularity of the dataset provided by the API is of much 
lower resolution than the data streams used in the dVSS’ operational algorithms.  Whereas we 
know the sensors in the master controllers and end-effector joints sample kinematic data at 
1200 Hz, the API exposes a much lower sampling rate, between 10 - 100Hz, depending on the 
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data point.  It still provides, however, an impressive 192 points of data in each sample.  
According to the publicly available API documentation, the exposed data “includes the motion 
of all master and slave manipulators, as well as a number of user console events such as button 
and pedal activations” (DiMaio & Hasser, 2008:  1).  These data points include the angles and 
angular velocity of each of the master and end effector joints as well as the instrument tip’s 
pose and translational/rotational velocities, ten to 100 times per second.  The system also 
registers which foot switch pedals are depressed and when.  The console even “detects the 
presence of the surgeon’s head when he/she is looking through the display eyepiece. Head In 
and Head Out events are triggered and transmitted by the API server” (DiMaio & Hasser, 2008:  
4).
Much like stereochronophotography did for Frank Gilbreth in his studies of surgical motion 
at the turn of the last century, the dVSS’ API renders surgical craft visible in ways previously 
inaccessible.  Walter Benjamin made this observation about the camera in his often-quoted 
“The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction:”
Evidently a different nature opens itself to the camera than opens to the naked 
eye – if only because an unconsciously penetrated space is substituted for a 
space consciously explored by man. Even if one has a general knowledge of the 
way people walk, one knows nothing of a person’s posture during the fractional 
second of a stride. The act of reaching for a lighter or a spoon is familiar 
routine, yet we hardly know what really goes on between hand and metal, not 
to mention how this fluctuates with our moods. Here the camera intervenes 
with the resources of its lowerings and liftings, its interruptions and isolations, it 
extensions and accelerations, its enlargements and reductions. The camera 
introduces us to unconscious optics. (1936)
But what are the implications of the daVinci® research interface opening up new worlds in this 
manner?  It, too, participates in the biotechnogenesis of the dVSS, creating new objects.  As does 
the “storage capacity” of many different media, it renders the skill of the surgeon as an object 
independent of the body of the surgeon in particular ways.  (A simple observation:  Both 
Benjamin’s camera and the dVSS API render gesture as digital, just with different sampling rates, 
different resolutions, and different possibilities for reversibility and playback).  This rendering-
external of the surgeon’s tacit craft knowledge, the “literalization of skill in an inscription 
device” marks a potential loss of the surgeon’s labor power (Lenoir, 2002:  43).  It places the 
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surgeon’s gesture potentially within the contested realm of intellectual property.  Whose 
“property” is the surgical gesture?  The surgeon who “made” the gesture?  Or is it the property 
of Intuitive Surgical, whose robotic platform rendered it as a recordable, storable, transmissable 
object?  Does the dVSS interface thus suggest an open source politics of craft?
Second, the dataset of the dVSS produces a new taxonomy of surgical skill and surgical 
error, at the micro-level of the gesture.  For example, researchers at Johns Hopkins University 
are running Hidden Markov models against the daVinci API’s data stream to automatically 
recognize the “gesture primitives” of surgical craft.  Much like language can be parsed according 
to phonemes, researchers at JHU foresee the ability to computationally recognize different 
elements of a surgical procedures, which they call “surgemes.”  At this point, their research has 
been used to develop visualizations of different “surgical signatures”:  novice, intermediate, 
expert (see image below - The “expert” is marked by clear separation between gestures.  The 
less experienced surgeon makes any number of “unnecessary” movements).   Explicit in this 
research is the development of mechanisms for objective surgical assessment:  assessment by 
and through the dVSS interface itself, measuring how a particular surgeon’s “signature” deviates 
from the precisely-separated gestures of an expert.  
Two “Surgical Signatures”
Figure courtesy of Gregory D. Hager, Professor of Computer Science, The Johns Hopkins University
Source:  https://www.cisst.org/wiki2/images/f/fa/Hager_-_LanguageOfSurgery.pptx.pdf
As a tool in generating an even more precise profile of risk and error, the dVSS interface sets 
the stage for new positivities for “safety’s” intervention.  In the context of ever more 
proliferating environments of risk, da Vinci surgeons must perform, or else, giving robotic surgery 
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a different valence in the “cutting edge” sensibility of contemporary medicine, the drive to 
always be “state of the art.”  Robotic surgical performance seems defined both by virtuoso 
performativity, and, increasingly precise specifications of error, and the demand to meet not the 
norm, but the impossible ideal of expert, error-free practice.
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C O N C L U S I O N S
Part I:  The Becoming Surgeon of the Robot
The notion of a completely autonomous surgical robotic has so far received short shrift in 
this dissertation, even though I have argued that the dVSS interface signals as much the 
“becoming surgeon of the robot” as it does the “becoming robot of the surgeon.”  In part, I am 
hesitant to speculate on the future of surgical robotics in relation to the automation of surgical 
craft.  It is unclear whether or not robotic engineers will succeed in creating a truly 
autonomous surgical robot, nor that they will be motivated to do so.   But in the more 
speculative mode of a coda, I want to briefly consider the “becoming surgeon of the robot,” 
particularly as it sets in motion a range of opposing discourses about humans and machines.
It is the affective force of this figure, the 
specter of the autonomous surgical robot, that 
propelled an internet meme that circulated in May 
of 2006.  It was reported that, “for the first time, a 
robot surgeon in Italy has carried out a long 
distance heart operation by itself.”  When I first 
came across the story a month or two ago in the 
archives of the popular technology website Engadget (Blass, 2006), I was both intrigued and 
alarmed:  Was it true?  Could it be!?  If it were true, how had my research missed such a crucial 
moment in the becoming-surgeon of the robot?   But the more I tracked the meme across 
blogs and newswires, through RSS pingbacks and comment threads, the less and less I cared 
about the truth-value of the meme.  It is, and isn’t true.  Instead, the story’s truth mattered less 
than its truth-effect as I realized the range and depth of affects it had mobilized about the 
(im)possibility of the becoming surgeon of the robot.  As it circulated through the blogsphere, 
the story opened up to public commentary, resulting in a crystallization of many of the themes 
I’ve struck in this dissertation.  I present the meme here as a way to see how the affective force 
of surgery at the robotic interface produces a web of critique in a relatively comic key.  The 
form of the comment thread turns out to be both useful and economical in terms of focusing 
and amplifying discourse in a condensed frame.  Comment threads do not readily lend 
themselves to extended arguments but rather incite the posting of “discursive gems,” compact 
articulations of the cultural imaginary of the various publics that haunt the internet.  As I outline 
below, these “gems” dramatize many of the issues I raised in the body of my dissertation such 
as the perceived inflexibility of computational techniques, the conviction that software is 
inherently rule-bound, linear, and/or procedural and therefore dangerously “automatic.”  The 
robo-surgeon recounted in these comment threads is the specter of the automaton.  The 
inflexibility of technique is dramatized at the interface of the robot with the unexpected and 
contingent, which in turn is both the promise (flexibility) and demise (fallibility) of the human.
The Meme
 On May 18, 2006, the news agency United Press International posted a story to its 
newswire, reporting that “for the first time, a robot surgeon in Italy has carried out a long-
distance heart operation by itself” (2006).  Dr. Carlo Pappone, head of Arrhythmia and Cardiac 
Electrophysiology at San Raffaele University in Milan, initiated the surgery from a PC laptop in 
Boston, where he was presenting to an international congress on arrhythmia.  With the click of 
Pappone’s mouse button, the robot then proceeded to perform the surgery at a hospital in 
Milan, on a 34-year-old patient suffering from atrial fibrillation.1  Pappone and the heart 
specialists at the conference monitored the operation via tele-videoconference.  The article 
concluded by suggesting that the robo-surgeon’s software reflected the “expertise of several 
human surgeons” and that the surgical robot “has learned to do the job thanks to experience 
gathered from operations on 10,000 patients,” Pappone said (United Press International, 2006).
143
1 Atrial fibrillation, or “afib”, is a condition in which the electrical impulses that drive the heart muscle to contract 
rhythmically misfire, resulting in an inefficient, syncopated “quivering” of the heart.  While atrial fibrillation is 
generally asymptomatic, in some patients it may result in chest pain, palpitations or fainting spells.  It has also been 
linked to an increase risk of stroke.  A surgical procedure often performed to address atrial fibrillation is called 
catheter ablation, and requires snaking a catheter through the patient’s veins to the left atrium of the heart, where 
electrodes that can detect electrical activity from inside the heart are used by an electrophysiologist to "map" 
abnormal electrical activity.  The surgeon then inserts another probe into the catheter, which emits radiofrequency 
energy to ablate or destroy the “localized” abnormal neuro-electrical pathways in the heart tissue itself.
The Commentary
The story immediately circulated through the blogosphere, and appeared on such 
prominent websites as engadget.com and digg.com. 2  As I have suggested, the circulation of the 
meme produced concentrated pockets of commentary and debate, in the form of comment 
threads on the various blogs and newswires that referenced the story.  
Some of these comments retrace familiar territory, commenting on the inflexibility of rule-
bound technicity in the face of or even against the messy contingencies of surgical practice.  In 
these comments,  the automatic gets figured as a kind of linear procedural logic that locks up at 
the first sign of complexity and the unexpected: 
Similarly, a second kind of response pitted the human against the robot, asserting the 
superiority of the human, reflecting confidence in what I have previously identified as the 
surgeon’s operative judgment:
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2 Internet circulation, particularly tied to the blogosphere, is a complicated mix of automated proliferation through 
RSS feeds and intentional human-driven citation.
In turn, bloggers pictured the human as fallible, posing human fallibility as irreducible and 
robotics as infinitely improvable.  Adam K., for example, both recognizes the limitation of 
current instantiations of technology but articulates the dream of technical perfection realized:
Other threads, however, opened up onto different terrain.  For example, this thread from 
Digg (below) opens up important questions regarding robot ethics — to what extent can 
ethical behavior be engineered into the software and hardware of robots?  
This is a particularly difficult issue for surgical robots in particular, whose tasks involve 
performing a kind of violence on the patient-body, a controlled trauma, but nonetheless one 
that seemingly violates Isaac Asimov’s “First Law of Robotics:”   “A robot may not injure a 
human being, or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.”  This comment 
thread points to the difficult question of how one might program ethics into machines, as 
Asimov’s fictional set of foundational operating instructions encourage us to consider.3  But the 
question of machine ethics opens onto human ethics as well, such as the way in which ethical 
145
3 For a detailed discussion of Asimov’s “Three Rules” in relation to the problem of machine ethics, see Anderson 
(2008).
“first principles” still hold sway in medical ethics.  For example, a precept commonly taught in 
medical school is Primum non nocere (“First do no harm”).
Still other posts engaged the labor politics of automation.  On the one hand, the robot 
promises to do our dirty work.  As “Ian” quips:  
On the other hand, figured as the ultimate in “foreign labor,” the robot threatens to replace us.  
Advancements in surgical robotics will render surgeons unemployed, if not obsolete.  
Commentators “rbvdb” and “tekdemon” condense this anxiety in their exchange on Engadget:
Even further, some threads braid issues of subjectivity, consciousness, and accountability, and 
the instabilities that the becoming surgeon of the robot introduces into these relations.  
“Cheapside” asks what or who he becomes as an effect of uninvited surgical incursion, and who 
or what might be held responsible for the crime?  Finally, “P!” puts the question of displaced 
judgment and justice concisely:
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Through sometimes desperate hyperbole, insistent irony, and parodic allegory, the bloggers 
declare and domesticate the anxiety at the heart of robotic surgery and the becoming-surgeon 
of the robot.  They open additional questions and raise new, contested issues.  Just this short list 
of comments opens up onto new fields of practice with new ethical and political problematics 
and possibilities, including the labor politics of automation and of outsourcing, the complex legal 
and ethical issues of machine and systems accountability, not to mention the inverse question of 
our ethical responsibility toward sentient machines.  
However,  far too often the bloggers repeat and elaborate old narratives.  Many of the 
common threads work by positing a kind of exceptionalism to either the robot or the human, 
rehearsing a conventional antagonism that ignores the work of the interface I’ve tried to work 
both through and from throughout this dissertation.   The pull of this binary antagonism signals 
both the difficulty of keeping open the interface and the necessity to continue to strive to do 
so.  At stake is the ability of medical caregivers and patients—in other words, all of us—to 
engage with the implications of socio-technical change, which promises to only accelerate as 
more and more of human practice (both manual and cognitive) is augmented with 
computationally-intensive technologies.  We need to be asking new questions, forging new 
concepts, or we risk replaying the same old stories while technological change proliferates 
independent of our ability to make sense of it, even as it radically transforms our taken-for-
granted “common sense” about what it means to “care” for each other, in medical contexts and 
beyond.
* * * * 
Part II:  Care at the Interface
Taking Stock:  Focusing the Question
As I’ve worked through this dissertation, I have made several major observations and 
claims.  First, I have argued that the relationship between care and technology in medicine is a 
vexed one.  Care and technology are often thought in terms of an opposition:  care is what 
humanizes medicine, puts a "human touch" on the alienating, dehumanizing effects of its 
creeping techno-rationality.  And yet, paradoxically, in formations of contemporary biomedicine 
the receipt of “quality medical care” is often seen as synonymous with access and acquiescence 
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to these very same technologies, as physicians and patients alike engage in the dogged pursuit 
of the best techniques of cure.  Viewed in terms of an opposition, the politics of care seemingly 
hinges upon keeping open the possibility of human relationality in the face of the rationalized 
technical cure.  The politics of care in this view thus consists of fending off the technical, and 
defending the human from the encroachment of technology.  And yet it seems fair to posit that 
medicine will continue to be shaped by emergent technologies, and that these will 
fundamentally alter (in contemporary terms), what it means to care, and, more fundamentally, 
what it means to be human, to establish relationships defined by “human touch.”  Not only is it 
unreasonable to imagine a future medicine somehow purified of the technical 
instrumentalization of the human body, it’s equally nostalgic to posit a coherency to “the 
human” outside of a technological relation.  Consequently, I posed in this dissertation a different 
question:  What might it mean to think at the interface of care and technology, to consider the 
technicity of care?   
I have argued that to begin to answer that question in a useful way requires focus—
understanding the specificities of particular human-machine interfaces where care takes place.  
Technological relations, like relations of care, should not be engaged in the abstract.  
Consequently, this dissertation is largely a case study based on Intuitive Surgical’s da Vinci® 
Surgical System.  I chose this surgeon-robot interface because it dramatizes and focuses the 
oppositional nature of care and technology outlined above.  As a device that telemediates the 
surgeon’s embodied relation with the patient, it operationalizes the delivery of surgical care 
through technical means, severing direct contact with the patient and offering instead its 
interfaced “information equivalent.”  In retrospect, I pursued the media specificity of the dVSS a 
bit further than I had anticipated, but by tracing the specificity of the dVSS into the complex 
logics of its command and control systems, my analysis opened up the productivity of error.  In 
contemporary surgical medicine, error is seen as something to be eliminated from both 
technical apparatuses and systems of care.  And yet attention to the media specificity of the 
dVSS and its computational systems illustrates how error figures foundationally in the complex 
feedback loops by which the dVSS platform generates haptics, the sense of embodied tactility in 
relation to the patient’s body.  In other words, error and failure seem as central to the “nature” 
of robots as it does to “human nature.”  If “to err is human,” at the contemporary moment, to 
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err is also robotic.  Furthermore, while not care per se, I have argued that haptics are a 
necessary condition of possibility for caring touch at the robo-surgical interface.  What effect on 
our ability to rethink care in the context of cure might obtain if error and fallibility are 
considered constituent of both human and machine?  
Having just considered the media specificity of the technicity of care at the interface, the 
third chapter of this dissertation focused and further specified the concept “interface.”  I 
engaged the history of the term interface, and thematized it around certain key issues like 
authority and autonomy, as well as communication and its failure.  A focus on the term’s 
deployment in computational contexts yielded figurations of the interface as porous skin and as 
the exposure of methods or means that constitute computation’s mediality.  I then returned to 
the dVSS platform’s interfacing of human and robot through Waldby’s optic of biotechnogenesis.  
Waldby’s analytic, I contend, allows us to understand the “becoming-robot of the surgeon” as 
the poeisis of new human/technology interfaces.  This ongoing creative process puts the stability 
of the categories human and machine at risk and out of sync, but does so with the promise of 
opening up the future to unforeseen possibilities for embodiment.  I then began the work of 
mapping a “modest cartography of the present,” engaging specifically with the different futures 
that the becoming-robot of the surgeon might be opening up.  The becoming-robot of the 
surgeon raises the promise and the nightmare of the automatic:  the virtuosity of the machinic 
and the alienation of the automaton.  The “problem of error” in medicine mobilizes both of 
these senses of the automatic and yet I suggest again that fallibility — of both human and 
machine — cannot be overcome.  I conclude by returning yet again to an interface, the da 
Vinci® research interface and how it, too, participates in the biotechnogenesis of uncertain 
objects.  These objects raise issues such as the “ownership” of gesture, the proliferation of new 
taxonomies of surgical skill and error (even at the microlevel of the myo-electric signatures 
produced by moving the human hand), and finally the potential “reversibility” of the surgical 
record, a playback that might signal the autonomous “becoming-surgeon of the robot.”  
The Craft of Care
What difference does this dissertation make, specifically for care?  First, my case study 
focuses and sharpens the question of the technicity of care and advocates for exploring the 
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new modes of comportment that thinking about care with and through technology makes 
possible.  I opened this dissertation in the operating rooms at University Hospital, a site of 
surgical pedagogy.  There, I argued, teaching surgical technique depends upon a complex 
interplay of visuality and performativity, a particularly tight circuit of vision, performance-as-
doing, and re-performance-as-display.  Surgeons refer to this pedagogical mode as “See one, do 
one, teach one.”  A consideration of the technicity of care affects several dynamics in the 
teaching OR.  For example, it challenges the assumption that partitions “softer” considerations 
of care from the seemingly instrumental application of technique (particularly techniques of 
cure).  Conceptions of care often play into the human-technology/care-cure division that my 
dissertation critiques.  For example, in his essay, “A History of Caring in Medicine,” physician-
scholar Joel Howell (2001) suggests that “care implies caring—listening, understanding, empathy, 
compassion, counseling, and providing emotional support” (77).4  From this perspective, care 
represents all the activities that humans can do and machines (currently, at least) can’t.  And 
when doctors and surgeons fail to be caring, they’re often criticized as “acting like a machine.”  
What my analysis presents, I believe, is a challenge for medical curriculums to interrogate the 
care/cure distinction, to understand how an attention to care can permeate even the teaching 
of the most mundane procedure or the most high-tech surgical maneuver.  This is not a claim 
that “machines can care, too” but rather that care is nonetheless operative in and through our 
relations with technology.  My hope is that this dissertation spurs more reflection on what 
forms care takes in its techno-mediated modalities.  In part, in the context of the OR one can 
understand care at the surgeon-patient interface to center around the cultivation of a sense of 
craftsmanship.  Like other craftsmen, surgeons often see the encroachment of technological 
“assistance” to their work as somehow diminishing of their craftsmanship (even though their 
work has always already been permeated with tools).  However, theorizing care’s technicity 
suggests that that robotic surgery involves no simple abandonment of craftsmanship, that it is 
instead continuous with a long tradition of taking care in one’s technical work, a careful 
attention and tactile engagement with precious materiality (the tools, the vulnerable flesh of the 
patient, etc) and, yes, a love of its variability and nuance.  Additionally, my own ethnographic 
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4 I would reference here as well Sandelowski’s (2000) explication of the tension between “true” and “technical” 
nursing and the increased friction that technology places on that tension.  Clearly, the care/cure dichotomy 
connects in significant ways to gendered divisions of labor in medicine, as well as the economic and power 
relations among different medical professions. 
research and interviews with surgeons at University Hospital suggest that they know that the 
dVSS is transforming their experienced relation with patients on the operating table (although 
they struggle to articulate exactly how) and yet they consistently characterize the dVSS as “just 
another tool.”  As I’ve argued, this reductionism to “mere” instrument elides the affectivity of 
technology in intimate medical contexts and closes down on engagement with the 
particularities — the problems and possibilities — that new technologies inaugurate.  
Hopefully, my analysis provides contemporary surgeons with a means to articulate how their 
relationship with their patients and with their own embodied craft knowledge might be 
changing, and with what valence.  This fluency seems all the more urgent at the contemporary 
moment, as politicians, corporations, medical professionals and patients alike grapple with 
imagining new health care systems that overcome the excessive costs and structural inequities 
of the current system.  Understanding how, why and in what way technicity modulates care will 
be vitally important as proponents of new health care systems attempt to strike a balance 
between curbing the expenses associated with contemporary technomedicine while at the 
same time broadening access to the best techniques of care and cure.  It is my contention that 
limits and possibilities of caring technicity should help shape struggles over the ownership and 
management of medical craft.  
Second, and more broadly, I believe my study opens up the question of care to different 
disciplines, putting pedagogy, craft and discipline at the core of our understandings of care.  My 
own approach to the dVSS as case study has attempted to weave together media studies and 
visual studies, cultural studies and computer science to understand the contexts of care in 
contemporary medicine.  One might argue that my analysis of the command and control 
architecture of the dVSS’ haptics takes me beyond the proper domain of the humanities (or the 
equally plausible critique that as a humanist, I’m a poorly-equipped interlocutor in the disciplines 
of AI and robotics).  However, I argue that the humanities, as the study of what it means to be 
human, must extend into territories previously left to scientists, technicians, computer scientists 
and engineers, for the future articulations of human and machine are going to stretch our 
capacities—our disciplinary tools and techniques—to make sense of humanity’s possible 
futures.  In a more modest vein, while I’m not certain that my work will cathect such readers, 
implicit in my engagement with the dVSS haptic systems is a hope that robotics engineers might 
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pursue research agendas that intentionally seek to amplify the conditions of possibility for 
technologically-mediate care.  I’ve suggested that the productivity of error and haptics might be 
crucial to such an agenda.   What might it mean to build new medical and surgical instruments 
with an eye toward not only technical efficiency and patient safety, but toward enhancing the 
capacities for care, for human relationality with and through technology?
Finally, I see this dissertation as contributing to debates about the relation of making and 
craftsmanship more broadly to what it means to be human, and to humans’ ethical and 
community orientations and obligations to each other and to the environments in which we 
live.  This is manifested in Anne Balsamo’s research on the growing importance of “tinkering” in 
the digital age (e.g. the DIY cultural movement with its emphasis on “thinkering”) as well as 
Richard Sennett’s recent calls for a reinvigoration of craftsmanship as a mode of citizenship 
(Balsamo, 2009; Sennett, 2008).   I recently participated in a workshop on the future of the 
humanities and had the opportunity for extended conversation with the Executive Director of 
the Penland School of Crafts, Jean McLaughlin.  I’ve long known about Penland; my wife in fact 
participated in a two week ceramics course at Penland early on in my graduate school years.  
Located in the Blue Ridge Mountains of North Carolina, the School has been characterized as a 
“sanctuary for the hand,” and as such, has historically pursued a rigorously anti-modern ideology 
in relation to technology.  Not all technology, of course, for crafts as diverse as woodworking 
and ceramics and bookmaking all rely on technology.  But in keeping with its craft orientation, 
Penland has not only eschewed technologies of automation and mass production, but also 
media and communication technologies in particular.  Opportunities for tele- and 
computationally mediated experience are seen as, if not antithetical, at least counterproductive 
to its commitment to engagement, immersion and retreat.  However, Penland has recently 
begun to develop its computational and telecommunications resources.  The School now has 
wireless internet, and many of the studios are equipped with computers to allow students easy 
access to online exhibitions of other artists work for inspiration.  The transformation of 
photography from a chemical to a digital medium is also propelling Penland to consider the 
utility of digital labs.  What struck me in these conversations were the parallels between the 
craft workshop and the OR, and the sense that telemediation necessarily alienates the hand 
from the material.  McLaughlin’s contributions to the workshop proposed a fundamental 
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relationship between embodied making and human being, and the need for the humanities to 
connect theory and practice.  In a context seemingly vastly different from the high-tech world 
of contemporary surgical medicine, I find the flip side of robotic-surgical technique in Penland’s 
passionate preserve of a “traditional” hand-tool-material relation:  both craft practices fetishize 
the hand-tool relation, even as they pursue divergent investments in a technologized future.  A 
future research project might explore how each context opens up the other, particularly in 
relation to key issues like the politics of touch and its mediation, and the relationship of craft 
and craftsmanship to care and connectivity.
Unfolding Care at the Interface
What, then, is care at the interface?   From the point of the view of biotechnogenesis, the 
“essence” of care is co-produced and unfolding.  Care thus becomes a reality-effect of its 
performance.  It is the image of the practices that precede it.  In robot-assisted surgery, those 
practices are themselves proceduralized within a computational framework that positions the 
surgeon or “wetware” and the machine or “hardware” in a necessarily interdependent relation.  
The Object Oriented Programming paradigm accentuates the mode proper of the interface as 
an exposure or “bringing forth.”  Fundamentally that “bringing forth” puts the human and the 
technical into and out of phase with each other in very concrete ways:  the triangular tension 
among the nature of the human, the nature of the technical, and the porous boundary between 
them sends care into a performative or auto-poetic mode.  Following Waldby, this mode makes 
care a form of production that doesn’t appeal to something outside the interface.  It is not 
humanistically referential.  Care is immanent to the processes of biotechnogenesis.  In a way, it is 
automatic or partakes of automaticity.  And yet it is not “boxed in” either.  Waldby and others 
would suggest that to try to answer this question in any kind of final way would be antithetical 
to the provisionality of the bio-tech interface.  Instead, I would rephrase the question: what 
might it mean to question care ontogenetically; that is, to consider care as a question of 
becoming, of how it comes to be (rather than as an ontological question of what care is)? In a 
sense, the ontological question is also the wrong frame given the embeddedness of error or 
fallibility in the machinic.  “Care” necessarily falls back into the dynamic of failure I articulated at 
the end of chapter 3.  The question “what is care?” requires one to answer it or to fail, as 
opposed to attending to the systemic productivity of ubiquitous failure and its emergence in 
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multiple, various, additional interfaces.  In this latter sense, care emerges in post-humanist 
collaborative relation, of which the surgeon-robot assemblage is but one particular instance.  
Rather than a nostalgia for stability, the vision of care that threads its way through this 
dissertation leads to an expectation of a certain agonism at that relational interface, where 
increasing mediations and prosthetic extensions of care don’t “sync” with our given notions of 
what it means to take care but are—nonetheless—relations in and through which we must 
learn to live and love.
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